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The literature on transitional justice and international human rights norms has been 
useful for explaining norm internalization for transitioning states. And yet, the literature 
could not account for the variations to state behavior after norms were implemented via 
domestic transitional justice policies of truth-seeking, prosecutions, and reparations. Why 
have states where great efforts were put into confronting an ugly past relapsed in their 
behavior? This research fills this lacuna be examining the period after states institute 
transitional justice policies to determine how states have varied in respecting norms. 
Taking the case of Peru, Uruguay, and South Korea that have advanced to adopt norms and 
enact transitional justice policies, this study overviews the status of international norms of 
human rights. The findings demonstrate the positive influence that transnational advocacy 
networks have in pushing the state to better its compliance with adopted norms. And 
additionally, this research points to the continuing impact former regime personnel and 
domestic political interests have over that of human rights norms. Ultimately, the questions 
that animate this study relate to broader theoretical debates over the influence of 
international norms for states and how transitional justice and international politics figures 









“Soy inocente.” (I am innocent) This was the catchphrase of former Peruvian 
president Alberto Fujimori, whose trial of human rights abuses began with his extradition 
from Chile in 2007. On April 8, 2009, Peru’s Supreme Court convicted Fujimori of 
murder, aggravated kidnapping and battery, and crimes against humanity and sentenced 
him to 25 years in prison. The prosecution was considered a heralding moment for the 
progress of norms of accountability and represented the expansion of transitional justice 
policies in Peru, from truth-seeking (2000-2003) and reparations (2005), which now 
included criminal accountability (2009). However only a year after the trial, obstacles to 
justice emerged. Discussions of Fujimori’s amnesty began, other human rights cases 
faced administrative difficulties, and individuals accused of human rights crimes were 
elected into public office, including the presidency. Why did a state that prosecuted a 
head of state, launched truth-seeking, and issued reparations for victims of human rights 
lag in its efforts to follow-up in complying with human rights norms? What factors 
contributed to this situation? 




(Dube 2011, 181) and increase the likelihood of better human rights practices (Sikkink 
and Kim 2013, 280), as seen with Peru, have not always held true. This study examines 
why states vary in their compliance by tracing the political dynamics after states 
implement human rights norms via domestic policies of transitional justice, from an 
extended framework of the spiral model of human rights (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Risse 
and Ropp 2013). Human rights norms are “social and legal standards that specify how 
moral beliefs rooted in Western liberal conception of universal human dignity, as 
articulated in the UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, should direct 
behavior” (Clark 2001, 11). The spiral model provides a useful framework for 
understanding how international human rights norms evolve, considering the interactions 
between international and domestic spheres. Through a five-stage process of norm 
adoption, the model determines at which point norms begin to guide states’ behavior, 
establishing for instance transitional justice policies that demonstrate compatibility with 
norms of accountability, as “responses to confront wrongdoings of repressive predecessor 
regimes” (Teitel 2000, 69).  
However, the spiral model and existing literature on transitional justice leave out 
the story of what happens after norms get implemented in domestic policy. The implicit 
expectation of states compliance with accepted human rights norms, assumes a level of 
continuity of state behavior consistent with the respect for norms. Therefore, state 
behavior that deviates from compliance challenges these theoretical expectations.  
My study focuses on the deviations from compliance with norms and proposes a 
theoretical extension, built from the process tracing based norms literature and policy 
driven perspective of transitional justice that traces norm developments and compliance 
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through policies of truth-seeking, reparations, and prosecutions. Applying these 
perspectives to a comparative study of states from Latin America and East Asia, namely 
Peru, Uruguay, and South Korea, that accepted and implemented norms, but varied in 
behavior after transitional justice policies, the current study contributes to better 
understanding the relationship of norm influence on states and why states change in 
compliance after norm adoption. Additionally, this new approach that examines political 
processes after norm acceptance discloses theoretical discussions regarding social 
structures of norms versus interest calculations that guide state behavior. 
 
1.2 Development of International Human Rights Norms 
The changes to the international system following the end of the Second World 
War brought the expansion of human rights norms. The Nuremburg War Crime Trials 
(1945-1946) established the foundations for modern justice on human rights by holding 
leaders of major states accountable for “crimes against peace and against humanity” 
(Overy 2003, 1-2). Following Nuremburg, human rights rose to the center of politics with 
the establishment of legal instruments to enforce human rights norms.1 Subsequently, the 
literature in international relations on human rights also took a turn, examining the 
proliferation of norms via newly established international legal obligations and its effects 
on state behavior.  
                                                          
1 The seven core international human rights treaties include: the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Brysk and Jimenez 2012, 5). 
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Since the 1980s scholarly interest shifted more towards examining transitions of 
repressive regimes from committing human rights abuses to respecting human rights 
norms (Dube 2011, 177). On the question of norms, scholars began theorizing about the 
construction, emergence, and dynamics of change of human rights norms. Constructivist 
literature focused on “persuasion and socialization as key factors in the process” of norm 
building, norm change, and reconstruction of existing norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998; Nadelmann 1990; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Risse and Ropp 2013). Finnemore and 
Sikkink theorized a model of norm life cycle in three stages, starting from emergence, 
cascade, and leading up to internalization (1998). Throughout the cycle, norm 
entrepreneurs were important in using framing and persuasion to convince “a critical 
mass of the state… to embrace new norms” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895). 
Two theoretical debates emerged on the idea of norm change and internalization, 
namely the rationalist logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness. The 
rationalist approach argued that norm conforming state behavior was “based on 
calculations of material and ideational interests” (Krasner 1999, 30) and state leaders 
gave in to normative changes if the “combination of incentives” (De Nevers 2007, 56) 
outweighed the costs. Transitional justice norms were viewed in a similar way, as norms 
adopted by states through policies of prosecution, truth-seeking, and reparations for 
strategic purposes of consolidating peace in democratic transition (Lincoln 2011). 
Decisions to implement norms of accountability and “address the past” depended on 
calculations of power balances between the incoming democratic regime and the former 
enemies during transition (Kovras 2014, 6). Thus, states adopted accountability only 
when it served the purposes of the government in power.  
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Reasoning based on the logic of appropriateness approached norms differently. 
Even in cases where states ratified human rights agreements to avoid criticism from the 
international community against a state’s repressive policies, Simmons (2009) argued 
that such behavior in the long run influenced states in changing their behavior with 
respect to norms. States complied with norms because they understood them to be 
appropriate (Finnemore 1996, 28-29) and adequate (March and Olsen 2009, 3) not 
because of utility calculations. Such perspectives brought discussions on norms to a 
“social and ideational conception” (Finnemore 1996, 6), focusing on the “ideational 
content” of norms (Ben-Josef Hirsch 2013, 4).  
The theoretical debates on norms extended the focus of norms literature inwards 
to also consider the interactions between the domestic and international spheres. The two 
level dynamic accompanied the spread of international norms and its application through 
domestic policies. Some scholars worked to identify the mechanisms and actors involved 
in the processes of international norm adoption and diffusion. They drew on the 
importance of transnational networks, local agents, and nongovernmental organizations 
in the development of mechanisms of truth, justice, norm diffusion, and reconciliation 
(Sikkink 2011; Kim 2012; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Hayner 2001; Clark 2001). 
Others examined the structural elements of domestic institutions in the processes of norm 
change for states. Norms were intrinsically linked to “domestic structures and domestic 
norms” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 893). Depending on the type of state structure, 
acceptance and compliance with norms varied (Cortell and Davis 2000, 66). For instance, 
variation could be seen in the case of transitional justice policies (e.g., truth commissions) 
that developed out of the cascade of international norms of justice and legal 
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accountability (Lutz and Sikkink 2001).2 Whereas some states addressed past abuses 
immediately after regime transition through the “invention” of truth commissions (Olsen, 
Payne, and Reiter 2001, 559), others took much longer in responding to past crimes. The 
differences were linked to states’ democratic consolidation.  
The approach of human rights norms from the domestic level gave way to studies 
examining transitional justice policies of prosecutions, truth commissions, and 
reparations. Roht-Arriaza and Popkin discussed the success of truth commissions in Latin 
America, evaluating the extent to which commissions provided victims a platform to tell 
their stories, “obtain some form of redress” and access a “measure of accountability” 
(1995, 262).  Hayner measured the influence of twenty-one different truth and 
reconciliation commissions (TRC) (Hayner 2001), comparing their effectiveness to that 
of other policies such as prosecutions, reparations, and legislative changes. Ben-Josef 
Hirsch, MacKenzie, and Sesay’s work also focused on truth-commissions, but with an 
emphasis on the need to reexamine the measurement of TRCs’ “global success” (2012).  
Other scholars drew on the importance of domestic trials, as central components 
to transitional accountability. Sikkink and Kim (2013) explored the effects of prosecution 
on levels of state repression, concluding that they lead to better human rights practices for 
states. Roht-Arriaza (2005) theorized the influence of high-profile trials on regional 
advancements of transitional justice. In a few cases, scholars also examined state policies 
                                                          
2 Other scholars have argued that the internationalization of truth commissions was not only limited to the 
influences from the justice cascade and domestic state developments but were also related to the debates 
that took place after the establishment of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission about 
“why, when, and for whom a TRC would be desirable” (Ben-Joseph Hirsch 2013, 3). From this point 
onwards they argue that the norm of truth and reconciliation commissions shifted internationally from 
being considered the “weaker alternative” to other transitional justice policies and more as a 
complementary and equal tool to that of prosecutions (Ben-Joseph Hirsch 2013, 3). 
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and the accountability norm together. For example, Bassin and Van Zyl’s study on Sierra 
Leone argued for the necessity to have both criminal prosecutions and TRC to address the 
“causes and consequences of mass atrocity” (2009, 252).  
However, thus far, studies that assess all the different types of transitional justice 
processes have yet to be explored. As states have multifaceted obligations for addressing 
accountability for past abuses (Méndez 1997), it is essential not only to consider one or 
two specific policies that reflect norms of truth or justice, but to examine truth-seeking, 
reparations, and prosecutions together as complementary policies for states. Taking a step 
further, surveying the extent to which these policies have been consistently carried out in 
states reveals yet another new dimension of scholarship.  
 
1.3 Theoretical Rationale: Converging Frameworks 
My study brings together a modeling framework of international human rights 
norms and other works from transitional justice to examine norm effectiveness in the 
periods of transitional and post-transitional justice. The spiral model (Risse and Sikkink 
1999; Risse and Ropp 2013) is useful in tracing processes of norms adoption and 
exploring conditions (independent variables) that trigger change in state behavior 
(dependent variable).  
The model traces the developments at five critical junctures. During the first 
phase, leaders of authoritarian regimes engage in repression. In response to state 
violence, transnational advocacy groups mobilize international pressure and shame the 
state. States respond with tactical concessions to divert attention from the international 
community. The model suggests that over time normative pressures from the 
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international level (transnational networks) increase in power, bring transitions from 
authoritarian to democratic governments, and open room for states to modify their laws 
and establish institutions to monitor human rights. At the final stage, states engage in 
behavioral change, implement norms, and comply with normative rules (Risse and 
Sikkink 1999, 20-32; Risse and Ropp 2013, 6-9).  
The norm of individual criminal accountability becomes central during the last 
phase of the model when states start behaving more in compliance with norms. The norm 
considers all citizens equal and “liable under the same law” (Grodsky 2009, 820). 
Accountability is channeled through transitional justice policies, in the form of 
prosecution of human rights criminals. The trial of high level state officials could 
arguably be seen as a symbolic event that would connote implementation of norms of 
accountability in the domestic legal system. Prosecution also satisfies victims’ demands 
and “clears the way for otherwise unattainable victim compensation” (Landsman 1996, 
82). Despite the convergence of the last phase with transitional justice policies, as seen 
with the norm of accountability and prosecutions, the spiral model does not specifically 
envision the importance of transitional justice policies within its theoretical framework. 
Transitional justice norms are considered as part of the general set of norms that are 
accepted and implemented in the model.  
Other questions of the spiral model’s framing concentrated on the processes prior 
to the final phase where transitional justice policies emerged as a central component. For 
instance, questions referred to the “little attention to cases without the visible role of 
transnational advocacy networks,” hinting at the possibility that the model picked cases 
which supported its claims (Suh 2012, 44). Jetschke and Liese also raised concerns of 
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model specifications, pointing to the small number of states that “transgressed” with a 
previous record of gross human rights violations through “stages four and five” (2013, 
28).  
While both the spiral model and transitional justice policies address similar 
grounds of norms of accountability, the former focused more on how the norm reached 
the state, whereas the latter centered on domestic practices of the norm. However, that is 
not to disregard some transitional justice scholars that recognized the importance of 
international actors. For instance, Suh (2012) and Subotic (2012) acknowledge the 
importance of international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch in pressuring human rights issues which lead to domestic 
political transition. Olsen, Payne, and Reiter assess the importance of regional players 
such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in bringing normative changes to the 
state (i.e. justice cascade) (2011, 560). Nonetheless, broad theoretical explorations that 
connect theories of international relations and norms (in this case the spiral model) with 
transitional justice remain underdeveloped.  
Transitional justice necessitates an exploration at the international level. The 
spiral model provides the necessary international and domestic connections that 
complements the literature on transitional justice policies. Therefore, scholarship on the 
post-norm adoption period is a step toward the future of both transitional justice and 
norms studies. Existing research has not accounted for the aftermath of norm adoption 
and why states vary in their behavior of compliance.  
I propose an updated model and theory of norm internalization with a broader 
time horizon. This approach probes the deeper question of how the relationship between 
10 
 
two variables (such as norms and compliance) came into existence (Heström and 
Swedberg 1998, 7) and why it varied. Additionally, it lays out the theoretical grounds for 
explaining the disparity between models and real-world observations. In doing so, my 
study addresses a deeper problem of how the relationship between norms and compliant 
state behavior changed and what factors conditioned these developments.  
 
1.4 Research Design 
 States vary in their experiences of norm adoption and application of transitional 
justice policies. My interest lies in examining cases of states that adopted human rights 
norms and put them to use domestically, via legislative changes that include transitional 
justice policies. While some states continued their compliance with norms of 
accountability by consistently prosecuting human rights violators, others failed to follow 
up on their normative obligations. Such behavior deviates greatly from theoretical 
propositions on norms acceptance and implementation which expects states to sustain 
respect for norms.  
In order to assess and understand these differences, it is important to trace 
political dynamics. I follow Coleman’s framework (1986) on social action. Coleman’s 
macro-micro-macro model argues that instead of leaving the analysis at the macro level, 
it is more relevant to consider how macro-level conditions affect the individual, to what 
extent the individual changes as a result of macro events, and at the end how individuals 
at the micro-level generate macro outcomes. Conceptualizing my research along these 
terms, macro-level phenomena are the processes of international norm adoption by states 
as explained in the spiral model. Specifically, I seek to understand the link between 
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human rights norms and states’ consenting behavior. I want to analyze why states behave 
differently towards compliance after norm adoption and initial implementation of 
transitional justice policies.  
I first take a micro-level approach to trace the political developments that led to 
states’ varying behavior in the period after states accepted norms and were well into the 
final stage of the model. To do so, I categorize transitional justice policies, which 
generally are expected to emerge towards the latter part of norm acceptance, as the 
starting point when states reach the final phase of the model. For this study, I examine 
policies of prosecutions of human rights criminals, truth-commissions, and reparations 
for victims. 
 
Figure 1.1 Spiral Model and Transitional Justice Compliance 
I define and measure states’ compliance with the three policies, according to the 
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report, and distribution of reparations. I use archival information from international 
advocacy groups, domestic non-governmental organizations (NGO), national human 
rights institutions, and research institutes, along with interviews from prominent human 
rights practitioners that provides both quantitative and qualitative data on the status of 
norms. First, compliance with norms of accountability is assessed through the number of 
acquittals and convictions of human rights cases that continued after the emblematic trial 
of human rights criminals (i.e. heads of state). Presidential pardons or amnesties of 
human rights criminals after conviction, including the existence of amnesty laws, are 
considered as measures that demonstrate non-norm compliance. Second, compliance with 
reparations is based on states’ record of distributing financial, medical, and symbolic 
reparations. These include monetary compensations, follow-up medical visits, monument 
building, official state apologies, and designation of commemorative dates. Third, 
compliance with truth-seeking is measured through the follow-up with recommendations 
from truth commissions, which also include reparations policies and prosecutions of 
criminals.3   
After assessing states compliance with transitional justice policies, in addition to 
other relevant international norms that have been adopted and implemented (e.g., norm of 
right to life), then I proceed with identifying variables that condition states’ and in doing 
so explain the reasoning for the differences. I consider the variables from the spiral model 
that were most influential in bringing states to advance in accepting international norms 
                                                          
3 These measures follow the definition of Van Zyl (2011, 49) on transitional justice measures as 
constitutive of: follow-up to truth and reconciliation commission recommendations and reparations to 
victims-an obligation under international law for victims of gross violations. 
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and implementing them domestically, to examine how the role of these variables even in 
the post-norm adoption period may play a role in influencing states behavior.  
The two variables include the role of transnational advocacy networks and the 
status of the rule of law. By transnational advocacy, I refer to the types of “organization 
characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and 
exchange” in the form of international advocacy, inter-governmental organizations, and 
domestic human rights groups dedicated to promote human rights norms (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998, 3). Transnational advocacy also includes liberal democratic states. The 
network of transnational advocates serves a central role in the spiral model, as the driving 
force that helps states transition from a non-norm complying state to one that behaves 
consistently with norms. I argue that the role of transnational advocacy networks, 
continues to have a positive influence in preventing states non-compliance in the period 
after transitional justice policy implementation.  
 Rule of law is a precondition for “sustained human rights change and for 
habitualization practices” of the spiral model (Risse and Ropp 1999, 277) especially 
during the latter phases when norms are adopted and transitional justice policies, are 
implemented. The belief in the judiciary as an important factor in confronting human 
rights abuse is also put forth by international human rights lawyers. From their legalistic 
tradition they view the judiciary’s proper function as the “best mechanism for protecting 
human rights” (Yasuaki 2010, 376). Other studies carry this idea further by suggesting 
that independent judiciaries guarantee better access to fair trials (Simmons 2009). 
Domestic “legal and institutional mechanisms” that are able to “independently” check 
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state policies are important for human right to eventually gain sufficient “domestic 
traction to change rights practices overall” (Simmons 2013, 45). 
Traditionally judicial institutions were used by human rights offenders as 
instruments of power (de Greiff 2012, 46). Hence, when the judicial branch engages in 
reforms that establish its institutional independence free from the other branches of 
government, it creates a sense of civic trust. Also, it helps advance the administration of 
justice in prosecutions of human rights criminals (regardless of political position) and 
reparations programs. The improved quality of the rule of law can ultimately contribute 
to the success of transitional justice policies.   
Following these comparisons, I also identify other conditioning factors that have 
not been explored by the spiral model, but that have been referred to in the literature on 
transitional justice. These include the type of former regime elements which are 
associated with the process of democratic transition. Transition refers to whether or not a 
state underwent a negotiated change between the outgoing regime and the incoming 
government or a ruptured break from a repressor regime to a new government (Linz and 
Stepan 1996). Such factors have yet to be considered in the scholarship. This variable is 
particularly relevant for the case studies, as there may be a correlative relationship 
between the type of transition and compliance record with norms. For instance, the 
assumption may be that a negotiated transition, that sustains a level of former regime 
personnel presence, may lead to a negative compliance record with norms. I find this to 
be true in the cases of Uruguay and Korea, which both experience negotiated transitions 
but also for Peru that despite the ruptured break with the past still continued to manifest 
former regime power. In all three cases, former regime presence had a negative impact on 
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norm compliance. The results and observations of these variables are then extended back 
to the macro-level relationship between international norms and states.  
What emerges from the macro-micro analysis is the need to expand the reach of 
the spiral model and norms literature to also cover the post-norm adoption period. 
Moreover, the findings signal the importance of reconsidering how existing views of 
norms and state relationship ought to be conceptualized. For instance, variables such as 
former regime elements considered to be obsolete in the spiral model as the state 
advanced into the final phase, surface as an important determinant in states’ norm 
compliance for Uruguay, South Korea, and Peru.  
Within the frame of macro-micro-macro analysis, I use a comparative case study 
that provides a “detailed exploration of hypothesized causal mechanisms” (Jetschke and 
Liese 2013, 28). This approach allows me to explore in detail transitional justice phases 
and what followed after and the conditions that limited or helped in the continued norm 
respect for states. Comparative case studies include states in which international human 
right norms and transitional justice policies experienced various degrees of compliance. I 
consider three states with serious human rights pasts from two regions, East Asia (South 
Korea) and Latin America (Uruguay and Peru), whose norm adoption and progression 
can be contextualized in the spiral model of human rights. Peru, Uruguay, and South 
Korea are historically, politically, and socially distinct. However, they share the 
experience of human rights violations in a repressive state and challenges to early 
advocacy work, the influences of local and international advocacy groups in human rights 





 Compared to the emblematic cases of human rights violations and human rights 
improvements in Latin America (i.e. Chile and Argentina) and East Asia (i.e. China), 
South Korea, Uruguay, and Peru have been understudied. In particular, East Asia as a 
region has received little attention in the study of human rights and transitional justice. 
Only “five percent” of transitional justice research published in recent years is related to 
the Asia-Pacific region (Jeffrey and Kim 2014, 2). Partly, this is due to the slow rate of 
accountability the region has experienced. As Sikkink explains, Asian countries ratified 
the Rome Statute at a “lower rate” (Sikkink 2011, 249). The Statute affirmed the 
independent and complementary jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Bellelli 
2010, 17) adding a layer of accountability on states’ human rights practices. Hence, the 
reluctance of states to accept the Statute postponed the impact of human rights norms in 
the region. For this reason, states such as China continued to challenge human rights 
claiming interpretation of “human rights with Chinese characteristics” (Kinzelbach 2013, 
166). 
Amidst these developments in Asia, South Korea stands out for its record of 
respecting human rights. Korea adopted norms of accountability and established one of 
the most extensive systems of truth-seeking in the region. With an estimated ten truth 
commissions, the reach of the commissions extended to examining past abuses of 
dictatorships, Japanese colonial rule, and even violations that occurred during the Korean 
War (1950-1951). Korea also advanced in implementing norms of accountability by 
holding two heads of state accountable for murder related to the 1979 coup d’état and the 
May 1980 Kwangju Massacre (Katsiaficas 2012, 364). Moreover, it became the state 
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where the Asian Human Rights Charter was declared that called for the observance of 
principles from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Lee 2005, 41). These 
involvements separate Korea from lagging regional human rights development. In doing 
so, it adds more importance to the analysis of Korea as the leading state in human rights 
norms adoption and implementation, which provides an insight for other states in the 
region following a similar trajectory of political change.   
In contrast, Latin America has been the forerunner in transitional justice, with 
truth seeking, justice, and international and regional human rights norm advancement. It 
has the most developed human rights system, beginning with the 1938 Declaration in 
Defense of Human Rights that passed resolutions even on “women’s rights” (Cleary 
2007, 7). Latin America also “accounts for 55 percent of all domestic human rights 
prosecutions,” (Popovski and Serrano 2012, 10) and enjoyed a “shift in norms about 
transitional justice” (Sikkink 2011, 160). Rather than focus on cases that have been 
extensively examined (e.g., Chile), this study considers two states that have received less 
attention.  
Uruguay was one of the first states in the region to ratify the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its First Optional Protocol in 1970. 
Uruguay’s decision to ratify the ICCPR was the “logical outgrowth of Uruguay’s long 
tradition of support for multilateral human rights efforts and its domestic support for the 
rule of law” (Lutz and Sikkink 2000, 642). Roughly five years later, Uruguay transitioned 
from one of the oldest democracies in the region, referred to as the “Sweden of the 
South” (SERPAJ 1992, xviii), to a national security state. The military was involved in 
the political system with an objective to “transform the country’s political and economic 
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institutions” (Mares 2011, 387) and institutionalized human rights violations. During this 
period, Uruguay faced a heightened level of incarceration rate, with “one in six 
Uruguayans” being imprisoned (Mares 2011, 399).  
Uruguay encountered yet another change nearly three decades later by 
prosecuting two former heads of state for human rights violations. Such processes took 
place amidst Uruguay’s record as the only country in the world that “twice 
democratically approved an amnesty law designed to shield the military from criminal 
prosecution for violations” (Skaar 2011, 137). Assessing the status of norm compliance 
for a state that experienced significant political and also normative changes to human 
rights makes Uruguay an interesting case of comparison with Peru and Korea.   
The last case is Peru. The armed conflict in Peru lasted from 1980 to 2000, during 
which both terrorist groups and the state were responsible for the deaths of 69,280 
persons. The abrupt transition to democracy in 2000 ushered in a series of human rights 
changes with the adoption of norms of truth-seeking, accountability, and reparations. As 
a result, comparatively with South Korea and Uruguay, Peru established the earliest truth 
commission following democratic transition. Moreover, while Peru was not the first state 
in the region to prosecute a former head of state for human rights crimes, it was the first 
to try a democratically elected leader. The trial represents an example of the “broader 
trend in the region favoring retributive justice for cases of grave violation of human 
rights” (Burt 2012, 120-21). Furthermore, as noted by Sikkink, Peru has one of the most 
developed reparations programs in the region. Despite advances in human rights 
however, Peru recently demonstrated behavior that put in question the state’s level of 
norm compliance with transitional justice policies. Principally, the foregone pursuit of 
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other trials of heads of state that were responsible for human rights violations during the 
1980s (i.e. García) presents a challenge to a state that made significant progress in 
respecting human rights. The difference that is overtly manifested in Peru’s case is one 
that will serve as a point of comparison with Uruguay and Korea in assessing their status 
of compliance.  
 
1.5 Outline of the Study 
Considering all the variables that influenced states compliance with human rights 
norms, namely transitional justice norms in the form of reparations policies, truth-
commissions, and prosecutions, in the chapters of this study, I first acknowledge the 
trajectory of events prior to transitional justice. The spiral model provides this framework 
of situating the three states’ process of norm acceptance that led to the implementation of 
human rights norms, including transitional justice.  
Despite the political and cultural differences, Uruguay, Peru, and South Korea 
share common characteristics of norms acceptance that conforms to the spiral model. In 
each chapter of the country cases, I first outline how states proceeded in internalizing 
norms from the basis of the spiral model’s five stages. First, all three states endured a 
period of state repression. As the first phase of the model, repression manifested in the 
form of violence, which is ever-present in authoritarian (Svolik 2012, 2) and military 
based regimes. Korea faced a series of repressive periods, from colonial (1910-1945) to 
military rule during Chun Doo Hwan’s regime (1980-1988) that sparked pro-democracy 
protests throughout four major cities of the peninsula (i.e. Pusan, Masan, Seoul, and 
Kwangju). Peru also suffered a period of authoritarian rule with significant military 
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presence. Political repression against the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso led to 
disappearances and deaths during Belaúnde Terry’s government (1980-1985). Additional 
violations took place in Alan García’s presidency (1985-1990) when concerns for human 
rights virtually evaporated (Roberts and Peceny 1997, 199). However, Peruvian society 
underwent the “gravest breaches of human rights” (Cassese 1999, 162) during Fujimori’s 
government (1990-2000). In the case of Uruguay, people suffered through two periods of 
military repression from 1962-1972 and during Bordaberry (1973-1976) and General 
Álvarez’s rule (1981-1985), when all constitutionally guaranteed individual liberties were 
placed under martial law (Weinstein 1993, 86). 
Repression was followed by the second phase of denial. After this period, all 
states conceded to accepting some norms, mainly through the ratification of international 
legal standards. The three states arrived at the final phase of norm internalization at 
various time periods. The phase coincided with the introduction of transitional justice 
norms through domestic policies. Uruguay prosecuted former president and military 
general Bordaberry and Álvarez on February 9, 2010 and October 22, 2009. Peru 
convicted former president Fujimori on April 7, 2009, although it has yet to try García. 
Likewise, Korea also tried Chun and Roh in 1996.  
Having established the norm adoption processes of Korea, Peru, and Uruguay, in 
each of the case study chapters, I then turn to compare and assess each state’s compliance 
with transitional justice policies. According to theoretical expectations, all states ought to 
have displayed similar compliance record with norms in the period after norm 
application. This meant that in terms of transitional justice policies, Korea, Uruguay, and 
Peru would have enacted policies related to truth-seeking via truth commissions, 
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reparations programs, and accountability through prosecution of human rights violators. 
Additionally, states were expected to have followed-up with the recommendations made 
by truth commissions, provided reparations, continued prosecution of human rights 
crimes, and removed obstacles to administering justice. Such ideas are more clearly 
demonstrated in the table below.  
Table 1.1:Transitional Justice Policies and Expected Outcome for Three States 
 Truth-Seeking 
(State Sponsored) 













































However, an examination of Korea, Peru, and Uruguay reveals differences in their 
respect for international norms following transitional justice policies. Although Uruguay 
has made progress in prosecuting two former heads of state for human rights crimes, it 
has yet to discard the amnesty law (Ley de Caducidad) dating from 1986. Similarly, Peru 
is facing obstacles in the administration of justice with delayed convictions for human 
rights criminals. In the case of Korea, two convicted heads of state were given 
‘presidential pardon.’ This difference is what makes the states more interesting to 
compare, as cases with variance on the dependent variable (i.e. compliance) have a 
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“better chance of generating more useful results” (Peters 1998, 67). The variation is 
visualized in the table below. 
 
Table 1.2: Actual Compliance Outcome for States 
 High Level of Norm 
Compliance  
(Follow-up included) 









(from theoretical model)  







*Actual Outcome  




of Transitional Justice  
(2 or 1 mechanism of 
transitional justice) 
               South Korea    
 
Why are these three states that demonstrated a level of norm internalization and 
engaged in transitional justice behaving differently in the period following transitional 
justice? Using the mechanisms established by the spiral model, in each country chapter I 
compare the extent to which the conditioning variables of transnational advocacy, rule of 
law, transition type, and former regime personnel influenced changes during and after 
transitional justice for all states.  
Although transnational advocacy presence was expected to diminish as the state 
advanced in the spiral model, in reality they were the single most important factor that 
sustained state compliance with norms for Peru and Uruguay. The domestic side of 
transnational advocacy was more important in bringing the development of truth-
commissions in South Korea’s case, although transnational advocacy (mainly from the 
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religious sectors of World Council of Churches) did play a significant role for the 
promulgation of the norm of right to life. The amicus curiae briefs from the International 
Center for Transitional Justice, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ 
rulings against state amnesty, and the mobilization of the national human rights 
organizations in Peru pressured the state to investigate Fujimori’s case, which led to his 
prosecution in 2009 (ICTJ 2008). Similarly for Uruguay, the Organization of American 
States was also instrumental in pressuring Uruguay on grounds of human rights by 
denying its offer to host the 1978 meeting of the General Assembly in Montevideo. 
Furthermore, combined efforts from the Washington Office on Latin America, local 
advocacy organizations such as the Servicio Paz y Justicia, and the Inter-American 
Court’s (IACtHR) ruling against the amnesty law as a violation of international treaties 
(Lessa 2012, 147), resulted in the national referendum to revoke the amnesty law in 2009.   
Other new conditions however revealed the fallbacks from norm compliance by 
the three states. For instance, the presence of previous regime elements (i.e. associated 
with type of regime change) within the political apparatus of the state aggravated the 
respect for norms. The strength of former regime circles in domestic politics indicated an 
unfinished regime change process and an obstacle to the administration of justice. 
Generally, the transition from a human rights oppressor to respecter regime is one that 
accompanies earlier stages of the spiral model (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 30). Uruguay 
was a state that already advanced in democratic consolidation (Börzel and Risse 2013) 
and thus expected to be free from the interference of former regime elements. However, a 
close examination of Uruguay revealed the continued power of former generals 
associated with human rights crimes that opposed human rights trials.  
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For Korea, similar to Uruguay’s negotiated transition, former regime elements in 
power hampered the efforts of truth commissions to provide proper reparations for 
victims of human rights abuse. When transitional justice policies were starting to be 
debated in Korea, although the power of the military as an institution decreased 
significantly, the links between Roh (former leader and human rights violator) and then 
President Kim Young Sam’s political party remained. Kim previously merged affiliations 
with Roh’s political party (Gentilucci 2005, 93) who also sponsored Kim’s presidential 
race with 200 billion WON (~2.55 million USD) in 1992 (Lee 2011). In other words, Roh 
continued to maintain political power through Kim’s political reign through the 
presidential race and party members, most of whom had been with Roh previously. Such 
relations continued even to the present day. 
In the same way, the debate on Fujimori’s amnesty and the slow rate of 
accountability towards former leaders such as García are heavily influenced by their 
strong political presence in government along with the military. Human Rights Watch 
previously documented the military’s unwillingness to cooperate and to “credit the 
testimony of victims’ relatives” (2012). The power that the military exercised in 
preventing the continuation of prosecutions indicated the possibility of an unfinished 
regime change. The observation is further corroborated with President Humala’s 
presidency (2011-2016), during which former military personnel associated with human 
rights crimes, such as general Daniel Urresti and Humala himself served in key positions 






The literature on transitional justice and the spiral model of human rights change 
remains theoretically useful and provides a clear “pattern of human rights progress” 
(Risse and Ropp 2013, 7). Yet, the variations in state response to norm internalization 
after the phase of rule consistent behavior and transitional justice policies presents 
questions that cannot be readily answered by the existing literature. Why have states 
where great efforts were put into confronting an ugly past relapsed in their behavior?  
My study aims to provide answers to these questions by bringing together the 
process-tracing work of spiral model of human rights change and transitional justice 
policy work in examining the status of human rights norms. From Chapter 2 to 4, through 
a historical and comparative case study of norm compliance, I explore under what 
circumstances states continued or failed in consistent compliance with norms. The 
comparison of Peru, Uruguay, and South Korea during post-norm acceptance reveals 
differences in state behavior that may be influenced by both external and internal factors 
such as the strong presence of transnational advocacy networks. By gaining an 
understanding of the factors that may impact the continued internalization of international 
human rights norms as specified in the spiral model, the findings of this research make 
contributions to the greater theoretical literature on international norms and transitional 
justice.  
The last chapter of this study summarizes each case study, compares the 
successful and unsuccessful cases to compliance, and dives further into the theoretical 
discussions and questions that rise as a result of the three state comparison. The study 
began from the premise of the logic of appropriateness that is associated with 
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constructivist approach, to reconsider the importance of utility calculations of states or 
the logic of consequences in understanding the relationship of norms and state behavior. 
The processes of norm acceptance that led states to implement transitional justice norms 
through domestic policies in the spiral model could not fundamentally change states’ 
behavior to sustain their course of compliance. The impact that domestic factors such as 
former regime elements and changes in government could still have on states that reached 
the final phase of the spiral model revealed concerns not considered in the spiral model 
and the norms literature. My study demonstrates the vulnerability of states’ commitments 
to normative obligations and the continued importance political utility calculations have 








On April 7, 2009 former President of Peru Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) was 
convicted for crimes against humanity and sentenced to 25 years in prison. Fujimori’s 
conviction was an example of the “broader trend in the region favoring retributive justice 
for cases of grave violation of human rights” (Burt 2012, 120-21). While Peru was not 
the first Latin American state to prosecute a former head of state for human rights crimes, 
it was the first to try a democratically elected leader. Despite installing an “authoritarian 
style of rule” (Maxwell 1997, 38), accompanied by human rights violations, Fujimori 
enjoyed a broad base of public support. For this reason, his prosecution represented a 
moment of triumph for human rights norms (namely accountability) over that of domestic 
political interests that shielded him. However, the delayed arraignment of other culpable 
human rights violators such as President Ollanta Humala, among other things presents a 
puzzle for Peru’s norm compliance. It is a case that challenges the expectations from the 
spiral model on norm compliant behavior. Moreover, Peru’s trajectory brings out the 
importance of former regime elements and the disintegration of the domestic front of 
transnational advocacy in the relationship between international human rights norms and 
states.    
Uruguay, South Korea, and Peru implemented transitional justice policies and 
arrived at what could be considered as the last phase of the spiral model (Risse and 
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Sikkink 1999; Risse and Ropp 2013). And yet, despite the progress made, Peru’s 
behavior varied towards norms after the enactment of transitional justice policies. Out of 
191 cases of human rights crimes tried from 2005 to 2012, over 59 percent were acquitted 
by Peru’s judicial system (Burt 2012). Moreover, discussions of Fujimori’s amnesty 
resurfaced since July 2009 (La República 2009) and during Ollanta’s government, 
Fujimori’s family asked for presidential pardon on humanitarian grounds (La República 
2012). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s recommendations, which included 
reparations policies, have been implemented but face administrative difficulties.  
Why has the state backtracked from the progress it has made on accepting and 
applying norms? The purpose of this chapter is to trace Peru’s human rights norms 
compliance after the adoption and application of norms using an extended framework of 
the spiral model of human rights. I first outline Peru’s norm adoption process, then I 
examine compliance according to the state’s consistency in carrying out accepted norms. 
Particularly, the study focuses on transitional justice norms (truth-seeking, reparations, 
prosecutions, and legislative reforms) and Peru’s compliance with recommendations from 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, number of prosecutions, convictions, and 
acquittals, and the allocation of financial, medical, and symbolic reparations. From these 
indicators, the chapter then probes the question of why a state that advanced to instituting 
transitional justice policies did not continue respecting adopted norms.   
 
2.1 Tracing Human Rights Development: Spiral Model 
Peru’s changes towards international norms followed a trajectory resembling the 
five steps of the spiral model. This study follows the categorization of the Truth and 
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Reconciliation Commission which details Peru’s state repression from 1980, when the 
guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso announced its “popular war from the countryside to 
the city” (Guillerot 2006, 137) to 2000.4 During the two decades of armed conflict, Peru 
experienced three periods of authoritarian rule with significant military presence in 
Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985), Alan García (1985-1990), and Alberto Fujimori’s 
governments (1990-2000). Political repression against Sendero resulted in 7,995 deaths 
and disappearances during Terry’s government (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 
2003). Violations increased with García, to the extent that respect for human rights 
virtually evaporated (Roberts and Peceny 1997, 199).  
Repression was contributed in part by foreign states, with the network of 
collaboration established between the United States and the armed forces of Peru to 
combat communism during the Cold War and proliferation of drugs in the 1990s. 
Washington’s contribution to Peru’s human rights violations has been alluded to in the 
Final Report of Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The report discusses 
Washington’s support for Peru’s security forces, which included “low intensity conflict 
(LIC) strategies and training in the School of the Americas (SOA),” that exacerbated the 
disrespect for human rights norms (Parodi 2009, 181; 224). In response, international 
nongovernmental groups such as Human Rights Watch expressed concerns of the United 
States indirect implication in human rights crimes (1990, 241). And yet, violations 
persisted.  
                                                          
4 The year when state repression officially ended, has been subject to debate, with scholars that refer to 




During Fujimori’s government, Peru endured the “gravest breaches of human 
rights” (Cassese 1999, 162). Human rights violations became commonplace, with the 
emblematic cases of violations in the Barrios Altos massacre of civilians and the forced 
disappearance and extrajudicial execution of students and professors at La Cantuta 
University by state sponsored death squads. Human rights groups that attempted to 
uncover the violations, present writs of habeas corpus, and litigate human rights cases 
faced great danger (Burt 2014, 150). Even when cases were taken to court, convictions 
were issued without due process, based “on police assertions” or “uncorroborated 
testimonies of another detainee repenting in exchange for naming names” (Laplante and 
Theidon 2010, 295).  
 
Denial and Tactical Concessions 
Repression was followed by denial of external and internal allegations of human 
rights abuses with the state contesting the validity of human rights norms (Risse and 
Ropp 2013, 8). Changes to state behavior came gradually after the advent of a 
transnational network established between international and domestic advocacy groups. 
As domestic opposition and local human rights groups remained weak, they turned to 
international advocacy for help. A strong transnational advocacy was built under the 
leadership of Americas Watch, Washington Office on Latin America, and Amnesty 
International and exerted pressure on Washington to decrease the amount of U.S. military 
aid to Peru (McClintock and Vallas 2003, 134). Amnesty International was one of the 
earliest collaborators in Peru’s advocacy work. On September 21, 1983 Amnesty 
published an open letter directed to President Belaúnde Terry, criticizing the extrajudicial 
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execution, arbitrary arrest, and torture of indigenous populations from military personnel 
in the Uchuraccay region (El País 1983). A few years later in 1988, Americas Watch 
Committee also publically charged the Peruvian government of tolerating human rights 
abuses towards civilians (Americas Watch Committee 1988, 9).  
Initially, Terry and García’s governments responded to the allegations with 
denial. Amnesty International’s reports sent to Terry were “tirado al tacho de la basura” 
(thrown into the dustbin) (APRODEH 2014; Crabtree 1992, 96). Nonetheless, it helped in 
warning the government that their actions were under international scrutiny.  
Continued transnational pressure led Peru to give in to some of the demands from 
the human rights community. Fujimori used tactical concessions to legitimize his power 
after the self-imposed coup d’état in 1992 provoked domestic and international criticism. 
Some attempts were made at recognizing the importance of international norms via the 
newly imposed 1993 Constitution. Though not to the extent of the 1979 Constitution that 
dedicated an entire section to international norms, the fourth final and transitory 
disposition of Peru’s new Constitution included language in favor of international 
standards. It stated that human rights and liberties recognized by the Constitution shall be 
interpreted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
international agreements Peru ratified. Moreover, Article 55 of the Constitution carried 
the importance of international norms further by stating that all treaties celebrated by the 
state formed a part of national law (Constitución Política del Perú 1993).  
Nonetheless, the reforms did not bring a fundamental change in state behavior 
with respect to norms. In fact parallel to the new Constitution, Peru adopted Amnesty 
Law (Law No. 26479) and Interpretative Law (Law No. 26492) on June 1995. The laws 
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gave amnesty to military, police, and civilians that were investigated, accused, or 
convicted of acts related to the internal war (CNDDHH 2015). Hence, the 1993 
constitutional revisions were tactical concessions that Peru followed, consistent with the 
spiral model for the purpose of getting “the international human rights community off” 
the state’s back (Risse and Ropp 2013, 6).  
However, what the government failed to calculate were the prolonged effects 
amnesty laws had on the opposition. According to the spiral model, states that 
underestimate transnational advocacy and implement laws contrary to norms end up 
“strengthening the domestic opposition” (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 28). Conforming to 
these expectations, Peru’s amnesty laws that overturned norms of accountability brought 
increased mobilization of transnational advocacy against the state, including regional 
human rights organs such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Fujimori faced 
an empowered domestic opposition and increased transnational pressure that challenged 
his bid for third term in office and ushered in a democratic transition. 
 
Latter Phases of Norm Adoption and Extending the Spiral Model 
Different from states that experienced a negotiated transition, where transition 
entailed a pact of non-accountability against the former regime, Peru’s ruptured transition 
with Fujimori’s resignation via fax from Japan, facilitated the adoption of accountability. 
The return of Peru to democratic arrangements in the governments of interim president 
Valentín Paniagua (2000-2001) and newly elected Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), 
brought significant changes. The two presidencies coincided with the characteristics of 
the latter phases of the spiral model, during which the state ratified relevant international 
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treaties, changed domestic laws, set up new domestic institutions, and sustained 
compliance with adopted international human rights norms (Risse and Ropp 2013, 7).  
One of the first judicial reforms reintegrated the three judges from the 
Constitutional Tribunal who were dismissed by Fujimori (Popkin 2004, 429). And in a 
symbolic move on January 2001, “Congress voted to return Peru” to the jurisdiction of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Root 2012, 62). Peru never had the right to 
withdraw from the Court’s jurisdiction. Article 98 Section 1 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights explained that all states party to the convention must comply with the 
Court’s decision under all circumstances. However, during Fujimori’s presidency Peru 
announced its withdrawal from the Court. This stance was not only the state’s protest 
against the Court’s criticisms against Peru for the violation of Article 8.1 of the American 
Convention, which “requires an impartial and independent tribunal” (Wilson and Perlin 
2001, 321) for all legal cases, but also a political move to undermine the respect for the 
rule of law. For this reason, the return of Peru to the Court’s jurisdiction was a symbolic 
“step among several necessary to reestablish the rule of law and human rights 
accountability in Peru” (Root 2012, 62).  
Paniagua’s government also made legislative reforms based on the Inter-
American Court’s rulings. Acknowledging “Peru’s responsibility for a series of human 
rights violations committed during Fujimori’s regime” the state decided to “abide by the 
Court’s rulings in some 150 cases” (Burt 2013, 288). These included the Supreme 
Court’s nullification of Amnesty Laws (Law No. 26479 and Law No. 26492) (Center for 
Justice and Accountability 2008), made in reference to the Inter-American Court’s 
rulings in Barrios Altos v. Peru case. On the massacre of 15 Peruvian citizens by a state-
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sponsored death squad in Lima’s Barrios Altos neighborhood, the Court ruled that 
Amnesty Laws were “devoid of legal effects” and violated Peru’s obligations under the 
American Convention (Binder 2012, 314; Burt 2011, 305).  
Democratic transition and the strengthening of the international human rights 
regime also reinforced local pressures to seek justice in the form of prosecutions and truth 
commissions (Coatsworth 2003). This period coincided with the launch of “official 
judicial investigations” into human rights violations in Peru with the Comisión de la 
Verdad y Reconciliación (Truth and Reconciliation Commission: CVR) on 
2001(McClintock 2006, 98). Peru also ratified the Rome Statue of the International 
Criminal Court on Nov. 10, 2001. 
Contrary to the expectations of, and hopes for, norm compliance for states that 
advanced to adopt norms and implement transitional justice policies, Peru’s behavior 
after truth-seeking (2001-2003), reparations (2005), and prosecution of major human 
rights criminals (2009) demonstrated setbacks to norm compliance. In the next section, I 
assess Peru’s record of consistency in respecting adopted norms of human rights focusing 
separately on each period after 2003, 2005, and 2009, the year when the trial of former 
president Fujimori concluded. These years are considered as the phase after norm 
implementation, which has not been accounted for by the spiral model that stopped its 
theorization after the state transitioned to a democracy and engaged in norm respecting 
reforms. I regard the number of convictions and acquittals that followed human rights 
prosecutions, follow-up with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ rulings, the 
regional organ that also prosecuted human rights criminals, and the status of reparations’ 
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distributions. Whereas these problems do not reflect the entire failure of Peru’s human 
rights progress, they are important to regard as indicators of noncompliance.   
The conclusions point to a set of domestic and international factors that hindered 
the process of sustained norm respect, including internal divisions of domestic human 
rights groups that formed a part of transnational advocacy, old power circles from the 
type of democratic transition that impeded norm influence, and international actors that 
continue to empower the military apparatus. Taken together, the conditions from the 
Peruvian case take the debate further to more substantive theoretical discussions on the 
logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences.  
 
2.2 Rule of Law and Domestic Prosecutions 
Peru’s legal system provided the necessary mechanisms for international norms of 
accountability to thrive. Based on a monistic system of law, where international and 
internal legal systems form a unity, under Article 55 of Peru’s 1993 Constitution, 
international law in Peru has an “automatic effect once the state becomes party to 
international commitments” (Salmón 2000, 111). All treaties ratified by the state form a 
part of national law. These exclude non-self-executing international norms that do not 
become judicially enforceable upon ratification and necessitates legislative changes.5 For 
example, the Convention Against Torture (CAT) is a non-self-executing treaty that 
requires states to pass legislation which makes violation of rights enumerated in the 
convention illegal under domestic law (OHCHR 1984). Peru incorporated the CAT 
                                                          
5 Author’s interview with Dr. Elizabeth Salmón, Department of Law, Institute for Human Rights and 
Democracy-Pontifical Catholic University of Peru, July 24, 2014, Lima. 
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norms with Article 321-A of Título XIV-A of “Crimes against Humanity” in the national 
penal code (Congreso de la República 2002). Additionally, Peru is the only Latin 
American state that has a law requiring compliance with sentences by international 
tribunals to which Peru is a party state (Salmón 2011).  
However, the de facto established standards for the application of international 
legal norms did not result in Peru’s compliance with norms of accountability. For the 
state to pursue accountability and safeguard rights of individuals, the respect for the rule 
of law “defended by an independent judiciary” ought to have been pre-established 
(O’Donnell 2004, 32). From the data that measures Peru’s judicial independence, the 
judiciary revealed a level of fluctuating independence and partiality which restricted the 
fair application of legal rules.   
I use descriptive statistics of de facto judicial independence, “whether rules on 
parchment end up being translated into behavioral judicial independence” (Conrad and 
Moore 2010, 8), from three different datasets. The datasets provide information on the 
level of independence from the period after democratic transition in 2000 and the years 
after truth-seeking, reparations, and prosecutions (emblematic cases) concluded. Witold 
Heinsz’s Political Constraint Index (POLCON) measures the variable in a dichotomous 
way, where “1” depicts an independent judiciary and “0” no independence. Cignarelli and 
Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project breaks the division to a trifold with “2” 
reflecting a full level of independence, “1” structural limitations on judicial 
independence, and “0” no independence. In a similar way Tate & Keith’s measure based 
on US State Department’s Yearly Country Reports, categorizes “2” with a fully 
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independent judiciary, “1” as somewhat independent, and “0” at non-independence 
(2009).  
Interestingly, all three datasets infer some common observation on the rule of law 
and the independence of the judiciary in Peru. Influenced by the government’s proactive 
stance for truth-seeking and incorporate norms of justice via reparations, the judiciary 
was able to gain a higher level of independence during Toledo’s term in office (2001-
2006). CIRI, Tate & Keith, and POLCON’s score reflected these changes, with scores 
that increased from a status of limited or no independence to a limited to full level of 
independence in 2003-2006. However, contrary to expectations of norm compliance, 
shortly after Toledo’s term the judiciary’s independence fluctuated. From 2007 to 2011, 
the years during which the Fujimori was tried, CIRI recorded a decreased level of 
independence at “1” (2007-2011) while POLCON’s score continued to measure a full 
level of independence.  
The diverging scores described García’s new regime (2006-2011), which allowed 
for selective judicial independence. García’s government demonstrated some norm 
respecting behavior with the Ley de la Carrera Judicial (Law No. 29277) in 2008 with 
the “objective of guaranteeing the independence and impartiality of judicial function” 
(Macher 2014, 80) and Fujimori’s conviction in 2009. However, compliance with norms 
of accountability on other fronts remained restricted. While allowing litigations against 
Fujimori to continue, García signed a decree that halted prosecutions for human rights 
violations committed before 2003 (Amnesty 2010). Partly this decision had to do with 
human rights accusations against García for the cases of El Frontón (1986), Accomarca 
(1985), and Cayara (1988). The decree restricted the judiciary’s power, delaying the time 
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for accusations against Fujimori and García to resurface. Faced with domestic and 
international criticism, García withdrew the decree. Nevertheless, the government 
continued to publically oppose human rights trials (Human Rights Watch 2012), 
challenging the jurisdiction of the courts.  
The judiciary also experienced serious obstacles to the administration of justice. 
According to the Human Rights Trials Project (Burt 2012),  from 2005 to 2012 out of the 
191 cases on grave human rights violations that were tried, 59 percent were acquitted. 
These included cases presented by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Final 
Report in 2003, of which 60 saw some level of judicial advancements (IDEH-PUCP 
2011). Only 34.5 percent of the 191 cases rendered convictions by the courts. More 
specifically from 2009 to 2012, the period of post-transitional justice policies, the judicial 
branches of government tried 28 cases on grave human rights violations (Burt 2012). Out 
of the 28, 60.7 percent were acquitted, 25 percent were issued mixed convictions (one of 
the accused would be convicted), and 14.3 percent were convicted. The percentages of 
acquittals by the courts from 2009 to 2012, did not correlate with the behavior of a state 
expected to comply with norms of accountability. Cases related to Sendero and the other 
guerrilla group Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru however, received greater 
amount of progress, compared to that of state committed crimes (Macher 2014, 32).  
Furthermore, Peru also lagged in judicial reforms recommended by CVR. From 
2007 to 2014, 56% recorded positive advancements, 33% remained unchanged, and 11% 
registered a setback to institutional reforms (Macher 2014, 25). During this period, 
García reappointed members of the military and one police officer who sat on military 
tribunals and covered up for “human rights violators” during Fujimori’s presidency (Páez 
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2008). Moreover, Legislative Decree 1094 approved in 2010 reincorporated all illicit 
conduct committed by a police or military during service, which had already been ruled 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal in 2006. The decree removed civilian 
jurisdiction over military and police crimes. The developments in the judicial system 
coincided with delays in justice, absolutions in prosecutions of human rights criminals, 
and non-adherence to recommendations from inter-governmental bodies.  
 
2.3 Compliance with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) was an alternative system 
of justice for victims and the transnational human rights movement to promote 
accountability for Peru.6 During the internal armed conflict, dozens of cases were brought 
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Court. And 
until 2011, Peru held the record for the state that received the greatest number of 
sentences from the Court (Salmón 2011, 55). In many of the cases the “Court found the 
Peruvian state responsible and ordered criminal investigations” (Burt 2011, 305).  
The Court dealt with twenty-eight principle cases of human rights violations in 
Peru. Twenty rulings took place in the post Fujimori period, during which transitional 
justice mechanisms were starting to be implemented. In principle cases of violations, 
Peru demonstrated what earlier studies on the IACtHR have found on the state’s lack of 
“the means or the will to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice” (Tan 
2005, 329).    
                                                          
6 For more information on studies related to the Inter-American Court of Human Right’s judgements and 
compliance record of states, see Wright-Smith 2011. 
40 
 
Table 2.1 Cases of Peru in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1999-2013) 
Cases  Issues of Concern Year  
J. v. Peru Right to Personal Liberty, to Protection of 
the Home, to Judicial Guarantee; Right to 
Personal Integrity 
2013 
Osorio Rivera y Familiares v. 
Peru 
Right to Personal Liberty, to Protection of 
the Home, to Judicial Guarantee; Right to 
Personal Integrity 
2013 
Abril Alosilla y otros v. Peru Right to Private Property 2011 
Anzualdo Castro v. Peru Forced Disappearance 2009 
Acevedo Buendía y Otros v. 
Peru 
Socio-Economic Rights 2009 
Penal Miguel Castro v. Peru Arbitrary Execution; Death Penalty 2006 
Baldeón García v. Peru Torture 2006 
La Cantuta v. Peru Right to Life; Extrajudicial Executions; 
Forced Disappearance 
2006 
Acevedo Jaramillo y otros v. 
Peru 
Right to Fair Trial 2006 
Trabajadores Cesados del 
Congreso v. Peru 
Legal Concern 2006 
García Asto y Ramírez Rojas 
v. Peru 
Arbitrary Detention; Arbitrary Arrest; 
Preventative Detention 
2005 
Huilca Tecse v. Peru Extrajudicial Executions; State 
Responsibility; Freedom of Association 
2005 
Gómez Palomino v. Peru Forced Disappearance; Grave Violation 2005 
Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru Right to Physical Integrity; Torture 2004-5 
Cruz Flores v. Peru Ill-treatment; Incommunicado Detention; 
Solitary Confinement 
2004 
Hermanos Gómez Paquiyauri 
v. Peru 
Arbitrary Detention 2004 
Cinco Pensionistas v. Peru Right to Private Property 2003 
Barrios Altos v. Peru Legal Concern; Arbitrary Execution; 
Arbitrary Detention; Forced 
Disappearance; Summary Execution 
2001 
Tribunal Constitucional v. 
Peru 
Legal Concern 1999-01 
Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru Legal Concern 1999-01 
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Of the numerous cases that can be considered in examining the status of norm 
compliance involving the Court, some have been studied to a great extent, while others 
have yet to be explored. For the purposes of this study, I will look at two principal cases 
of human rights violations that occurred during the armed conflict and that as of early 
2016 were still being processed after the 2009 conviction of Fujimori. Ochoa Lizarbe v. 
Hurtado (Accomarca Massacre) and Hugo Bustíos-Saavedra and Eduardo Rojas-Arce v. 
Perú received considerably less attention compared to other cases and also resulted in 
disappointing norms progress. As the cases are spread across the spectrum of the internal 
conflict occurring at different points in time, they will be interesting to examine in-depth. 
Analyzing the Accomarca Massacre, references will be made to IACtHR’s Barrios Altos 
v. Peru ruling, as the results from Barrios Altos which led to the derogation of Amnesty 
Laws and opened the possibility for human rights litigations to move forward, had a 
profound impact on Accomarca. The examination of the Court’s orders related to these 
cases from as early as 1998 to as late as 2005 will provide a trajectory of the state’s 
behavior in complying with international legal standards.  
 
Barrios Altos v. Peru and Accomarca Massacre 
Regarded as the heralding case for human rights advancement with the IACtHR’s 
decision that led to the derogation of Amnesty Laws, a critical re-examination of Barrios 
Altos v. Peru hints not only at the successes but also sheds light to the possible limits of 
international norms in influencing state compliance with human rights. On September 14, 
2001, the Court ruled against the military death squad Grupo Colina operating within the 
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Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército (Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces), for the 
arbitrary execution of 15 persons, including an eight-year-old child, and four other 
individuals who were gravely wounded on November 3, 1991. The Court’s decision also 
included rulings on Amnesty Laws that “carecen de efectos jurídicos” (were devoid of 
legal effects). This was the first time that an international jurisdiction declared national 
laws to lack legal grounds and obligated the state to disregard of self-imposed amnesty 
laws (Cassese 2004, 23). Toledo’s government worked with the Court to annul the laws.  
In light of CVR’s findings that found former president Fujimori “criminally 
responsible for the creation and operations of the Colina Group death squad” (Burt 2009, 
393), the case was incorporated into Fujimori’s trial. Four years later, the Special 
Criminal Court found Fujimori guilty of mediated authorship of Barrios Altos on 
aggravated homicide and along with other crimes sentenced him to 25 years in prison. 
Additional convictions were issued on October 2010 by the Special Criminal Court of the 
Supreme Court of Justice against 19 of the 31 death squad members implicated in the 
Barrios Altos massacre. The majority of defendants appealed the ruling.  
Despite the support from transnational advocacy groups (CEJIL 2010), the 
trajectory of events after the appeals took a different turn from what was expected. The 
Supreme Court announced its ruling for the appeals on July 20, 2012, including 
“controversial measures” of “reduction in the sentences” for the defendants (Burt 2012). 
The decision was condemned by various human rights organizations as a “paso atrás 
para los derechos humanos” (step back for human rights) (Noriega 2012). The Supreme 
Court’s ruling questioned the status of the rule of law and norm respect for a state that 
had vowed to respect the rule of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.   
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However, one positive change emerged from the case. The IACtHR’s 2001 
rulings that nullified the Amnesty Laws opened the possibility for investigations into 
human rights violations that took place in the district of Accomarca in 1985. Commonly 
referred to as the Accomarca massacre, on August 14, an army patrol under the mandate 
of Sub-lieutenant Telmo Ricardo Hurtado Hurtado and Juan Rivera Rondón, assassinated 
62 commoners, among them women, children, and elderly people (Comisión de la 
Verdad 2003). The massacre was carried out as a part of Plan Huancayoc, a 
counterinsurgency action by the military’s national security subzone 5 against Sendero 
and its supporters.  
The state legitimized its tactics in the name of anti-terrorism. Former Amnesty 
International representative Michael McClintock recalled, starting from December 1982 
there was a “state policy” to not recognize forced disappearance and other human rights 
violations (García 2014). The policy extended to the first term of García’s regime (1985-
1990), during which the massacre occurred. Nevertheless, due to the outcry from 
international and domestic advocacy groups on the massacre (i.e. Americas Watch 
Committee and APRODEH), the state made some concessions. The president of the 
Armed Forces Joint Command was dismissed and a Senate Committee was appointed to 
investigate the crimes. And yet, the case was assigned to military courts where under the 
Code of Military Justice “murder, torture or abduction” were not even considered to be 
“military offences” (Americas Watch Report 1986, 68).  
After the IACtHR’s ruling on Barrios Altos and the nullification of Amnesty 
Laws, during which Peru began implementing transitional justice measures, some level of 
justice was sought for Accomarca. The Third Supra-Provincial Criminal Court of Peru 
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issued an order No. 2005-0039 on May 31, 2005, to re-open investigations. Along with 
the domestic case that was re-opened, a civil action suit was filed before the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida (Ochoa Lizarbe v. Hurtado). With the 
persistence from the transnational advocacy network that included the Center for Justice 
and Accountability, Instituto de Defensa Legal, the APRODEH, and Asociación de 
Familiares Afectados por la Violencia Política del Distrito de Accomarca, relatives of 
victims from the massacre Teófila Ochoa and Cirila Puido filed a deportation case against 
Hurtado Hurtado and Rivera Rondón who were living in the United States (Davis 2014, 
218). The case also included accusations of “torture, extrajudicial killing and crimes 
against humanity,” which were conceded on August 15, 2008 for Rondón and on July 15, 
2011 for Hurtado (CJA 2008).  
Risse and Ropp illustrates this dynamic of sub-processes, as consisting of a two-
level game. At “the domestic and international level” it pitted “proponents of actual 
implementation of now prescriptively validated human rights norms against their 
opponents” (Risse and Ropp 2013, 7). In Peru’s case, the cooperation from the U.S. 
government and advocacy groups at the international level with pressure from domestic 
victims’ groups, mobilized transnational support and produced advances in human rights.  
The progresses in the case however, did not continue. Official hearings for 
Accomarca that opened on November 4, 2010 were delayed for another four years. The 
oral proceedings for Accomarca included President García, who was cited by the 
National Criminal Court to testify for the massacre on March 25, 2014 (Mejía 2014). 
During the hearing on March 30, 2014, García testified that acts of crime against 
humanity did not occur and that the massacre was out of his control, as the military 
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personnel in command worked with orders that the previous president provided (La 
República 2014). García was one of many individuals cited to testify in the phase of 
witnesses of the judicial proceedings that was to conclude on July 2014. To date, the 
sentencing is still “con fecha aún desconocida” (with an unknown date), as the next 
phase of litigation involving oral proceedings of evidence and material of defense for the 
29 accused has yet to take place (Mazzei 2014). Peru’s behavior related to Accomarca 
reflected the limits of norm compliance, conditioned by political interests that prevented 
accountability. The political interests included former regime personnel, including 
García, who preferred not to be held responsible for the crime.   
 
Hugo Bustíos-Saavedra and Eduardo Rojas-Arce v. Peru                
The Bustíos-Saavedra and Eduardo Rojas-Arce case showed a similar trajectory 
of events, where the state that was expected to act in compliance with adopted human 
rights norms and rulings on accountability diverted in its behavior against respecting 
norms contrary to theory. Nearly three decades earlier than Barrios Altos, the Inter-
American Court made a historic ruling on the extrajudicial execution of two journalists 
on June 5, 1990. The Court’s order was in response to a transnational petition Case 
10.548 Informe No. 38/97 that was filed with IACHR by Human Rights Watch, 
Committee to Protect Journalists, and the Center for Justice and International Law (Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights 1998). The advocacy groups called on IACHR 
to examine the death of journalist Hugo Bustíos Saavedra and gunshot wounds suffered 
by Eduardo Rojas Arce, who were reporting on the death of Primitiva Jorge (age 61) and 
his son Guillermo Sulca (age 17) by agents of Sendero in Ayacucho. 
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Witnesses and victims’ family testimony in No. 100107 of the Comisión de la 
Verdad y Reconciliación (2002) and in the legal complaint No. 0101-2000-002451,7 
identified the perpetrators as agents of the state, more specifically the military forces. The 
Court argued that Peru as a state party to the American Convention was obliged to “adopt 
all necessary measures to protect the life and safety of all persons whose rights may be 
threatened,” including witnesses and family members of the victims (Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights 1990). Due to the authoritarian nature of the regime and the 
disregard for human rights norms during the internal war, the state responded with denial.  
A decade later, the case resurfaced with the Comisión de la Verdad y 
Reconciliación (Truth and Reconciliation Commission or CVR). CVR’s Final Report 
included testimonies from victims’ families and witnesses to the Bustíos case and 
recommendations to the state on implementing future mechanisms of accountability. On 
October 2, 2007, the National Criminal Court convicted Colonel Víctor La Vera 
Hernandez and Amador Vidal Sanbento to 17 and 15 years in prison for the aggravated 
murder of journalist Bustíos and the attempted murder of Eduardo Rojas Arce. At the 
time of the crime, Víctor La Vera, also known as Ojos de Gato, was the chief of the 
military base in Castropampa and Vidal Sanbento was a military officer.  
The culprits and their sentences were confirmed once again a year later by the 
Second Transitory Criminal Court of the Supreme Court of Justice. Both rulings were 
seen as a moment of victory over impunity (CNDDHH 2008). An examination into what 
followed after the sentences however, questioned the state’s position in seeking justice. 
                                                          
7 The usage of case numbers to refer to testimonies follows the recommendation from an official in the 
Defensoría del Pueblo.  
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Instead of being sent to a regular prison, the two former colonels were sent to the military 
prison of Vírgen de Fatima, and by 2011 left the prison on a “semi-free status” without 
having paid their monetary reparations of fifty million soles (Páez, Hidalgo, and Aguirre 
2014). These developments reiterated the practice of impunity from both military and 
civilian justice systems. Furthermore, the “exemption from punishment for violations of 
civil and political rights” (Ambos 1997, 11) of convicted criminals during the period of 
transitional and post-transitional justice (2007-2011) questioned assumptions of state 
respect for human rights, including norms of accountability and justice.    
The Bustíos case surfaced once more on June 17, 2013 amidst new investigations 
on other responsible individuals. During his imprisonment, Vidal continued to claim 
innocence and testified against Captain Daniel Urresti, then chief of military intelligence 
unit, and Jhony Zapata as the true responsible agents to the crime (Zileri 2014). 
Following these allegations, the Peruvian judiciary emitted an order for opening an 
evidence period against Urresti for mediated authorship. Notwithstanding however, 
Urresti was sworn in as the Minister of Interior on June 23, 2014.  
President Humala was aware of the allegations against Urresti. However, the 
charges did not prevent him from appointing Urresti (Bustíos 2014). Responding to 
Urresti’s induction to the Cabinet of Ministers, international and domestic human rights 
groups expressed their grievances. Instituto de Defensa Legal publically declared the 
need to seek justice (WOLA 2014), Instituto Prensa y Sociedad and the Coordinadora 
Nacional de Derechos Humanos asked for the president’s reconsideration (RPP 2014), 
and international groups Fundación Para el Debido Proceso, Center for Justice and 
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International Law, and Washington Office on Latin America expressed concerns over the 
nomination of an individual involved in a human rights investigations (WOLA 2014).  
The decision from the executive to grant a public position to a person investigated 
for crimes against humanity sent a message of disrespect towards human rights from the 
state. In doing so, it brought back the culture of impunity from the repressive phases of 
Peru’s political history to a state that had already transitioned to a democratic 
government, adopted international human rights norms, and laid out accountability 
against human rights criminals. The setbacks represented the inconsistent compliance 
with adopted human rights norms, quite differently to that of theorized expectations of 
norm-compliance from a state that addressed past crimes via transitional justice policies. 
  
2.4 Truth-Seeking 
  Parallel to prosecuting human rights criminals, Peru engaged in legislative 
reforms that adjusted domestic standards with international norms of transitional justice, 
including truth-seeking policies. This section examines the implementation and state 
compliance with truth commissions. As truth and justice were regarded as a preexisting 
condition for reconciliation from the past (Silva 2002, 88), it was not unexpected to see 
states adopting measures of truth-seeking and prosecutions. For Peru however, truth-
seeking was adopted prior to the start of litigations against principal human rights 
criminals (e.g., heads of state). The decision reflected the public’s low level of trust 
towards judicial institutions (Laplante and Theidon 2007, 243). From the victims’ 
perspectives in particular, the legal system “may be viewed with suspicion,” since it 
failed to protect them previously during the years of political violence (Laplante and 
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Theidon 2007, 243). For states in these conditions, hence, truth-seeking could be seen as 
the optimal choice to initiate processes of addressing the past.   
 
Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 
 To provide a thoughtful response for victims of conflict, an inter-institutional 
group was set up by the Ministry of Justice, led by prominent jurist and human rights 
advocate Diego García Sayán (González Cueva 2006, 74). Under the Supreme Resolution 
304-2000, passed during Paniagua’s government, the group explored possibilities of 
establishing a truth commission. Participants included state organs (e.g., Ministries of 
Justice), Defensoría del Pueblo, and domestic NGOs (e.g., Conferencia Episcopal 
Peruana)  (Congreso de la República 2000). The result of the working group was the 
establishment of the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR; Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission), twenty-second of its kind in the international system. 
 The mandate of the Commission covered all forms of violations of fundamental 
rights including acts perpetrated by state and armed groups from 1980 to 2000. CVR also 
carried an ethical obligation to criticize society’s ceguera (blindness) towards human 
rights violations and engage in a moral restauration of citizens on the basis of 
“conocimiento, reconocimiento, arrepentimiento y perdón” (understanding, recognition, 
repentance, and pardon) (Lerner 2002, 30). The commissioners included professors, 
lawyers, religious leaders, sociologists, a retired air force general, and other professionals 
of various formations (Pinto 2005, 57). The President of the Commission was Salomón 
Lerner Febres, a vocal critic of the Fujimori government. During and even after his 
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mandate, Dr. Lerner was subject to death threats, “te voy a matar como un perro” (I will 
kill you like a dog), from individuals who opposed the work of CVR.8  
 The commissioners sought to provide an interpretation of the “underlying causes” 
of violence, recommend policy reform, and contribute to the efforts towards justice and 
reconciliation (Transfer Commission of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Peru 2014, 1). CVR submitted its Final Report on August 28, 2003. The Report 
calculated a total of 69,000 Peruvians killed or disappeared in the internal conflict, 
26,259 of them in Ayacucho between 1980 and 2000 (Transfer Commission of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of Peru 2014, 12). A disproportionate majority of the 
victims resided in poor rural areas and spoke indigenous languages as their mother 
tongue. The profile of the victims pointed to the deep rooted inequality within Peruvian 
society that played a part in the violence (Hayner 2011, 37; Lerner 2004, 208). Also, the 
commission established state responsibility for 37 percent of the deaths and 
disappearances and Sendero for the rest of the deaths and disappearances (54 percent).  
 The mandate of the Commission did not extend to hold anyone legally 
accountable. However, the Report included victims and relatives of victims’ testimonies, 
including the names of the violators. Seventy-three individual cases of violations were 
investigated and published, which extended from extrajudicial executions in an Ayacucho 
hospital in 1982 to the extrajudicial executions that occurred in the Japanese 
ambassador’s residence in 1997 (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2003). By 
listing the details of the crimes, CVR initiated conversation amongst state branches 
                                                          
8 Author’s interview with Dr. Salomón Lerner Febres, Former President of the Comisión de la Verdad y 
Reconciliación, July 7, 2014, Lima. 
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responsible for litigating human rights abuses to explore possibilities of seeking justice. 
These goals were more specifically included in the proviso of volume VII of the Final 
Report. It stated, that the “Commission expected diligent action” from the Ministry of 
Public of the human rights violations and that when in fact after a “prudential lapse of 
thirty days no evidence of action existed, it would ask the Ombudsman’s office” to 
intervene in formulating accusations against perpetrators (González Cueva 2006, 88).  
Although not to the extent of the South African truth commission that offered 
“individualized amnesty” for perpetrators that came forward (Hayner 2011, 13), in this 
way CVR also assumed an active role for accountability. 
   
2.5 Compliance with CVR: Reparations 
 CVR’s Final Report sustained that justice could not be obtained only through 
punitive actions of the state (i.e. criminal proceedings), but that it had to be 
complemented in other dimensions (Lerner 2007, 12). CVR’s recommendations resulted 
in some important legislative advances in reparations policy. However, even the 
institutionalization of reparations faced administrative difficulties.  
 Finalizing the Final Report on January 2003, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission also began studies on drafting a bill to provide “substantial stimulus for the 
implementation of its recommendations” with a Law Establishing the National Council 
for Reconciliation (Transfer Commission of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Peru 2014, 316-319). Under Article 9 of the law, CVR suggested the inclusion of a 
comprehensive set of transitional justice programs. One of them was the Programa 
Integral de Reparaciones (PIR; Integral Program of Reparations). PIR aimed to recognize 
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the “gravity of the harm caused by the State’s failure to protect the victims,” recuperate 
the “rights and dignity of citizens” through public gestures of memory, apologies, and 
letters to families, and provide “judicial rehabilitation” for victims to establish their “full 
and effective” civic and political rights (Laplante 2014, 76-77). The policies constituted 
the “materialization” of the recognition of pain and suffering of the victims of violence 
(Guillerot and Magarrell 2006, 31).  
 A Comisión Multisectorial de Alto Nivel that was in charge of follow-up of state 
policies in the fields of peace, collective reparations, and national reconciliation (CMAN) 
was created by presidential decree on February 2004 (Macher 2014, 241). The political 
period during which CMAN was established and a national plan for reparations was 
explored, coincided with Toledo’s government that pushed to address past violations. 
Thus, the work of CMAN was facilitated through cooperation from the government.  
 Months into the work, Congress passed Law No. 28223 that created the National 
Registry for Displaced people under the auspices of the Defensoría and “put into law the 
concept of absence due to forced disappearance during the period 1980-2000” (Hayner 
2011, 38). A year later on July 20, 2005, Congress unanimously approved Law No. 
28592 Ley de Reparaciones (Law of Reparations), with the objective to establish PIR for 
victims of violence. Additional legislative measures were passed in 2006 to complement 
PIR, including Consejo de Reparaciones (Council of Reparations: CR) that was in charge 
of elaborating Registro Único de Víctimas (RUV) (registry of victims).     
 The implementation of reparations policies however, has not been without 
difficulties. Local governments continued to consider reparations as a work only 
involving the central government and others did not regard it as an issue of priority in 
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their region (Defensoría del Pueblo 2008, 42). Moreover, even central state agencies have 
not been cooperative in promulgating reparations. According to the Defensoría, until 
2012, the Ministry of Housing, Construction, and Sanitation had not implemented any 
measure in consideration for the victims (Defensoría del Pueblo 2013, 22). The lack of a 
unified front from government agencies in charge of executing the reparations plan 
limited the efforts to provide victims with an integral form of recognition. 
 Specific reparations projects handled directly by PIR also did not meet the needs 
of the victims and their families. PIR annually assigns funds for the payment of personnel 
specialized in areas of health to provide services to victims and their families. For the 
most part, health professionals are Spanish speakers who lack the linguistic capacity to 
communicate with the majority of victims, whose mother tongue is an indigenous 
language. Also, as these personnel are not given training on the customs of the rural and 
indigenous communities, the extent of their work has had a limited reach (APRODEH 
2008, 33).    
 The victims’ registry Registro Único de Víctimas encountered similar 
bureaucratic difficulties which prevented the reparations program from being universally 
applied to all victims. The principles of nondiscrimination, equity, and equality in 
international human rights law (Guillerot 2006, 153), which accompanied reparations 
norms was disregarded. These were the result of politically influenced discriminatory 
victim coverages that chose to recognize one group but not the other. PIR defined the 
beneficiaries of reparations as victims of displacement, arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, 
rape, and abductions from security forces, armed forces, and auto-defense committees. 
Families of deceased or disappeared persons, children born as a result of the violence, 
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children recruited by auto-defense committees, persons unjustly accused on charges of 
terrorism and betrayal to the state, and those who became undocumented as a result of the 
armed conflict were also eligible (CNDDHH 2014, 34). However, the broad definition 
excluded former guerillas and even members of the state forces.  
 Some scholars would even argue that the exclusion of members of insurgent 
groups as beneficiaries to reparations targeted women. For instance, numerous women 
alike Martha Quintimari Naco who were forcefully recruited to Sendero and subject to 
human rights violations, were not eligible for compensation (Castillo and Navarro 2014). 
Similarly, other guerilla members who were equally subject to violations during or after 
their imprisonment (de Waardt 2013, 837), as explained in CVR’s Final Report with the 
case of the military base Los Cabitos, were not allowed to claim reparations. Los Cabitos 
was the military base that served as a place of detention, torture, and assassination from 
1983 to 1990. It is not known how many individuals were taken to Los Cabitos to be 
tortured and assassinated without due process, only then to be burned in the furnace that 
continues to exists today in La Hoyada (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2003; 
CNDDHH 2013; APRODEH 2014).  
 The implementation of collective reparations programs also faced administrative 
obstacles. On June 2007, before the finalization of RUV, collective reparations towards 
communities that suffered human rights violations were instituted. Reparations were 
distributed through various small projects in affected communities of violence. And only 
a small portion of reparations were allocated for victims of sexual violence. Moreover, 
the reparations programs in function for women’s health were located in urban areas, far 
away from the rural communities where the majority of women who had been subject to 
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sexual violence resided (APRODEH 2008, 33). The status of collective reparations, fell 
short of the objectives to expand basic services that also included women’s health 
(CNDDHH 2014, 34).  
 Adding to the problems of compliance with reparations, Peru enacted reforms that 
modified PIR. On 2011, García passed Supreme Decree No. 051-2011-PCM. The Decree 
set a time limit for identifying reparations recipients (El Peruano 2011). Under Article 1 
of the Decree, the final date for the identification of beneficiaries was designated for 
December 31, 2011. The Decree also allocated a specific amount of fund for reparations, 
at 10,000 SOL (~3,582.96 USD) per victim of disappearance, death, sexual violence, or 
victims who were handicapped. However when the decree was implemented, 10,000 SOL 
was modified to be given for each victims’ families. Furthermore, victims and family 
members that failed to register until December 2011 were excluded from reparations 
(Castilla and Navarro 2014).  
The arbitrary decisions were criticized by victims’ family groups such as the 
Coordinadora Nacional de Afectados por la Violencia Política. Nonetheless, the decree 
continued with no avail. Nearly three years later, the new government of Humala 
responded to victim groups requests by passing a Supreme Decree No. 221-2014-EF that 
expanded the amount of the reparations program to 5,899,749,400 SOL (roughly 
equivalent to 2,114,612,309.92 USD) (El Peruano 2014). However, Humala’s Decree 
also did not include an official reactivation of the victims’ registry, thereby restraining 
the applicability of reparations to only those registered victims prior to December 2011. 
 As of July 2014, there were 189,639 registered victims, 7,289 more than 182,350 
victims that registered by July 2013. The majority of them were victims of violence, 
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while the rest were made up of families of victims. Thirty-one percent of the victims 
await to receive reparations (Castilla and Navarro 2014) and the rest that registered after 
December 2011 still anticipate for state modification of the law. In states emerging out of 
a long period of internal armed conflict, reparations by the new regime ought to be 
“intended as acts of assertion of the rights themselves,” to reestablish the basis of 
legitimacy and not only aim to address the breach of an individual person’s rights (Rubio-
Marín 2006, 25).  
The observation of the period after the implementation of reparations policy, a 
phase that extended beyond that of the spiral model, revealed the discrepancy between 
the theoretical expectations of compliance and follow-up with reparations policies and 
the experience on the ground. Rather than see a behavior of continued norm compliance 
with adopted norms via a consistent follow-up and administration of reparations for 
victims of human rights abuses, the examination of the post-policy period described a 
situation that fell short of meeting expectations of compliance. Such conclusions were 
also seen with legislative changes that originally were to align the state with international 
human rights standards.      
 
2.6 Compliance with CVR: Legislative Changes 
 CVR’s Final Report also recognized the importance of strengthening international 
human rights norms in domestic law that had been neglected by former regimes. 
Compared to the 1979 Constitution, international law within the Constitution of 1993 had 
less influence in the administration of justice and due process. In fact some of the 
provisions in the 1993 Constitution violated human rights norms, namely the right to life 
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in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 4 of the American 
Convention. Article 54 of the 1993 Constitution established that the death penalty “se 
impondrá por delitos de traición a la patria y homicidio calificado, y por todos aquellos 
que señale la ley” (will be applied to crimes of betrayal against the state and homicide, 
and all others as seen fit with the law) (Tribunal Constitucional 1993). As Article 235 of 
the 1979 Constitution applied the death penalty only in cases of betrayal of the state in 
case of an external war, the 1993 Constitution amplified the applicability of the 
violations, disregarding the respect for the norm of the right to life. 
 The Final Report from the Commission asked the state to first recuperate certain 
normative standards from the 1979 Constitution. One of them was Article 101. Under the 
Article, “Los tratados internacionales celebrados por el Perú con otros estados, forman 
parte del derecho nacional” (international treaties celebrated by Peru with other states, 
form a part of national law) (Congreso de la República 1999). Moreover, if treaty norms 
were analogous to the ones that were already in the constitution, then international norms 
had direct incorporation as internal norms (Rubio Correa 2012, 103). In cases in which 
treaty norms did not preexist in the constitution, then they would obtain a constitutional 
rank, and could only be modified with a constitutional reform process. Article 101 also 
included the regulation of constitutional hierarchy of international treaties. It stated, in 
situations of conflict “entre el tratado y la ley, prevalece el primero” (between 
international treaties and national law, international prevailed over the domestic) 
(Congreso de la República 1999). 
 Parallel to the recuperation of Article 101, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission also recommended a reform of Peru’s penal justice system to accommodate 
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international norms emerging from ratified international treaties (i.e. the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, among others). However, on both the proposed 
adjustment to the constitution and changes to the penal code, the state did not comply 
with CVR. For example, Peru ratified the Inter-American Convention on Forced 
Disappearances of Persons on February 8, 2002. Despite the adoption of the Convention, 
the norm of forced disappearance in Peru’s Penal Code Article 320 (adopted on February 
21, 1998) was not adjusted in accordance with international standards. The definition of 
forced disappearance under Article 320 conditioned the crime to be “debidamente 
comprobado” (duly verified) (Medina Otazu 2000). The interpretation made it confusing 
and difficult to define the responsibility in the sentence, as it required evidentiary 
assessment to process the crime. Furthermore, Article 320 only considered as subject of 
crime “the official or public servant” that deprives a person of their liberty as the 
perpetrators (Código Penal del Perú 2008). This categorization of the norm did not 
include all other subjects of criminal participation established in Article II of the Inter-
American Convention on Forced Disappearances of Persons. Even after CVR’s 
recommendations, Article 320 remained unchanged. Peru’s unwillingness to cooperate 
with legal modifications was criticized by the IACHR on numerous occasions, with the 
latest one to date on June 10, 2012 (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
2012).  
 
2.7 Compliance with other Norms: Mecanismo Nacional de Prevención 
 Peru also demonstrated lagging efforts in complying with other international 
normative obligations. Along with thirty-one states, in 2006 Peru ratified the Optional 
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Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. Party-states had one year to adopt legislative reforms with 
respect to the Convention, due to the non-self-executing nature of the treaty that required 
corresponding processes to accompany implementation. Protocol provisions involved the 
creation of a Mecanismo Nacional de Prevención, which oversaw the status of prevention 
of torture and the establishment of the Subcomité para la Prevención that inspected 
detention centers of the security and armed forces (Sanz Mulas 2008, 160).  
A year into the ratification of the protocol however, the state failed to comply 
with changes to domestic legislation. Peru also continued to violate treaty obligations 
through practices of torture. From 2009 to 2010, 139 cases of torture and ill and 
degrading treatment were registered (CNDDHH 2011, 26). The findings were particularly 
important as the period fell after the prosecution of Fujimori in 2009. The trial 
demonstrated a marker of domestic compliance towards international norms of 
accountability. Fujimori’s conviction however, did not influence the state’s respect 
towards the prevention of torture. In a report to the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Commission of Jurists and the 
domestic NGO Comisión de Derechos Humanos criticized Peru’s continued use of 
torture and its unwillingness to take preventative actions (CIJ and COMISEDH-PERU 
2012). The government also did not provide protection and access to justice and 
reparations to victims of torture.  
The preventative mechanism that had been approved by the Consejo Nacional de 
Derechos Humanos on 2010 had to wait four years for approval. Understanding the 
urgency of the status of torture in Peru, international affiliates of the Coordinadora 
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Nacional de Derechos Humanos, such as Amnesty International, voiced their calls for the 
state to implement the mechanism (Amnistía International 2013). Even the United 
Nations Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture urged Peru to implement a 
mechanism for the prevention of torture (La República 2013). Partly as a result of the 
pressures from the transnational advocacy front, four years later on June 11, 2014 
Congress approved the creation of the Mecanismo Nacional de Prevención.  
The long awaited passage of Mecanismo could have been regarded as another 
marker of state’s efforts at complying with adopted international human rights norms. 
However, along with the Mecanismo, Peru also advanced measures to counteract its 
effects. On January 13, 2014, Law No. 30151 was passed. The new law modified 
subsection 11 of Article 20 of the penal code referring to the use of arms and other 
methods of defense for armed forces and security personnel (Congreso de la República 
2014). The changes included the exoneration of security forces personnel for killings or 
lesions resulting from their occupational functions (Congreso de la República 2014). 
Hence, while Mecanismo sought to implement standards against torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Law No. 30151 provided security forces 
with impunity for any future torture related violations. The law was heavily criticized by 
human rights groups (CNDDHH 2014), which were disregarded by the state. Once again 
the state found a way to circumvent human rights norms within legal boundaries. A step 






2.8 Causes of Limitations: Domestic Front of Transnational Advocacy 
Peru’s behavior in the period following the institution of transitional justice 
policies painted a concerning picture of a state struggling to maintain compliance with 
norms. Interestingly for Peru, the same causes that helped it reach the last phase of norm 
adoption in the spiral model also restricted it from continuing its efforts of norm respect. 
This section explores some of these, the first of which was related to domestic human 
rights groups. Particularly, the political vulnerability of domestic human rights groups 
resulted in the loss of momentum for the sustained state compliance towards norms.  
The spiral model of human rights envisioned the advocacy movement both 
domestically and transnationally as a unified force. Earlier studies on the role of 
nongovernmental organizations in Iran and Egypt point to the failure of the spiral model 
to recognize divisions in civil society with regards to human rights (Stachursky 2010). As 
Jetschke and Liese argue, domestic human rights movements may be divided along 
institutional grounds, between grassroots groups, religious organizations, and NGOs 
operating at the national level (Jetschke and Liese 2013, 31). Such was the case for Peru. 
Domestic advocacy groups’ involvement in Peruvian politics brought out the institutional 
differences between various groups, fragmented the human rights movement, and 
affected Peru’s norm compliance behavior.   
Leading up to the fall of Fujimori in 2000 and the transition into Valentín 
Paniagua’s interim presidency (2000-2001) that ushered in democratic governance, 
Peru’s human rights NGOs remained united in confronting past violations. As human 
rights researcher Iris Jave observes, human rights advocates representing various NGOs 
joined the interim government of Paniagua to help the new government prioritize 
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addressing past abuses of the internal war.9 Similar to other neighboring states in 
transition (e.g., Chile), key government political positions were filled with people that 
had “long trajectories of working for the defense of human rights” (Youngers 2003, 436-
437). For instance, the executive secretary of the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos 
Humanos, Susana Villarán was appointed as the Minister of Women.   
The groups that these human rights advocates in Paniagua’s government 
represented, formed a part of the transnational advocacy front during the early years of 
repression. Faced with regimes that muted opposition and detained suspected terrorists 
for fifteen days without charges (Cleary 1997, 91), domestic NGOs reached out to 
international affiliates, forming a transnational advocacy network for the protection of 
human rights. From as early as 1982, Comité de Derechos Humanos de Cusco asked the 
Organization of American States (OAS) to investigate human rights abuses. Human 
rights advocate Javier Diez Canseco even traveled to Washington seeking support from 
the Washington Office on Latin America, members of U.S. Congress, and the OAS to 
exert pressure on Peru (Youngers 2003, 127). These efforts paid off through the 
connections established between international and domestic groups, such as Federación 
Latinoamericana de Asociados de Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos (FEDEFAM). 
FEDEFAM’s support for Peruvian victims’ families included the establishment of a 
Comité de Apoyo in Peru and the 1982 FEDEFAM regional congress held in Peru 
(Youngers 2003, 114). 
                                                          
9 Author’s interview with Coordinator Ms. Iris Jave, Institute for Human Rights and Democracy-Pontifical 
Catholic University of Peru, July 14, 2014, Lima. 
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As expected from the spiral model, during the last phases of norm adoption 
domestic and international human rights networks pressured the state to “achieve 
sustainable improvements of human rights conditions” (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 31). 
Transnational advocacy influenced the state to reform its policies in accordance to 
international norms and implement changes that reflected these standards. Among them, 
transitional justice policies were also included. Jave explains that, “el movimiento de 
derechos humanos había impulsado la creación de la Comisión de la Verdad” (the 
human rights movement gave way to the creation of the Truth Commission).10  
Over time, domestic advocacy began disintegrating. Previously, the principal 
objective of human rights organizations focused on preventing the possibility of human 
rights disappearing in the public agenda. However in the period that followed democratic 
transition, without a common opposition to confront (i.e. the authoritarian regimes), the 
focus of the movement began to change. From campaigning on recuperating democracy 
and freeing innocent prisoners, the movement expanded its reach to truth-seeking and 
reparations to victims. In this process, numerous small organizations emerged and have 
yet to have a say in expressing their demands (Bebbington, Scurrah, and Bielich 2011, 
238). Some human rights activists characterize such developments as the evolution of the 
aim of NGOs that diversified their purpose beyond that of addressing past abuses.11 Other 
                                                          
10 Author’s interview with Coordinator Ms. Iris Jave, Institute for Human Rights and Democracy-Pontifical 
Catholic University of Peru, July 14, 2014, Lima. 
11 Author’s interview with Dr. Francisco Soberón, President of the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos, 
July 11, 2014, Lima. 
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human rights defenders, regard the change as a fragmentation of the human rights 
movement.12  
Institutional divisions started manifesting more prominently during this period, 
with NGOs setting agenda preferences according to their own objectives. For instance, 
the Movimiento Ciudadano Para Que No Se Repita (PQNSR) created on June 2003, 
primarily worked on observing the compliance of CVR’s recommendations. The PQNSR 
represented the “cara popular” (popular face), with victims and activists from local 
human rights committees participating (Bebbington, Scurrah, and Bielich 2011, 235). If 
the PQNSR embodied the victims and activist side of human rights, the Coordinadora 
Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDDHH) represented the NGO side. Its membership 
included eighty-one local organizations, along with international supporters. The 
CNDDHH acted as the spokesperson for the human rights movement since 1984, 
focusing on themes of innocent prisoners and recuperating democracy. Despite their 
differences, the two organizations worked together in pushing for the respect of human 
rights.  
Tensions between the organizations manifested in the first trimester of 2009, 
which coincided with Fujimori’s conviction. The CNDDHH worked to lobby the national 
government in promoting human rights and PQNSR focused on work that was more 
symbolic (Bebbington, Scurrah, and Bielich 2011). Additionally, whereas PQNSR 
represented victims’ groups that were based in rural areas, the CNDDHH worked 
together with international supporters that remained in urban centers. Differences 
                                                          
12 Author’s interview with Coordinator Ms. Iris Jave, Institute for Human Rights and Democracy-Pontifical 
Catholic University of Peru, July 14, 2014, Lima. 
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between the CNDDHH and PQNSR were based on the provincial urban divide and the 
victim centered versus human rights focused objectives (Bebbington, Scurrah, and 
Bielich 2011; Bebbington, Scurrah, and Bieliech 2009). Furthermore, the centralization 
of the PQNSR and CNDDHH in Lima, structured the relationship between province 
based advocacy groups and those in the capital in a hierarchical position. Given the 
differences, many smaller provincial organizations that worked with both groups 
expressed frustration in managing their networks (Bebbington, Scurrah, and Bieliech 
2009) and in promoting their cause.  
Issues of domestic fragmentation and the different agendas each group pursued 
shifted the concern of Peru’s human rights from the transnational to the domestic level. 
For example, Amnesty International’s Urgent Action (UA) Bulletins decreased from 194 
UAs from 1990 to 1999, to a smaller number of 45 UAs from 2000 to 2007. When a state 
reaches a high level of political openness with democratic transition, the need for 
domestic organizations to call upon “AI [Amnesty International] to initiate UA 
campaigns begins to decline” (Meernik et al. 2012, 241). The lowered rate of violations 
accounted by Amnesty shed more light to the shift of human rights discourse from the 
international to the domestic level. As Peru’s human rights organizations enjoyed more 
power to proliferate, they relied less on international partners.  
Taking a step further, these views also conformed to the idea that societies with 
greater degrees of openness are associated with decreasing levels of UAs (Meernik et al. 
2012, 244). In the period from 2000 to 2007, when the state returned to democratic 
governance and instituted transitional justice policies, Peru enjoyed a greater degree of 
political openness. As a result, international attention, as measured through the number of 
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UAs, towards Peru’s human rights also declined. This is particularly important to point 
out in the assessment of the post-transitional justice period, as states like Peru that are 
gradually taken out of the international spotlight suffer setbacks to norms compliance. 
Hence to a certain extent, for human rights to be respected more consistently, it may be 
necessary for transnational advocacy to continue overseeing states’ record of compliance. 
The political involvement of human rights NGOs in the years following the 
transition to democracy, also contributed to dividing the human rights movement. Human 
rights groups “lobby public authorities and share information with one another and the 
public in their efforts to set human rights standards and protect individuals from human 
rights violations” (Clark 2009, 87). Thus, advocacy groups worked to influence 
governments to better uphold citizens’ human rights. The President of Asociación Pro 
Derechos Humanos (APRODEH) Dr. Soberón noted that the NGO work by default is a 
political one, because it has “incidencia política” (political incidence).13 However, when 
NGOs partook in supporting presidential candidates with a history of human rights abuse, 
they placed themselves in a contradictory position of neglecting human rights norms. 
Peruvian NGOs became heavily involved in the 2011 presidential elections, with 
frontrunners Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of Alberto Fujimori, and former lieutenant 
colonel of the armed forces Ollanta Humala. The elections were characterized by leading 
national newspapers as a race between a candidate that represented cancer (i.e. Humala) 
and the other that symbolized AIDS (i.e. Keiko) (El Comercio 2009).  
                                                          
13 Author’s interview with Dr. Francisco Soberón, President of the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos, 
July 11, 2014, Lima. 
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Despite the human rights record of each candidate, Instituto de Defensa Legal 
(IDL), the CNDDHH, and the APRODEH declared their support for Ollanta Humala. 
The executive director of the IDL Ernesto de la Jara even released a statement of his 
support for Humala, who was identified by victims as Captain Carlos, responsible for the 
forced disappearance of civilians in the military base in Madre Mía (Burt 2014, 167). 
Humala also faced accusations from former sergeant of the armed forces Segundo Gómez 
Reátegui, who identified him as the assassin of “a unas seis personas” (around six people) 
in Venenillo in 1993 (Peru21 2011). Stating that “ten years of dictatorship cannot 
compare with the concerns regarding Humala,” the director argued that Humala would be 
better than the return to “fujimorismo” with Keiko Fujimori (WOLA 2011). In a similar 
way, the CNDDHH and APRODEH expressed support for Humala by launching the 
campaign of “Fujimori Nunca Más” (Fujimori Never Again) (García 2011). The 
campaign continued in the 2016 presidential elections with Keiko Fujimori also running 
as a candidate. The objective was to impede all possibilities of Keiko’s election. 
However, the politicization of prominent human rights organizations supporting a 
candidate with a marred human rights past also retracted the credibility of the movement 
as being susceptible to political influences. 
The Defensoría del Pueblo was also vulnerable to political influences. Despite the 
Defensoría’s positive role in advancing the respect for human rights norms (Pegram 
2011, 232), the institution experienced problems of political interference that delayed its 
commitments towards accountability. The Defensor (ombudsman) is elected and removed 
by Congress with two-thirds majority votes for a five-year term (with one reelection), 
enjoys immunity and the same prerogatives as other congressmen, and must be a lawyer 
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(Constitución Política del Perú 1993). Prior to the election, at times a Special Multiparty 
Commission is formed that takes recommendations in selecting candidates (Congreso de 
la República 2011). Therefore in the election process, Congress can exert power to 
dissuade a candidate from being recognized as the Defensor. The appointment of the first 
Defensor Jorge Santistevan (1996-2000) did not seem to be subject to political 
influences. However, Walter Albán (2000-2005) who assumed office following the 
resignation of Santistevan14 remained in an “interim status…subjected to repeated rebuffs 
by Congress” (Pegram 2011, 231). The situation has also been relevant for the vacancy of 
the ombudsman position from 2011 to 2016. Although Eduardo Vega Luna assumed the 
position of acting ombudsman since Beatriz Merino’s resignation (2005-2011), the 
official Defensor has yet to be elected. The vacancy has made the election of ombudsman 
subject to partisan politics, with political parties declaring their support for particular 
candidates (El Comercio 2014).  
The susceptibility of the Defensoría to political influences also extended to the 
laws that governed the institutional functions. Perhaps this was the unavoidable fate of 
the institution, created within the structural confines of Congress and whose decisions are 
subject to revision by other organs of the state. In Peru where there is no challenge to 
admissibility, the acts of the Defensoría are subject to revision by the judiciary and 
reconsidered only through a writ of reconsideration (Article 20 and 31 of the Basic Law 
of the Ombudsman) (Volio 2003, 246). Moreover, executive dominance in Peruvian 
politics resulted in indifference towards the work of the Defensoría even from President 
                                                          
14 In Peru, the law indicates that the existing ombudsman can “appoint his substitute when he is unable to 
continue in office, where temporarily or upon his resignation” (Volio 2003, 235).  
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Toledo and García (Pegram 2011, 240), that undermined the importance of the institution 
for the promotion of human rights norms in Peru. Hence, despite the work of the 
Defensoría in human rights advocacy, the institution’s position under government 
oversight weakened the impact of its work towards sustaining human rights 
compliance.      
 
2.9 Democratic Transition and Former Power Circles 
The presence of previous regime elements (i.e. political and military circles of 
power) that continued to hold power in government presented the greatest impediment for 
Peru’s compliance with transitional justice norms. Their position hinted at the possibility 
of an unfinished regime change or a regime change that accompanied the evolution of 
former regime circles into the new democratic government. Regime change generally 
accompanies the process of democratic transition and norm acceptance. During this 
change when a “dividing line” is marked “between an abusive past and a future rights-
respecting regime,” (de Greiff 2012, 55) states come to “accept the validity of 
international human rights norms” (Risse and Ropp 2013, 8). This point was theorized by 
the spiral model as part of the norm internalization process. In the case of a state that 
transitions from a civilian led authoritarian regime, there was still the possibility that 
civilian leaders of the former regime re-equilibrate the “system of short democratic 
transition” to profit from the new government in power (Linz and Stepan 1996, 69). Peru 
fit the characteristics of a state in this form of regime transition, with former political 
power holders such as Fujimori and García maintaining their presence in the new 
democratic government.  
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Peru’s former political circles created obstacles to the pursuit of justice, as many 
of them were implicated in human rights crimes. Scholars argue that when “central 
decision-making authorities lack the institutional means to control” or effectively “make, 
implement or enforce decisions,” the state experiences a stage of limited statehood 
(Börzel and Risse 2013, 65-66). The new democratic government of Peru faced similar 
conditions, with a limited capacity in seeking accountability due to the obstruction of 
seeking truth, reparations, and justice from former regime holders.  
Political poles of power centered on two former presidents and human rights 
criminals, Alan García and Alberto Fujimori. When García took office in 1985, he 
promised to “usher in new respect for human rights” (Kirk 1995, 357). Contrary to his 
promises, a year into the presidency, García was linked to the Accomarca massacre 
(1985), the massacre of 224 prisoners suspected of terrorist activities in El Frontón, 
Lurigancho, and Santa Barbara (1986), and extrajudicial executions in the Cayara, 
Erusco, and Moyopampa communities (1988) (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 
2003). Though García ordered these crimes, at the time he avoided responsibility and 
“demanded those responsible to be sanctioned” (Crabtree 1992, 110).  
During his second term from 2006 to 2011, García continued his contradictory 
human rights discourse. García’s government put “frenos” (brakes) on human rights 
advancement.15 Peru enforced reparations policies via the Plan Integral de Reparaciones 
and simultaneously promoted a government agenda contrary to CVR’s recommendations 
on legislative reform and the norm of accountability (Rivera 2010, 21). Vice President 
                                                          
15 Author’s interview with Dr. Francisco Soberón, President of the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos, 
July 11, 2014, Lima. 
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and retired admiral Luis Giampietri, openly opposed CVR’s work, “accused human rights 
advocates of freeing terrorists,” and “called for a new amnesty for the security forces” 
(Root 2012, 116). Giampietri was also involved in the crimes at El Frontón, for which 
García was being investigated. Soon investigations of García and Giampietri were 
shelved by the courts, “a decision that was upheld by the Constitutional Court in 2008” 
(Root 2012, 116). The court’s decision demonstrated the vulnerability of the judicial 
organ to García’s power. Political interests of human rights perpetrators were prioritized 
to that of the advances that had been made for the respect for norms. 
Regional human rights institutions were also challenged during García’s 
government. Amnesty’s Urgent Action Bulletin No. 250 from 2006, details how García’s 
political party Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) suggested Peru’s 
withdrawal from the American Convention of Human Rights (Clark 2014). When the 
proposal failed, APRA legislators put forward Legislative Decree 1079 on September 
2010, that ordered the closure of human rights cases against members of security forces if 
no decision had been reached in 36 months following investigations (Root 2012, 116). 
The decree did not get instituted. Nonetheless, the decree served as an indicator of the 
continued strength of the political opposition against human rights trials.  
The political alliance between old political circles exacerbated the respect for 
norms of accountability. During García’s presidency, an alliance was built between the 
“apristas” and “fujimorismo” (Rivera 2010, 21). Although the trial against Fujimori 
began during García’s term, his government was not proactive in seeking Fujimori’s 
extradition from Chile. Adjunct procurator to Fujimori’s case Dr. Ivan Montoya noted, 
“el gobierno de García no tiene interés en la extradición” (García’s government is not 
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interested in the extradition) of Fujimori (Noriega 2006). In fact, García deactivated two 
state organs that were working on the extradition of Fujimori. A peculiar thing to note 
about the alliance between García and Fujimori was that “García es amenazado durante 
el gobierno de Fujimori, logra a huir del país y vive ocho años fuera” (García is 
threatened during the government of Fujimori and succeeds in fleeing the country and 
living eight years abroad).16 However, when faced with human rights accusations, the 
two presidents overcame political differences and united in delaying investigations. The 
“slowness of trial proceedings in the Peruvian justice system” (Clark 2014) and lack of 
collaboration from state organs on legal proceedings (Arce 2010, 37), substantiated this 
conclusion.  
Deliberate limitations to compliance mirrored the political mood of this period. 
Various politicians started to refer for the necessity to “superar esa etapa” (overcome 
that phase) and end the “persecución” (persecution) against security personnel (Ciurlizza 
2007, 236). The obstacles extended to reparations policies. Consejo de Reparaciones 
(Council of Reparations), the entity in charge of elaborating the collective and individual 
victims’ registry under PIR faced bureaucratic difficulties. Consejo was moved from the 
Ministry of Justice to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and finally re-
institutionalized in the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. The institutional changes 
created operative difficulties for Consejo to effectively distribute reparations. 
Additionally, unprecedented financial cutbacks to its 2009 reparations budget obligated 
                                                          
16 Author’s interview with Coordinator Ms. Iris Jave, Institute for Human Rights and Democracy-Pontifical 
Catholic University of Peru, July 14, 2014, Lima. 
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Consejo to reduce remunerations for human rights victims (Defensoría del Pueblo 2013, 
24).  
Humala’s presidency (2011-2016) continued restricting compliance with 
accountability through the contestation of sentences for previously convicted 
perpetrators. The debate on Fujimori’s amnesty and the slow rate of accountability 
towards García were influenced by their political presence in government. The challenges 
to Fujimori’s conviction were the result of the continuing power of his supporters in 
Humala’s government. Revealed in the political scandal of Lópezgate, Humala’s 
administration granted extra official security to Oscar López Meneses, a person linked 
with Vladimiro Montesinos, who was in charge of death-squad operations during 
Fujimori’s presidency (Ortiz Martínez 2013). Though López Meneses was not charged 
for human rights crimes, the presence of a former Montesinos crony under the protection 
of Humala’s government revealed a connection between Humala and Fujimori’s power 
circles.  
The link between Humala and Fujimori surfaced with the delayed process of 
justice for violations of sexual and reproductive rights from Fujimori’s presidency. 
Disguised as a vaccination policy under the Programa de Salúd Productiva y 
Planificación, from 1996 to 2000 the state forcibly sterilized over 2,000 women of low 
economic status and indigenous descent (Aderete 2004, 96). The program came under 
fire during the presidential campaign of 2006. Humala criticized the program, while 
Fujimori’s daughter Keiko did not condemn the practice (CNDDHH 2011, 109). Despite 
his previous critical stance, once elected into office, it took Humala nearly three years to 
initiate any judicial process against Fujimori. Only after vocal criticisms from 
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international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, as of this 
writing, the case is being currently revised by the Senior Prosecutor (Alonzo C. 2014).   
Sympathizers to Fujimori’s regime also included politicians linked to García’s 
party, Humala’s party, and Fujimori’s party, that on multiple occasions asked for the 
reevaluation of Fujimori’s sentence (La República 2011) or to grant him a “humanitarian 
pardon” (Human Rights Watch 2012). The Minister of Justice in 2011 went as far as to 
publically attack the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of the incompetent rulings 
for the case of Chavín de Huántar that implicated Fujimori once again in another human 
rights crime involving the Japanese ambassador’s residence in 1997 (CNDDHH 2011, 
38). Although Fujimori has yet to be released from jail as of this writing, his privileges as 
an inmate are far different from other political prisoners (Tuteve 2014). In such ways, the 
presence of former political circles continued to exert significant influence in thwarting 
the compliance of human rights norms. Another layer of impediment related to old 
political circles of power was the military, which served a critical role in Peruvian 
politics.  
2.10 Former Power Circles: Armed Forces 
Impunity and difficulties faced in the judicialization processes were the results of 
a greater problem of an unfinished regime change from an authoritarian to a civilian rule. 
The armed forces exerted significant power during the civilian authoritarian leadership of 
Fujimori. The abrupt democratic transition did not prepare the incoming government with 
a structural plan to reduce the power of the armed forces. Although not to the extent as 
reforma pactada (pacted transition), where former regime personnel negotiated their 
amnesties before transition (Linz and Stepan 1996), Peru’s armed forces discussed 
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judicial protection with political leaders and they also formed a part (either indirectly or 
directly) of the new governing apparatus that chose to comply with human rights norms. 
These conclusions contradicted the process of norm internalization from the theoretical 
perspective of the spiral model, where regime change was regarded as an implied 
condition for the state to accept the validity of international norms. Hence, in Peru’s case, 
norms were adopted and transitional justice policies were established after democratic 
transition that also accompanied the presence of the institution that was responsible for 
human rights abuses (i.e. armed forces). 
In the course of Peru’s regime transition, power transferred to new elites in 
government that incorporated democratic values (McClintock 2006, 96). Human rights 
were given significant consideration, with the objective to address past crimes through 
transitional justice. Truth-seeking policies were immediately introduced (CVR 2001-
2003) and other advances in transitional justice continued throughout the early years of 
political transformation. During the last years of Humala’s presidency, the government 
also seemed to push the human rights agenda by institutionalizing norms through state 
reforms. The Vice-Ministry of Human Rights was created under the Law of Organization 
and Functions of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (Law No. 29809), with the 
aim to fortify state organs’ efforts in promulgating compliance and respect for human 
rights.  
Nonetheless, the sustained power of the armed forces,17 represented through 
military personnel serving in the new democratic governments, created an unfavorable 
                                                          
17 Author’s interview with Dr. Eduardo Bocanegra Dargent, Department of Political Science-Pontifical 
Catholic University of Peru, July 1, 2014, Lima. 
76 
 
environment for human rights. Peruvian political scientist Dr. Dargent points out, “un 
poder militar fuerte que va más allá del militar que está en el poder, no es que con la 
caída del régimen, se haya acabado la resistencia intensa hacia la justicia transicional” 
(military power that goes beyond that of the individual military personnel that is in 
power, is not one that from the fall of a regime, will stop the intense resistance against 
transitional justice).18 In other words, military power that sustained itself for many 
decades could not suddenly disappear with the fall of Fujimori. During Fujimori’s 
government, the power of the armed forces was equivalent to that of the civilian 
authorities. The military “issued its own political proclamations” and on “several 
occasions” sent tanks into the streets of Lima to “reinforce its positions” (Levitsky 1999, 
79). As the “reliable domestic ally” for Fujimori, the military acquiesced an inordinate 
amount of power (Rochabrún 1996, 22).  
 The pronouncement of military power became more evident in the new 
democratic governments with the implementation of transitional justice policies. The 
military originally decided to collaborate with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
A committee of support to the Commission was created in each military institute and in 
the offices of joint armed forces command (Arce 2011, 19). And high-profile leaders of 
the armed forces voluntarily agreed to be interviewed by the commissioners, including 
the former head of the Fuerzas Especiales del Ejército (DIFTE; Special Forces of the 
Army) General Luis Pérez Documet, who was later found to be guilty for the 
                                                          
18 Author’s interview with Dr. Eduardo Bocanegra Dargent, Department of Political Science-Pontifical 
Catholic University of Peru, July 1, 2014, Lima. 
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assassination of nine students and a professor at La Cantuta University (El Diario 
Internacional 2007).  
The cooperation from the armed forces did not last long. The military expressed 
its concerns towards the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s negative portrayal of the 
institution. The military characterized its role as secondary to that of the state arguing of 
only having obeyed the orders from the state and trying to “canjear impunidad por 
obediencia” (exchange impunity for obedience) (Arce 2011, 39). Justifying their actions 
and in efforts to discount CVR’s findings, the military set up their own version of truth-
seeking via the Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército (Permanent Commission 
of the Armed Forces History). A year before CVR’s Final Report publication, the 
military commission published its own version of the truth with En Honor a la Verdad 
(In Honor of the Truth).19 The report provided a unilateral rhetoric of the good natured 
military work (Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú 2012, 5). Given 
the period of regime transition and the widely respected findings of CVR’s Final Report, 
the military’s publication was not as well respected. Efforts from the military to counter 
human rights advancements however, could not be dismissed readily.  
The power of the military might have been expected to decrease with democratic 
transition and the state instituting transitional justice policies. Indeed, security reform was 
a major component of the truth-seeking process initiated with interim President Paniagua 
and Toledo’s government. The changes were part of the necessary conditions for a state 
in transition to consolidate democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996, 63). Reforms that 
                                                          
19 Author’s interview with Dr. Farid Kahhat Kahatt, Department of Political Science-Pontifical Catholic 
University of Peru, July 12, 2014, Lima.  
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recognized international norms and included human rights in domestic discourse were 
also envisioned in the spiral model, during the periods in which the state engaged in 
regime change (Risse and Ropp 2013; Risse and Sikkink 1999). First, the Peruvian 
National Police (PNP) that had been almost a minor branch of the Army during the 
internal armed conflict were released back to the civilian mandate (Basombrío Iglesias 
2012, 235). The next set of reforms focused on integrally restructuring the armed forces. 
The changes included handing over military control of the intelligence services to the 
civilian side and regulating military justice codes, by incorporating military justice within 
the state’s judicial organ.  
Although the reforms from 2000 to 2006 were enacted during a more democratic 
environment, the effects remained limited. This was contrary to the expectations of the 
spiral model that expected domestic practices to conform with international human rights 
norms in the final phase (Risse and Ropp 2013, 10) and compliance with adopted norms 
to persist. Perhaps it can be argued that as Peru was yet to be considered as a consolidated 
democracy its behavior did not meet the model’s expectation. Nonetheless, the model did 
not suspect conflict over human rights to occur in the latter phases, where the state even 
addressed past crimes via prosecution of former leaders, truth-seeking efforts, and 
reparations for victims. Peru’s case demonstrates that although the state may prioritize 
human rights, if the security apparatus from the previous regime retained some level of 
political control, it could still obstruct the compliance with internalized norms. 
Over the course of the years, the armed forces even succeeded in recovering some 
traditional powers in military justice. During García’s second presidency when Fujimori 
was convicted, legislation that reflected conformity with international human rights 
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norms were promulgated alongside countermeasures. For example, Legislative Decree 
1094 reincorporated delito de función (all illicit conduct committed by police or military 
during service) that was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal in 2006. 
Complementary to delito de función, Law No. 29166 that allowed the military to 
establish their own rules on the usage of lethal force was passed in 2008. According to 
the law, lethal force could be used to avoid vandalism to private and public property, 
recuperate control over public essential services, and avoid the destruction of public 
property, public essential services, and private property (Rules 31-55). In a similar way, 
Humala passed Law No. 30151 that modified the penal code. The changes to the 
subsection 11 of Article 20 of the penal code exonerated armed forces and police 
personnel from being held responsible for killings from their occupational functions 
(Congreso de la República 2014). The reforms thus, granted inordinate amounts of power 
for the security forces, without considering international human rights standards.  
The presence of the armed forces became strengthened with military personnel 
taking key positions in the political apparatus. This included the election of former 
lieutenant colonel of the military Humala as the president of Peru (2011-2016) and 
individuals of military background, also accused of human rights violations, being 
appointed to high-level positions in Humala’s government. Humala appointed retired 
General Wilver Calle as the Minister of Interior (May-June 2012) who served as a 
military attaché with Humala in South Korea (2003). Calle only served a brief term that 
ended with accusations of corruption related to Fujimori’s government (Peru21 2012). 
Retired military General Daniel Urresti followed after, as the Minister of Interior from 
June 23, 2014. Urresti’s appointment, who is currently undergoing investigations for the 
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Bustíos-Saavedra’s case, further revealed the executive’s disregard for human rights and 
the power of the military in political circles.  
 
2.11 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the compliance of human rights norms in Peru considering 
the period after the adoption and implementation of transitional justice norms through 
policies of truth-seeking, reparations, and prosecutions. In doing so, it took upon the 
spiral model of human rights as its starting theoretical perspective in analyzing the status 
of norms internalization.  
Changes after the phases enumerated by the spiral model demonstrate that Peru’s 
compliance with norms in the post-transitional justice policy period continued to be 
influenced by external and internal limiting factors. They included the disintegration of 
the domestic front of transnational advocacy and the existence of old power circles in 
government that supported institutions responsible for past violations. Taken together, 
these factors pointed to the conclusion that states had not internalized norms to the extent 
as theorized and expected from the spiral model. Peru’s case also hinted at the limitations 
of transitional justice policies in being able to achieve reconciliation for fractured 
relationships in societies emerging from conflict (Kovras 2014, 3).  
Particularly, the case of Peru pointed to the necessity to revisit the importance of 
former regime elements. Despite theoretical expectations of states that transitioned to 
democracies and where previous regime elements were expected to not exert power 
towards the latter part of norm acceptance, they continued to play a significant limiting 
role in the state’s respect for norms. Even the interim and first post-transition 
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governments that sought to uphold democratic values and initiate investigations into 
human rights violations of the internal war faced obstacles in carrying out their 
objectives. The challenges were directed from former political circles of power that 
included delays in justice from political leaders against human rights work. In the period 
of governments that followed, Peru continued to encounter difficulties to norm 
compliance. Presidents who were accused of their own human rights violations during the 
internal armed conflict did not want to pursue accountability to avoid conviction. And 
new laws adopted by the state expanded the jurisdiction of the armed forces, many of 
whose personnel had yet to face accountability for human rights crimes (e.g., Daniel 
Urresti).  
The fragmentation of the domestic front of transnational advocacy also decreased 
the level of influence of human rights oversight on the state. The absence of a unified 
advocacy front, which had been the principle driving force in the advancement of norms 
for Peru, exacerbated the condition for human rights. Although Peru advanced to 
implementing transitional justice policies and reached the final phase of norm acceptance, 
this observation hinted at the need to continue the work of transnational advocacy in 
order to sustain norm compliance for states.  
As Salomón Lerner, former president of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission noted, there is still significant work to be done to change Peru’s behavior 
with respect to international human rights norms.20 This perspective suggested that the 
adoption of norms through domestic legal changes alone may not guarantee compliance. 
                                                          
20 Author’s interview with Dr. Salomón Lerner Febres, Former President of the Comisión de la Verdad y 
Reconciliación, July 7, 2014, Lima. 
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The Peruvian state depended more on the political power of the governing apparatus and 
their interests in determining the state’s position towards human rights. Taken together, 
these conclusions suggest the necessity to reconsider the logic of consequences argument 
in dealing with cases of states that revert to their old behavior disregarding human rights 








Once known as the Switzerland of Latin America in the 1950s, Uruguay lived 
through a period of state repression between 1962 to 1972 and from 1973 to 1985. At the 
time, neighboring countries Argentina and Chile’s dictatorships were considered to have 
constructed the “most powerful and sophisticated apparatuses of repression found 
anywhere” (Wright 2007, xiii). Uruguay’s situation fared equally with grave violations of 
human rights, at times a “step above” that of Argentina and Chile,21 earning the title of 
the Torture Chamber of Latin America (Lessa 2011, 179). Since Uruguay’s democratic 
transition in 1985 and questions of accountability that began to be examined starting from 
Jorge Batlle Ibáñez’s presidency (2000-2005), Uruguay has made significant progress in 
truth-seeking and prosecutions, with the conviction of two former presidents Juan María 
Bordaberry and Gregorio Álvarez in 2010 and 2009. However, Uruguay’s human rights 
changes were overshadowed by neighboring states’ contributions to human rights.  
The chapter sheds light on the understudied case of Uruguay that confronted past 
abuses, adopted norms, expanded transitional justice norms in the region, and yet in 
recent years took a step back in continuing its course of norm respecting behavior. 
                                                          
21 Phone interview with Dr. Felipe Michelini, Human Rights Lawyer and Member of Parliament, Uruguay, 
November 20, 2014. 
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Uruguay was not the first state to prosecute former heads of state nor to try a 
democratically elected leader. Peru was the first. However, Uruguay was one of the few 
states in Latin America to put two former presidents in jail for “gross human rights 
violations” (Skaar 2013, 485). Moreover, Uruguay followed Argentina and Peru to 
become the third state in the region to legislatively (via a new law) overturn an amnesty 
law that protected security personnel from prosecution for human rights crimes (Skaar 
2013, 483). And yet, a year into the decision on February 22, 2013, the Supreme Court 
declared the new law unconstitutional. The Court’s decision against amnesty annulment 
legitimized the return to impunity and produced a “huge atrapamiento” (huge 
entrapment) for human rights progress and compliance.22  
These recent changes to norm adoption make Uruguay an important case in 
understanding the role between norm adoption, domestic policy implementation, and 
compliance, a look beyond the spiral model’s final phase of norm acceptance. Why did a 
state that adopted norms and addressed past accountability behave contrary to its record? 
In the sections to follow, I outline how Uruguay’s process of norm adoption and 
compliance changed throughout the years. Then, I focus on Uruguay’s behavior after the 
implementation of international norms of transitional justice (e.g., accountability) via 
domestic policies. I assess state compliance with the follow-up of recommendations from 
the official state truth commission Comisión para la Paz (Commission for Peace), 
distribution of reparations programs, and continued prosecution of human rights 
violators. The prosecution includes both the domestic and regional, including compliance 
                                                          
22 Online Skype interview with Dr. Jo-Marie Burt, Department of Political Science, George Mason 
University, December 15, 2014. 
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with rulings from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. From these observations, 
the chapter addresses why states vary in compliance after norm adoption and what 
conditions limited or helped states in respecting norms.  
Similar to Peru and South Korea, the chapter reveals how Uruguay’s compliance 
record, for a state that transitioned to a democracy in 1985 and began addressing past 
accountability from 2000, fell short of demonstrating norm-compliant behavior. Out of 
this observation, this chapter discusses how Uruguay’s compliance record raises 
questions for existing theories of norm development, such as the spiral model. 
Particularly it relates to the final phase of the model, where once the “promotion of 
human rights had become official state policy,” the model did not “expect political 
conflicts over human rights to occur” (Jetschke and Liese 2013, 33) and expected 
“sustained behavior and domestic practices that conform to the international human rights 
norms” to continue (Risse and Ropp 2013, 10).  
 
3.1 Tracing Human Rights Development: Spiral Model 
Uruguay’s repression lasted from 1967 to 1985, including Pacheco Areco’s 
civilian government (1967-1972), and Juan María Bordaberry (1972-1976) and Gregorio 
Álvarez’s (1981-1985) civic-military authoritarian governments. Areco’s government 
used Prompt Security Measures (PSM) to suppress human rights and weaken government 
opposition. Under the system, freedom of expression was curtailed with censorship and 
closure of newspapers (e.g., Época). The extent of repression was such that newspapers 
from neighboring authoritarian states were re-censored in Uruguay (Galeano 1989, 242).  
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The state abuse of power provoked a violent reaction from the opposition. 
Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (MLN-T) carried out acts that caused 
“loss of life and liberty to innocent people” as well as to “members of the forces of 
repression” (SERPAJ 1992, 18). These were in the form of kidnapping of businessmen 
with government links and unlawful killings of security personnel accused of torture 
(Martorell 1999, 65). Pacheco retaliated with more draconian measures that involved the 
armed forces. This change allowed the military to exert unprecedented control over the 
security apparatus and produced additional violations of rights, including the right to 
habeas corpus (Roniger and Sznajder 1999, 13).  
The United States also contributed to the aggravation of human rights violations. 
Uruguay’s police intelligence unit transformed into a national security agency and 
American agents such as Dan Mitrione, were sent to train officers on torture methods 
(McSherry 2005, 56). Mitrione was part of the AID Public Safety Program that gained 
“notoriety” for its torture training (Sikkink 2004, 63). Washington also set up a military 
training program. From 1950 until 1972, “a total of 2,119 Uruguayan personnel were 
trained at U.S. facilities” (Ryan 2005, 292). Training continued even after Uruguay 
collapsed into a civic-military dictatorship in June 1973.  
 
Denial and Tactical Concessions  
Shortly after repression, Uruguay moved to the stage of denial. According to the 
spiral model, during the early phases domestic opposition may be too weak to “constitute 
a serious challenge to the regime” (Risse 2002, 267). In situations where the “primary 
guarantors of rights” (i.e. the state) violate human rights, domestic human rights 
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advocates have “no recourse” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 12) and seek the support from 
international advocacy groups. As Uruguay had little experience in human rights activism 
(Markarian 2012, 270), domestic human rights groups sought support from organizations 
such as Amnesty International that expanded the work of transnational advocacy by 
bringing the issue of torture to transnational discussion. This was the first time that 
Amnesty started a campaign against torture pertaining to one particular state (Ruiz 2006, 
63). The campaign mobilized individual advocates, with Amnesty Chairman Ivan Morris 
asking readers of The New York Review of Book on March 18, 1976 for their support in 
the fight against torture (Morris 1976). Moreover, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross contributed to the pressure, with visits to Uruguay in 1976 and 1979.  
The network pressure from above empowered Uruguay’s grassroots movement. 
Some new groups that emerged were Madres y Familiares de Uruguayos Detenidos 
Desaparecidos en Argentina (Madres; Mothers and Families of Detained and 
Disappeared Uruguayans in Argentina) and Servicio Paz y Justicia (SERPAJ; Service of 
Peace and Justice). Originally, Madres developed out of individual families and mothers 
that traveled to Argentina to locate the disappeared. In Argentina, they worked with 
lawyers from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights who helped prepare habeas 
corpus petitions on the disappeared (Bucheli et al. 2005, 24). After numerous failed 
attempts at individual petitions in Argentinean courts, the families consolidated under the 
official name of Madres in 1977 to promulgate their cause.  
Servicio Paz y Justicia (SERPAJ)-Uruguay provided support for the Madres. 
Among the members of SERPAJ-Uruguay were mothers of the disappeared in Argentina 
(Bucheli et al. 2005, 30), who understood the emotional turmoil experienced by 
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Uruguayan mothers. SERPAJ originally formed in Medellín, Colombia in 1974, with the 
objective to promote peace and justice (SERPAJ 2014). When Father Luis Pérez Aguirre, 
a Jesuit priest, gathered a group of Christians to protest abuses on 1981, SERPAJ 
expanded to Uruguay and gained spotlight in the human rights movement (Markarian 
2012, 270). Due to their activism in representing families of political prisoners and the 
disappeared, the group was declared illegal by the state in 1983. Nonetheless, SERPAJ 
continued their work by calling for the winner of 1984 democratic elections to hold the 
armed forces “accountable for their actions” (Markarian 2012, 270).  
Religious and regional organizations also participated in advocacy. In contrast to 
Uruguay’s Catholic Church, which remained “silent” (Markarian 2012, 670) in the face 
of oppression, the Committee in Defense of Human Rights for Southern Cone Countries 
(CLAMOR) served as a liaison between victims of human rights, relatives, and the 
Uruguayan government. Urging the state to free political prisoners, CLAMOR 
“publish[ed] paid features requesting information about missing children whose parents 
were political activists” (Barreto 2014, 107). Additionally, regional intergovernmental 
organizations also joined in pressuring the government. A report from Uruguay’s Senate 
investigating commission released on October 6, 1970 confirmed the routine practice of 
“especially harmful torture methods” within the jurisdiction of Montevideo police 
(SERPAJ 1992, 12-13). These acts were in violation of Article 3 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions that prohibited “murder, mutilation, torture, cruel, humiliating and 
degrading treatment” for all persons in enemy hands (ICRC 2010). Substantiating the 
Senate’s report, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued recommendations 
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to Uruguay on improving their respect for norms (Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights 1978).  
In addition, liberal democratic states, such as the United States, that had 
previously pursued an agenda of aggravating human rights violations in Uruguay, joined 
in pressuring the state to improve its human rights record. The Carter administration, in 
particular, maintained a position of promulgating respect for human rights. As Kathryn 
Sikkink and Uruguayan Legislator Felipe Michelini noted, “con Carter, hubo un cambio 
importante” (with Carter, there was an important change).23 Carter’s government made 
sure that “derechos humanos fueron incorporados…a la política exterior” (human rights 
were incorporated… in foreign policy) (Bohoslavski 2012, 165) and used conditional 
assistance to reduce human rights violations (Bejesky and Bohoslavsky 2014, 311). The 
U.S. ambassador to Uruguay under Carter was therefore quite empathetic about human 
rights and took a proactive approach, asking embassy aids in Montevideo to find the 
number of political prisoners in Uruguay the day he arrived.24  
The spotlight of the international community, international advocacy groups, and 
domestic human rights groups originally was met with harsh denial from Uruguay’s 
government. For example, in response to the criticisms from the U.S. government and the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Uruguay responded with a “detailed 
denial of these allegations” and argued that “repressive actions” were necessary to thwart 
possible leftist terrorist action (Davis 1995, 58). Moreover, Uruguay termed 
                                                          
23 Phone interview with Dr. Felipe Michelini, Human Rights Lawyer and Member of Parliament, Uruguay, 
November 20, 2014; Author’s interview with Dr. Kathryn Sikkink, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard 
University, November 3, 2014, Boston  
24 Author’s interview with Dr. Kathryn Sikkink, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, November 
3, 2014, Boston. 
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Washington’s pressure as an “unacceptable intervention in its internal affairs” and in 
1978 withdrew all requests for economic assistance, which they believed were linked 
with improved human rights records (Davis 1995, 57).  
Nonetheless, the sustained pressure from transnational advocacy ultimately 
brought signs of change through legislative reforms. These mainly consisted of the 
ratification of international treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination (r. 1981) and the American Convention on Human Rights (r. 
1985). According to the spiral model, states view treaties as a “low cost” tactical 
concession (Risse and Ropp 2013, 6; Risse and Sikkink 1999). It is an easy way to get 
international pressure off their backs while still violating human rights. Uruguay’s 
government considered treaty ratifications in a similar way. Despite ratifying 
international agreements, the state continued to uphold Acto Institucional No. 5 that 
restricted the role of international organizations in protecting human rights enshrined in 
international agreements (Espiell and Gallicchio 2008, 408). As most treaties were 
protected by international organizations, conditioning their role implied that treaties were 
restricted in exerting their influence.    
Even under these conditions however, states miscalculate the effects of treaty 
ratification. Treaties can still constrain states’ behavior because they define the 
“expectations gap when governments fail to live up to their provisions” (Simmons 2009, 
14). The gap that is felt by voters when states do not adhere to treaty standards can affect 
a regime’s political future. Treaty norms also facilitate transnational advocacy work on 
holding states accountable for violating specific norms. For instance, in Amnesty’s 
Urgent Action Bulletin NS006 concerning Uruguayan political prisoner Waldemar De 
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Leon and deteriorating prison conditions at Libertad in 1979, Amnesty referred to 
Uruguay’s obligations in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Clark 2014). Such 
references pointed out the state’s non-compliance with international obligations.  
With the empowerment of advocacy groups and the concessions that followed, the 
repressive regime’s support base dwindled. To regain legitimacy, the regime made an 
effort to “appear” to be a government on its way to democracy (SERPAJ 1992, 49). 
Leaders’ desire for popular validation (Markarian 2005) resulted in the voluntary 
submission of the newly drafted constitution to a plebiscite on November 28, 1980. The 
new constitution was rejected by 57.9 percent of voters on November 1980 (Lessa 2013, 
45). These results revealed the public’s challenge to the regime. Such developments led 
the military to reconsider its position (Agüero 1998, 388), which culminated in regime 
transition.  
 
Latter Phases of Norm Adoption and Extending the Spiral Model  
Uruguay’s democratic transformation was distinctive from Peru’s experience of a 
ruptured break and shared more similarities with South Korea (examined in the next 
chapter). Regime transition was based on negotiations, an agreement reached between the 
military government leaving power and existing political parties (except for the Blanco 
Party) that were seeking democratic elections and a return to democracy. The specific 
time of transition has been subject of debate for scholars with some that refer to 1980 
(Michelini 1996), when the new constitution from the military government was rejected 
by a popular vote of 58 to 42 percent, and others that point to 1984-1985, when the 
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elections took place.25 As both years experienced important events that contributed to 
Uruguay’s norm progress, this chapter suggests the period from 1980 to 1985 as the time 
of democratic overture.  
When the “opposition won the plebiscite,” traditional political parties “emerged… 
less frightened” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 152). Faced with issues of legitimacy, the 
military agreed on a transition. Pacto del Club Naval (Naval Club Pact) was a negotiation 
between former military leaders and the incoming civilian regime that inaugurated its 
power on March 1, 1985. Similar to Korea, negotiations allowed the former regime to 
maintain power (Linz and Stepan 1996, 154; Sieff and Vinjamuri Wright 1999, 759) and 
pressure the new government of Julio María Sanguinetti (1985-1990) to provide “implicit 
promises of no prosecution of military officials” (Roht-Arriaza 2011, 160). On December 
22, 1986, Sanguinetti passed the Ley de Caducidad (Amnesty Law). The law challenged 
the accountability norm for crimes of the past by waiving the “state’s right to judge 
military or police officers involved in violation of human rights” (Allier 2006, 87).  
Such developments however did not discourage other human rights progress. 
Uruguay adopted Law 15.737 or the Ley de Pacificación Nacional (National Pacification 
Law) that provided “amnesty and release of all political prisoners” except those who had 
“committed blood crimes” (Lessa 2013, 135). Special commissions such as Comisión 
investigadora sobre situación de personas desaparecidas y hechos que la motivaron 
(Investigatory Commission on the Situation of Disappeared Persons and the Motivating 
Actions) were also formed on April 1985, to investigate the assassinations of 
                                                          
25 Phone interview with Dr. Felipe Michelini, Human Rights Lawyer and Member of Parliament, Uruguay, 
November 20, 2014; Online Skype interview with Dr. Jo-Marie Burt, Department of Political Science, 
George Mason University, December 15, 2014. 
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Congressman Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz and Senator Zelmar Michelini and disappearances of 
detainees during the military dictatorship (Michelini 1996, 160).  
Other progress was related to transnational advocacy. The passage of the Ley de 
Caducidad brought on increased mobilization of transnational advocacy against 
impunity. Amnesty International and Americas Watch expressed the necessity for the law 
to be annulled (Americas Watch Committee 1989). Amnesty even engaged in direct 
conversations with Sanguinetti on multiple occasions, eliciting a letter response from the 
president in defense of the amnesty law (Kritz 1995, 600). Domestic advocacy added to 
the pressure with the 1989 campaign against the Ley de Caducidad. Along with Madres, 
SERPAJ, Asamblea Nacional Por la Verdad y Justicia (National Assembly for the Truth 
and Justice), and families of victims, advocates gathered together to pressure the state 
from below (Roniger 2012, 56). They organized an “Ayuno Contra la Impunidad” (Fast 
Against Impunity), a remembrance day for the disappeared, proclaimed an open letter 
criticizing government policy, and in celebration of the International Day of Human 
Rights held a march on Plaza Independencia (Bucheli et al. 2005, 60).  
These groups also created a Comité Nacional Pro-Referendum (National 
Committee for Referendum) that launched an anti-amnesty initiative, collecting 
signatures for a referendum, allowed under Article 79 of Uruguay’s Constitution 
(República Oriental de Uruguay 1966). Human rights experts expressed concern over 
whether issues of human rights can be subject to a public vote.26 This was reflective of 
                                                          
26 Author’s interview with lawyer María Leoni Zardo, Center for Justice and International Law, October 15, 
2014, Washington D.C; Author’s interview with Dr. Kathryn Sikkink, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard 
University, November 3, 2014, Boston; Author’s interview with Director Eduardo González, International 
Center for Transitional Justice, November 10, 2014, New York.   
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the idea that “los derechos humanos no se plebicitan” (human rights are not put to 
plebiscite).27 As other political experts argued however, referendums were central to 
Uruguay’s political culture and democratic history.28  
The results of the referendum revealed public resistance towards change, with 57 
percent voting in favor and 43 percent voting against the law (Mazzarovich 2009). For 
over fifteen years that followed, “no truth, no justice” persisted as official state policy 
(Burt, Fried, and Lessa 2013, 2). The Ley de Caducidad however did not prevent 
Uruguay from adopting new human rights norms. Some of the newly adopted norms were 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (r. 1990), Discrimination Convention (r. 1989), 
Equal Remuneration Convention (r. 1989), Convention concerning Occupational Safety 
and Health and the Working Environment (r. 1988), and the Second Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR (r. 1993). As Uruguay upholds the monistic tradition, where states 
international treaty norms are directly applied to domestic law, the ratification expanded 
the pool of human rights norms the state was obliged to respect.    
Additionally, Uruguay also implemented transitional justice policies (2000-2010). 
Such policies included reparations, prosecutions, truth-telling, and “different forms of 
institutional reform” (de Greiff 2012, 49). Truth-seeking in particular is an “essential 
ingredient of justice” (Davis 2014, 89). Uruguay established the state sponsored truth-
commission Comisión para la Paz in 2000 via the Presidential Resolution No. 858/000.29 
                                                          
27 Author’s interview with Dr. Kathryn Sikkink, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, November 
3, 2014, Boston. 
28 Phone interview with Dr. Felipe Michelini, Human Rights Lawyer and Member of Parliament, Uruguay, 
November 20, 2014. 
29 This study regards official state sponsored truth-commissions as the ‘truth-seeking’ transitional justice 
policy. Non-governmental organization SERPAJ published the first truth-seeking report in 1989 that 
documented 4,933 political prisoners and 3,700 who were arbitrarily detained (SERPAJ 1989).  
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The commission was not without flaws. However, the commission’s attempts at finding 
truth and discussions on reparations that emerged represented a symbol of human rights 
progress. Starting with the Commission, legal proceedings against former president 
Bordaberry began on August 15, 2003. Although the case was dismissed on December 
2004, it resurfaced on 2006 with the Tribunal of Appeals that overturned the decision and 
ordered for continued investigations, which ended in his conviction in 2010. 
Simultaneously various reparations policies were implemented, such as Law No. 18.033 
in 2006 that provided individual reparations for individuals who had been unable to 
continue in work for political or union related reasons from February 9, 1973 to February 
28, 1985 (República Oriental del Uruguay Poder Legislativo 2006).  
However, since Bordaberry’s conviction in 2010, Uruguay’s has suffered blows to 
transitional justice. The following sections examine the state’s compliance with adopted 
transitional justice policies by examining the recommendations from the truth-
commission, distribution of the reparations program, rulings on prosecutions, and the 
removal of legislative obstacles to seeking accountability. From these observations of the 
post-implementation period of policies, I determine the internal and external conditions 
that contributed to Uruguay’s norm compliance record. At the international level, 
pressures from transnational advocacy helped in maintaining the state’s respect for 
norms. Contrary to this positive influence, the power of former regime circles in 
government, political party dynamics, conservative nature of the judiciary, and the 
vulnerability of the judicial system to political influences obstructed the state’s 




3.2 Rule of Law and Domestic Prosecutions 
As observed in Peru’s case, strengthening the rule of law contributes to bringing 
transitional justice and “sustained human rights change” (Risse and Ropp 1999, 277). 
Rule of law sets the conditions from which compliance with norms, in this case 
transitional justice policies, become facilitated. For Uruguay, measures of independence, 
status of prosecutions, and the record of compliance with human rights norms revealed 
somewhat of a complex relationship of interactions. I focus primarily on the years of 
transitional justice implementation (2000-2010) and post-transitional justice (2010-
present), while also taking into account the years of democratic transition (1985) and 
enactment of amnesty law (1986), central to discussions on Uruguay’s human rights.  
Even after democratic transition, Uruguay’s system of justice did not function 
independently. Pacto del Club Naval exposed a political culture where “accommodation 
and compromise” became “prized political virtues” (Barahona De Brito 1997, 36) and 
accountability was absent. Partly this was a result of the negotiated transition where it is 
“usually assumed that some kind of tacit agreement was made that the military would not 
be held accountable”.30 For cambio en paz (change with peace), Sanguinetti enacted the 
Ley de Caducidad. The amnesty law discarded the “the right to due process, the 
independence of the judiciary, and equality before the law” (Lessa 2013, 139).  
From 1985 to 2000, the year when truth-seeking was introduced, Uruguay 
recorded a high level of judicial independence (CIRI 2011; Tate and Keith 2009; Heinsz 
2007). Accordingly, Uruguay ought to have demonstrated sustained compliance with 
                                                          
30 Author’s interview with Dr. Kathryn Sikkink, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, November 
3, 2014, Boston. 
97 
 
norms, including norms of accountability related to the crimes of the authoritarian period. 
However with the exception of one isolated case on the disappearance of teacher Elena 
Quinteros in 2000, where the Supreme Court of Justice protected the judge assigned to 
the case from being subject to intimidation (Skaar 2013, 492), the respect for rule of law 
remained limited.  
Changes in regional and global human rights influenced Uruguay’s judicial 
system to become more progressive in the latter years of transitional justice. On the case 
of communist activist Nibia Salsagaray, who died in military custody, the Supreme Court 
ruled against the amnesty law and declared it unconstitutional. Although the decision was 
not applicable to other cases (Soltman 2013, 833), it created a precedent for the Court to 
rule against the amnesty law. The Court repeated the declaration of unconstitutionality 
against the amnesty law once again in 2010, with a new case of human rights violations 
related to Bordaberry who was already serving a thirty-year sentence for extrajudicial 
killings and violation of the constitution (Soltman 2013, 833).  
With Bordaberry’s new conviction on February 2010 and the beginning of the 
post-transitional justice period, Uruguay’s record of human rights compliance improved 
drastically. The developments included Uruguay’s attempts at circumventing the Ley de 
Caducidad. President Tabaré Vázquez (2005-2010) delegated the reinterpretation of the 
amnesty law to the tribunals (Roniger 2012, 69). Also referred to as the “new 
interpretation,” the state sought loopholes to shift the “focus from a broad amnesty to an 
amnesty with some exceptions” (Galain Palermo 2010, 606). As a result, by 2010, “at 
least eight former soldiers and police officers” were convicted for the crime of forced 
disappearance (Skaar 2011, 137), two former presidents and one former minister were 
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arrested and tried, and the first general in “active service” was convicted of murder 
(Skaar 2013, 493-494). These included the conviction of Bordaberry for mediated 
authorship of ten especially aggravated homicides and attack against the constitution and 
the ruling on former chancellor Juan Carlos Blanco for participating in the assassinations 
of Zelmar Michelini and Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz (Prats 2010, 238).  
From 2000 to 2010 during the period of transitional justice, attempts were also 
made to increase the judiciary’s record of seeking justice. On November 2006, the Senate 
voted to approve Law 18.026 that categorized international norms on genocide, crimes of 
war, and crimes against humanity in domestic law (Laura de Giorgi 2013, 85). These 
principles were enshrined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (r. 
2002) and the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (r. March 
4, 2009) (Michelini 2013, 7). Under Article 7 Section 1 Subsection I of the Statute, 
forced disappearance was categorized as a crime against humanity (ICC 2015). Related to 
the Statute, Article I Section B and D of the Inter-American Convention specified the 
state’s obligation to “punish” those persons who committed forced disappearance 
(Organization of American States 2015). As “disappearance of persons” along with other 
crimes against humanity were practiced in Uruguay during the dictatorship periods 
(Galain Palermo 2010, 602), the adoption of these international standards in the penal 
code was regarded as a sign of progress for Uruguay’s human rights.  
 Interestingly, the recognition of forced disappearance as a crime under 
international law was already embedded in legislation that pre-dated Law 18.026. In fact 
the Ley de Caducidad included a provision (i.e. Article 4) that allowed for cases of forced 
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disappearance to be investigated. With the introduction of the new law and Article 4 of 
the amnesty law that supported the norm, the judiciary gained more power to seek justice.  
However, rather than uphold the new international standard that had been adopted 
in domestic law, the judiciary debated the applicability of crimes against humanity and 
thwarted possible convictions. The institution chose to categorize only grave human 
rights crimes committed after 2006 when Law No. 18.026 was established, as a crime 
against humanity. UN Special Rapporteur Juan Méndez regards this view as 
“jurídicamente, un contra sentido” (juridically a counter-argument).31 Such problems of 
interpretation reemerged during the prosecution of General Álvarez in 2007.  
Instead of prosecuting Álvarez on forced disappearance, the Appeals Chambers 
focused on reducing his sentence. Although principles of international law were used by 
judges in litigation, when cases arrived at the Appeals Chambers, the majority of 
sentences were modified. The Chambers disregarded international standards and applied 
criminal offences in Uruguay’s criminal code “prior to their execution (in accordance 
with the non-retroactive principle)” (Galain Palermo 2010, 618). The conversion of 
forced disappearance, a crime against humanity under international law, into an 
aggravated homicide for 37 individuals, shortened Álvarez’s sentence from 26 years and 
8 months to 25 years. Such behavior was not representative of a state that was seeking to 
address past accountability and respecting adopted international norms. 
Even in cases where the remains of bodies did not appear, the judiciary 
categorized disappearances as aggravated homicide (Laura de Giorgi 2013, 86). A case of 
                                                          
31 Author’s interview with UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment Dr. Juan Méndez, American University College of Law, October 13, 2014, Washington D.C. 
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forced disappearance of 28 Uruguayan citizens who were taken from Argentina in 1976 
and tortured in clandestine locations was also ruled by the Supreme Court as an 
aggravated homicide in 2006. Arguing that forced disappearance was a “delito creado 
contemporáneamente” (crime created contemporarily), the Court sentenced those 
responsible to 25 years (Amnistía Internacional 2011, 30). International advocacy groups 
such as Amnesty International declared the decision to be “equivocada” (flawed) and 
called for reevaluation of the sentence (Amnesty International 2011).  
Parallel to the setbacks for norms respect, Uruguay also implemented legislative 
changes that promoted norms of accountability. Law No. 18.831 passed on October 27, 
2011, eliminated the effects of the Ley de Caducidad and was heralded as a historic step 
forward in the “fight against impunity for past crimes” (Amnesty 2011). The new law 
restored the judiciary’s autonomy that had been previously forfeited with the Ley de 
Caducidad and executive interference on cases of human rights violations (Soltman 2013, 
837). Furthermore, Law No. 18.831 aligned Uruguay’s legal system closer with 
international legal standards by enabling “victims or their relatives to seek justice without 
the legal obstacle of the law of impunity” (Michelini 2013, 3). 
Only two years after the establishment of Law No. 18.831 however, Uruguay 
retracted its position and came back to its non-norm respecting behavior. Rather than 
allow for the norm to address past crimes, the Supreme Court declared Article 2 and 3 of 
Law No. 18.831 unconstitutional on February 22, 2013. Article 3 established that crimes 
referred to under Article 1 and 2 are considered as “crimes against humanity pursuant to 
the international treaties” (Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2013). By declaring 
both articles unconstitutional, the Court relegalized the amnesty law, “revalidated the 
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statute of limitations against trying” crimes from the dictatorship (Sharnak 2015, 135; 
Sharnak 2014), and reversed recent Court rulings against the amnesty law. As Jo-Marie 
Burt points out, this in effect brought the amnesty law back on the book, “impeding” 
prosecutions from moving forward.32  
This state behavior raised questions about the theorization that in a consolidated 
democratic system, such as that of Uruguay, compliance with human rights standards and 
the respect for the rule of law persisted (Börzel and Risse 2013, 69). Additionally, the 
relegalization of amnesty laws countered the advances in norms of accountability that had 
been made with the prosecution of two former heads of state. Instead, the Supreme Court 
undermined the “effective enjoyment of the right to justice” (Michelini 2013, 3). The 
judiciary was relegated to its former status, with limited power over which cases to open. 
These processes of change reflected the “long tradition of pressure by the executive and 
political parties on the courts, especially on the SCJ” (Burt, Amivilia Fried, and Lessa 
2013, 18) that made the judiciary “un poder carente de peso politico” (a power lacking of 
political weight) (Skaar 2011, 140).  
Moreover, individual judges’ attempts to pursue accountability on their own 
grounds were discouraged and met with political pressure. Judges who dealt with human 
rights cases and referred to international law in their verdicts, such as Mariana Mota 
faced professional challenges, with the Supreme Court transferring Judge Mota to a 
civilian court in 2013 (Le Goff and Lessa 2013; WOLA 2013). The transfer resulted in 
                                                          
32 Online Skype interview with Dr. Jo-Marie Burt, Department of Political Science, George Mason 
University, December 15, 2014. 
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the dismissal of more than 50 cases related to dictatorship crimes that she was handling 
(Burt 2013).  
The position of the executive towards prosecuting human rights criminals also 
brought negative consequences for compliance with norms of accountability. President 
José Mujica’s (2010-2015) decision of moving “forward into the future” and leaving 
human rights abuses in the “past” implicitly condoned the actions of perpetrators during 
the dictatorship (Soltman 2013, 846). With this stance from the executive, which was not 
shared by all of Mujica’s fellow Frente Amplio politicians (Soltman 2013, 846), the 
judiciary was not urged to prosecute human rights crimes. From the perspective of the 
spiral model, Mujica’s position was unconventional for a state in the period after norm 
adoption. Rather than prioritize accountability for victims, which would be expected of a 
state that engaged in transitional justice policies, Uruguay preferred to put the past 
behind. In a way, Mujica’s stance portrayed Sanguinetti’s approach of cambio en paz.  
Such decisions revealed the failure of the political system to align itself with 
international norms. The “culture of impunity that existed for over 20 years still exerts its 
influence” (Le Goff and Lessa 2013) and the rule of law continues to be vulnerable to 
political influences. Uruguay in many ways did not resemble a state that had reached the 
final phase of norm internalization, adopted international legal standards, and 
implemented transitional justice policies.  
 
3.3 Compliance with the Inter-American Court and Commission of Human Rights 
The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) had a significant role in Uruguay’s 
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compliance record with human rights. The Court and the Commission were important in 
carrying out accountability via litigation against human rights crimes for both Peru and 
Uruguay. Under Article 62 Section 3 of the American Convention on Human Rights, to 
which Uruguay is a party to from April 19, 1985 and also under Article 27 of IACHR’s 
basic mandate, the Commission and the Inter-American Court both have the right to 
consider petitions regarding violation of human rights (Organization of American States 
2013; Organización de Estados Americanos 1969). For states such as Uruguay that have 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, the IACtHR thus has authority to make the state 
“liable” by prosecuting human rights violators (Pasqualucci 2013, 226). In this process, 
they played a “longstanding” role in “advancing state responsibility for serious human 
rights violations” (Tittemore 2006, 431).  
 The role of IACHR became more significant from the moment that amnesty laws 
started prevailing in Latin America. IACHR argued that amnesties for “grave human 
rights actions violated numerous state duties” in the American Convention (Teitel 2000, 
55; Tittemore 2006, 447). These included the right to protect and ensure human rights, as 
well as the victims’ right to judicial protection for those whose fundamental rights under 
the state constitution or in the Convention have been violated (Organización de los 
Estados Americanos 1969). From this position, the Commission made declarations 
against amnesty laws in Uruguay.  
After the failure of the 1989 plebiscite to nullify amnesty, Instituto de Estudios 
Legales y Sociales del Uruguay (Institute of Legal and Social Studies of Uruguay) along 
with Americas Watch and Amnesty International submitted eight cases against the state 
to the Court. This was part of a concerted movement to launch an international campaign 
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against the Ley de Caducidad. On 1992, IACHR responded first to the cases by releasing 
a report on Uruguay’s human rights. In the report, the Commission determined that 
Uruguay was in “breach of its duties” to Articles 1, 8, and 25 of the American 
Convention (Pinto 2012, 35). Article 25 referred to the right to judicial protection, Article 
8 to the right to a fair trial, and Article 1 outlined state obligation to respect all rights in 
the Convention (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1992). The report also 
noted the incompatibility of the amnesty law with the Convention and the necessity for 
the state to “identify those responsible for human rights violations” (Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights 1992). This was the “first time any intergovernmental 
body” directly addressed the “compatibility of an amnesty measure with a state’s 
obligations under a human rights treaty” (Mallinder 2009, 59).  
 Despite the regional push against amnesties, Uruguay’s compliance with norms of 
accountability continued to lag in the transitional and post-transitional justice periods. As 
Canton notes, until the enactment of Law No. 18.831 in 2011, the Commission’s 
decisions against amnesty had no legal impact in Uruguay (Canton 2007). The impact of 
the amnesty law and the Law No. 18.831 becomes clearer to understand in the 
emblematic case of Gelman v. Uruguay. The case spanned across transitional and post-
transitional justice periods and demonstrated the influence of the Inter-American Court 
on Uruguay’s norm compliance.  
 
Gelman v. Uruguay 
In 2006 a petition was made to the Inter-American Commission against the state 
of Uruguay. The case was admitted on March 2007 and in the July 18, 2008 Informe No. 
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32/08 released a year later, the Commission issued a series of recommendations. The case 
fell under the missing children cases during Uruguay and Argentina’s dictatorships that 
included links to both states’ armed forces. On August 24, 1976, Argentinean security 
forces broke into the home of Juan Gelman, an Argentine political activist and poet 
(Davis 2014, 88). Realizing that the poet had fled, in his place the security personnel took 
the son, daughter, and daughter-in-law María Claudia García Iruretagoyena, who was 
seventh months pregnant. Out of the three abductees, María Claudia alone was 
transferred to the headquarters of Uruguay’s Information Service of the Department of 
Defense. After María gave birth, her daughter Macarena was illegally appropriated.   
After Uruguay’s democratic transition, Gelman and his wife from Argentina, 
began investigating the case. They worked with the support from IACHR, IACtHR, and 
intellectuals (i.e. José Saramago) (Laura de Giorgi 2013, 79), who formed a part of the 
transnational advocacy movement for their case. On May 1999, they met with Uruguay’s 
Secretary of Presidency Elías Bluth, to seek support from the state (Bucheli et al. 2005, 
88). The period coincided with Sanguinetti’s second presidency (1995-2000), who denied 
Uruguay’s participation in the disappearances of Gelman family members. Instead, 
Sanguinetti incriminated the poet for promulgating an international campaign of shame 
against Uruguay. Sanguinetti argued that Gelman had worked to “presentarme como… 
insensible a reclamos humanitarios” (present me as… insensible to humanitarian claims) 
(Página12 1999).  
Only with the change in government in 2000, Gelman found some support from 
Uruguay. This was the same year that the official truth-commission Comisión para la Paz 
was established. While Sanguinetti rejected the responsibility of the executive branch to 
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investigate violations that involved the disappearance of minors, stated under Article 4 of 
the Ley de Caducidad, President Jorge Batlle Ibáñez (2000-2005) followed-up on the 
provisions of the law (República Oriental del Uruguay1986). Batlle allowed for 
investigations and recognized the “deuda estatal” (state debt) (Dutrénit Bielous 2005, 
209) for the Gelman family. After a source of information the Gelmans obtained revealed 
the identity and location of María Macarena, Batlle ordered DNA tests to confirm the 
child’s identity (Skaar 2013, 491). Following these developments, Gelman submitted a 
legal complaint in Uruguay on crimes against his daughter-in-law and granddaughter on 
2002. Although the case was stalled until June 27, 2005, it was eventually reopened. In 
the case, Uruguay “partially acknowledged its international responsibility” for human 
rights violations related to María Claudia García Iruretagoyena, María Macarena, and 
Juan Gelman (Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2013).  
It is important to note that Uruguay’s recognition of victims included Juan 
Gelman. The classification of who constituted a victim followed views from the IACtHR. 
According to the Court, the victim’s next of kin have the “right to know the truth about 
the facts of serious human rights violations and who is responsible for them” 
(Pasqualucci 2013, 225). In cases of forced disappearances and extrajudicially 
executions, the “direct next of kin of victims” are considered also as “victims of 
violations of the rights to personal integrity, judicial guarantees, and judicial protection” 
(Pasqualucci 2013, 225). Under this interpretation, family members filing the Gelman v. 
Uruguay case, would also be victims. Thus, Juan Gelman and his granddaughter María 
Macarena, as victims, had the right to know the truth about the disappearance of María 
Claudia and her husband, in addition to the identity of perpetrators.    
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The right to truth was also emphasized in IACtHR’s 2011 ruling in Gelman v. 
Uruguay. The Court required the state to engage in procedural determination of the “most 
complete historical record possible” (Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2011). This 
implied the investigation into truth via an official truth commission, whose report would 
include the crimes and identity of the violators. The Court also ruled that Uruguay had 
the obligation to “ensure judicial determination of individual and State responsibilities” 
(Pasqualucci 2013, 226), requiring the state to prosecute the Gelman case. In particular, 
the Court found the state responsible for the enforced disappearance of María Claudia. 
Referring to the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, 
IACtHR called on the state to take “legislative administrative” and “judicial” measures to 
investigate the fate of the disappeared and “punish” those responsible (Organization of 
American States 2015).  
The involvement of the Court in Uruguay’s human rights cases was 
unprecedented. For the first time in history Uruguay faced regional court jurisdiction for 
violating “fundamental human rights” (Lessa and Fried 2011, 40-41). The Court’s 
sentence included the state’s obligation to investigate the case, publicly acknowledge 
responsibility, place a placard with the names of the victims in the Servicio de 
Información de Defensa (Service of Defense Information), implement a plan of human 
rights for judges and public prosecutors, and establish a system of information for grave 
violation of rights committed during the dictatorship (Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos 2013). The external pressure exerted from the Inter-American Court brought 
Uruguay back to the spotlight on human rights grounds and resulted in greater changes 
domestically.    
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The case and the oversight of the Inter-American Court helped civil society that 
was attempting to keep the issue of accountability and impunity alive in political 
discourse (Burt, Fried, and Lessa 2013). Specifically, the developments that accompanied 
the case brought the issue of the Ley de Caducidad again to the forefront. By this time, 
Uruguay had experienced mixed set of changes to its norms adoption processes. The 
creation of transitional justice policies followed the expectations of a state advanced in 
norm adoption (e.g., Bordaberry’s prosecution in 2010). Additionally, the establishment 
of a national human rights institution (i.e. Institución Nacional de Derechos Humanos y 
Defensoría del Pueblo) on December 24, 2008 demonstrated state compliance with other 
international human rights norms (i.e. Paris Principles). However, the continued existence 
of the amnesty law continued to restrict compliance with norms of accountability.  
On March 2011, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights declared Uruguay’s 
amnesty law incompatible with the American Convention and the Inter-American 
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons. The Ley de Caducidad could not be 
applied to any of the human rights violations committed during the period of state 
terrorism (Lessa and Fried 2011, 40-41). The Court went on further to criticize the law’s 
democratic legitimacy. It argued that the enactment of the law during a democratic 
government and the public’s support of its continued existence did not “automatically 
legitimize” the norms (Lessa and Fried 2011, 40-41).  
Different from the negative response from Sanguinetti towards Gelman, the Inter-
American Court’s conclusions were received by President José Mujica (2010-2015) in a 
more progressive manner. By this time Uruguay had finished truth-seeking via an official 
truth-commission, established a reparations program, and held two heads of states 
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accountable. Despite the opposition headed by Partido Colorado’s Pedro Bordaberry 
(son of dictator Bordaberry) and threats from retired military personnel (Fernandez 
2011), the Senate approved the annulment of the law. On 2011, the National Assembly 
annulled the Ley de Caducidad via Law No. 18.831. The new law legally eliminated 
amnesty, which had been the “main barrier to criminal prosecution of dictatorship-era 
crimes” (Burt, Fried, and Lessa 2013, 1). Law No. 18.831 restored the state’s ability to 
prosecute human rights criminals. As the second referendum on the Ley de Caducidad in 
2011 had failed, with 48 in favor to 52 percent voting against the nullification, the 
adoption of Law No. 18.831 was regarded as a significant step forward in norm 
compliance. 
To the dismay of proponents of justice, rather than act in accordance with norms 
laid out in IACtHR’s rulings and Law No. 18.831, the state backtracked. On February 22, 
2013, the Supreme Court declared Law No. 18.831 unconstitutional. The ruling by the 
Court presented a significant setback for norms of accountability. Amnesty International 
issued a public criticism against the Supreme Court, Uruguayan Legislator Felipe 
Michelini from Frente Amplio declared it an absolute lack of empathy towards victims 
(Michelini 2013, 16), writer Eduardo Galeano protested against the decision, and the 
Washington Office on Latin America also issued calls for Uruguay to comply with its 
normative obligations (WOLA 2013).  
Although the Supreme Court’s ruling was case-specific and not universally 
applicable, it opened up the possibility for the Ley de Caducidad to survive. If the 
Supreme Court chose to declare Law No. 18.831 unconstitutional in other cases, it could 
even derogate the applicability of the law and bring back the admissibility of amnesty. 
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The Court’s decision contradicted the IACtHR’s recommendation for the state to not 
present any obstacles to investigate human rights crimes. This position also demonstrated 
Uruguay’s attempt to invoke internal legal norms to avoid compliance with international 
obligations. Such behavior violated Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, where “a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification 
for its failure to perform a treaty” (United Nations 1980; Ferrand 2013, 651).    
The advances made in complying with international human rights norms in 
accordance with the Inter-American System of Human Rights fell short of leaving a 
sustained change in Uruguay. Obstruction of justice continued even after the state had 
moved to the post-transitional justice phase, after norm adoption. The limiting factors of 
compliance included convoluted political interests from various actors, of which the 
Supreme Court of Justice also shared some responsibility. Uruguay’s judiciary is 
“orthodox” in its legal interpretations and resistant to change (Lessa 2013, 157; Brinks 
2008, 199). As lawyer María Leoni Zardo noted, the “judiciary in Uruguay is very 
conservative” and they hold a unique interpretation of “independence.”33 For the 
institution, independence is not seen in the de facto or de jure spectrum but rather 
understood as their right to maintain the judiciary almost as an autarkic organization.34 
Given this understanding, the judiciary was more reluctant to allow new interpretation of 
existing laws, including the domestic applicability of international law (Lessa 2013, 157; 
Lessa 2012, 145). Such views extended to the application of Law No. 18.831 that was to 
replace the amnesty law, which had shaped Uruguay’s judicial decisions since 1986.  
                                                          
33 Personal interview with lawyer María Leoni Zardo. 
34 Personal interview with lawyer María Leoni Zardo. 
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3.4 Legislative Changes: Truth-Seeking 
For Uruguay and also for Korea, the establishment of an official commission to 
‘investigate’ past crimes came at a slower rate than Peru. I emphasize the investigative 
nature of the commission because neither truth nor reconciliation was mentioned in the 
objectives of Uruguay’s commission. Rather, the emphasis was placed on peace, the 
natural conclusion that followed the end of a “war between antagonistic sides” (Allier 
2006, 89). However, the emphasis on peace and not on accountability, added to the 
mandate that prevented the commission to publically disclose information about the fate 
of victims (Burt, Fried, and Lessa 2013, 10), restricted its role of truth-seeking that could 
help “rebut official lies and myths regarding human rights abuse” (Van Zyl 2011, 49).  
On August 2000, Comisión para la Paz was created. The commission was led by 
two religious figures, three politicians from various political spectrums (Doctor José 
Claudio Wílliman of Partido Blanco, Gonzalo Fernandez of the Socialist Party, and 
Carlos Ramela Regules from Partido Colorado), and labor union leader José D’Elia 
(Comisión para la Paz 2003). The diversity of the group was understood as representative 
of the Commission’s objectivity in approaching ‘peace’ in the aftermath of the repressive 
governments.  
The mission was to investigate the “fate of the disappeared,” including minors 
during the dictatorship (Allier 2006, 89). To the extent that it could find the possible truth 
about a case (Comisión para la Paz 2003), the Commission tried to analyze testimonies 
and evidence by crossing information. However, the Commission only had the power to 
receive information and call witnesses, but not compel the “witnesses or those who are 
allegedly involved in these crimes” to testify before the Commission (Amnesty 
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International 2001). The Commission thus worked with very few resources to determine 
their cases. For this reason, only the fate of one of the persons missing in Uruguay was 
“ascertained completely” and in other cases there was partial (Allier 2006, 89) or even 
wrong ‘confirmation.’ For example, in one highly documented case of Sara Rita Méndez 
and her son Simón Riquelo, the Commission produced a controversial conclusion. 
Méndez was abducted on July 13, 1976 in Buenos Aires by an operative related to Plan 
Condor, and her son, then a 20-day-old-baby was kidnapped after her abduction. Shortly 
after their investigations, the Comisión para la Paz concluded that Simón Riquelo was 
dead (Burt, Fried, and Lessa 2013, 10). In 2002, Simón was found alive in Argentina.  
Additionally, the Commission’s reliance on military informants who provided 
false information further damaged the institution’s credibility. In particular, the 
commission’s overriding conclusion of the disappeared with the Operativo Zanahoria, 
involving the cremation of bodies of the disappeared that were later dumped at sea, came 
under scrutiny. Organizations such as the Familiares de Desaparecidos (Families of the 
Disappeared) urged the Commission to disclose specific dates and the location of the 
cremation sites, which were met by silence (La República 2002). Information about the 
disappeared was disclosed only to individual family members, who were “required” to 
keep the information secret (Burt, Fried, and Lessa 2013, 10).  
In such ways, the Commission’s investigations and findings have been a subject 
of debate. With “classified sources” (Burt, Fried, and Lessa 2013, 10) and a mere total of 
222 reports on cases of missing persons, it lost credibility as a proficient Commission 
dedicated to truth-seeking. Despite its problems, the existence of the Commission 
represented a major step forward for Uruguay in acknowledging the past. Recognition to 
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victims is the goal of all transitional justice measures and it is one of the first demands of 
victims--to be recognized that they have been “harmed, and intentionally so” (de Greiff 
2012, 42). Thus for victims the process of testifying to a Commission provided a form of 
recognition, catharsis, and a means through which they could channel their emotions 
(Roht-Arriaza 1995, 19). The Commission also fulfilled the “ethical and moral obligation 
of the nation” to victims (Skaar 2011, 159). Until its establishment, there had been “no 
admission by the state” (Burt, Lessa, and Fried 2013, 2) of security forces involvement in 
human rights crimes. Although SERPAJ published a report in 1989 that documented 
4,933 political prisoners and 3,700 who were arbitrarily detained (SERPAJ 1989), the 
state did not accept the findings. Hence, the Commission’s recognition that “crimes of 
state had been committed, and that these were carried out by state agents” (Allier 2006, 
91) fulfilled at least some function of accountability, in acknowledging the existence of 
violations, victims, and the identity of perpetrators.  
Comisión para la Paz found 38 cases of disappeared detainees in Uruguay, of 
which 6 were related to Argentinean citizens. Only 20 sites of burial were discovered, 
with the majority in Argentina (Fundación para el Debido Proceso Legal 2010, 226). 
Although the Commission was restricted to focus on the fate of the disappeared, it 
nonetheless made an effort to touch upon probable prosecutions. In the Final Report 
released in 2003, it noted the “state’s duty to defend the law,” referring to the state’s 
responsibility to litigate against human rights perpetrators (Allier 2006, 91).  
Hence despite its limited reach, the Comisión para la Paz made some advances in 
attempting to address crimes of the past. The conclusions of the commission did not have 
a legally binding force. Nonetheless, the commission issued a series of recommendations 
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to improve Uruguay’s compliance with international human rights norms. While they 
were not as extensive as Peru’s or Korea’s commissions, the little amount that they did 
issue managed to bring some positive changes at the domestic level. These included 
reparations policies for the state.  
 
3.5 Compliance with the Comisión para la Paz: Reparations 
  Under international law, states bear an obligation to provide reparations to 
victims of grave human rights violations. Uruguay ratified the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights on 1970. The Covenant entered into force in 1976. Under 
Article 9 Section 5 and Article 14 Section 6 of the Covenant, states are required to 
guarantee reparations for victims of “unlawful arrest or detention” and “miscarriage of 
justice” (United Nations Human Rights 1976). However, political repression during the 
1970s prevented Uruguay from promulgating respect for victims or respecting its 
normative obligations. For this reason, victims appealed to international institutions. On 
the case related to the arbitrary arrest and torture of Hugo Rodríguez against the state of 
Uruguay in 1988 taken to the United Nations, the UN Human Rights Committee ruled 
that Uruguay as a party state to the Convention had the obligation to grant appropriate 
reparations to the victim (United Nations Human Rights Committee 1988).  
Years later in 2000, the internal push for reparations policy came from the 
Comisión para la Paz. The commission recommended reparations in the form of 
“financial indemnification for damages suffered as a result of the illegal acts of 
government agents” for the families of persons killed (Allier 2006, 91). These 
suggestions conformed to theoretical conceptions of reparations in transitional justice, 
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where such policies were understood to include “material assistance (e.g., compensation 
payments, pensions, bursaries and scholarships)” (Van Zyl 2011, 49). However, no 
specification was provided from the Commission as to the extent of the reparations 
policy, whether or not psychological assistance and symbolic measures were to be 
prioritized, and if medical reparations (as had been the case with Peru) would be 
provided.  
The broad framework for what was to be incorporated in the reparations for 
victims, allowed the government to explore various measures to compensate for victims’ 
sufferings. Following the recommendations from the truth-commission, during Vázquez’s 
presidency (2005-2010), Uruguay sought to create a reparations policy. The policy was 
designed to recognize state responsibility in acts of torture, disappearances, political 
incarcerations, forced exile, and other grave human rights violations during civic-military 
regimes (1973-1985), in addition to the period from 1968 to 1972 when martial law 
prevailed.  
The new reparations law was different from Law 18.033 enacted on October 13, 
2006 that distributed reparations for individuals who had been unable to work for 
political or union related reasons from February 9, 1973 to February 28, 1985 (República 
Oriental del Uruguay Poder Legislativo 2006). The new policy amplified the population 
receiving reparations to also include non-working citizens who had been victims of 
human rights abuses (LaRed21 2008). Officially known as Law No. 18.596 or Ley de 
Reconocimiento y Reparación a las Víctimas (Law of Recognition and Reparations for 
Victims) adopted in 2009, for the first time in Uruguay’s history a law formally 
recognized the right of victims to integral reparations. Additionally, the law also 
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acknowledged the responsibility of the state in human rights violations during 
authoritarian periods (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura 2009).  
 Under Article 9, a special commission was formed to oversee policy 
implementation. Comisión Especial de Reparación (Special Commission for 
Reparations) issued documents that accredited victims’ conditions and established 
institutional responsibility for the state to provide medical, economic, and moral 
reparations. The commission was made up of representatives from government and 
human rights defenders from CRYSOL (Association of Former Political Prisoners of 
Uruguay) and Madres y Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos (LaRed21 2013).  
The first round of moral reparations was given out on April 6, 2012 under the 
auspices of the Special Commission and the representative of the Ministry of Education 
and Culture. 250 recipients were presented with a document that recognized state 
responsibility for crimes. María del Carmen Martínez, representing Madres, explained 
that the document was an important step for truth-seeing and justice in Uruguay 
(Presidencia República Oriental del Uruguay 2012). The first set of economic reparations 
were also allocated on the same day. Compensation varied according to category, with 
each victim’s family entitled up to 500,000 pesos (~20,627 USD) (Presidencia República 
Oriental del Uruguay 2012). By January 2013, up to 277 families and victims received 
economic reparations. These included 78 children who were born in captivity, 148 
families of victims executed or disappeared, and 45 people that suffered grave injuries as 
a result of torture (El Observador 2013; Página12 2013).  
Simultaneously, medical and symbolic reparations were also provided. As an 
integral measure of reparations, symbolic reparations were included to “restablecer la 
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dignidad de las víctimas” (reestablish the dignity of victims) (Kreft, Le Saux, and Lauzán 
2011, 10-11). With the aim to honor the memory of victims of terrorism, symbolic 
reparations policies were distributed with the celebration of commemorative dates, 
placement of remembrance placards in places where human rights violations took place, 
and a place for the memorial of human rights (Kreft, Le Saux, and Lauzán 2011, 10-11). 
By January 2013, over 318 symbolic reparations were granted.  
  Despite the compensations granted on 366 cases, Institución Nacional de 
Derechos Humanos y Defensoría del Pueblo (INDDHH) and the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Guarantees of Non-recurrence Pablo 
De Greiff noted that reparations were not without problems. By this time, Uruguay had 
adopted norms of accountability and truth-seeking and applied them via domestic policies 
(i.e. Comisión para la Paz and the prosecution of Bordaberry). However even in the post-
transitional justice period of 2012, INDDHH saw the need to realign national reparations 
that made distinctions amongst those deserving of reparations, contrary to international 
standards of reparations that universally guaranteed the right to reparations (INDDHH 
2014, 28).  
In response to the criticism, the commission responsible for receiving 
recommendations on reparations concurred that there was “mucho para hacer” (a lot to 
do) (INDDHH 2014, 28). However, it did not make specific reference as to how it was 
going to comply with INDDHH’s recommendations. In other words, despite the state’s 
recognition of limitations of the law and efforts from the national human rights institution 
to bring changes to reparations policies, the law remained unchanged. 
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 The UN Special Rapporteur Pablo De Greiff’s assessment of the status of 
Uruguay’s reparations also indicated similar problems. In his 2013 observation the 
Rapporteur recommended legislative revisions to eliminate incompatibilities between the 
right to reparations and right to pensions (INDDHH 2014, 29). Such points were brought 
up again in 2014, when difficulties that affected victims’ rights to integral reparations still 
persisted. For instance, the reparations law contained provisions that excluded potential 
beneficiaries with restrictions on age, ages in service, minimum periods of detention, and 
maximum income level to receive reparations (De Greiff 2014). Exclusion also applied to 
families of victims of human rights violations from leftist radical groups. Uruguay 
recognized reparations for victims of state terrorism. However, it failed to acknowledge 
compensation for roughly sixty policemen, military personnel, and rural patrols who were 
extrajudicially executed by radical groups during the 1960s and 1970s (El País 2014). 
The policy therefore neglected the rights of all victims of violation for reparations under 
international law.  
 Reparations also did not include outline specific dispositions for women’s rights 
and violations suffered by women. During the authoritarian era, Uruguay won “notoriety” 
by acquiring the “highest per capita population of political prisoners” (Coonan 1996, 
530). The majority of those incarcerated were tortured. Women comprised 28 percent, 
nearly one third of Uruguay’s prisoners who experienced torture and ill-treatment (Fried 
2006, 544). Thus, in terms of the share of violations, women deserved recognition for 
reparations that also included women’s health provisions. Moreover, under the 
reparations law, victims had to provide evidence of violation. This included an 
assessment of their injuries according to the national penal code (De Greiff 2014). 
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Evaluation of violations risked re-victimizing victims. For women who were victims of 
sexual abuses, such information was difficult to obtain as the extent of prolonged 
psychological and physical damage could not be measured readily (INDDHH 2014, 29; 
De Greiff 2014).  
 Uruguay has yet to introduce changes to the reparations policy. Looking at the 
aftermath of the application of a transitional justice policy thus reveals a puzzling 
question to theoretical expectations as to why a state that progressed to implement such 
norms backtracked in complying with the policies.  
 
3.6 Causes of Advancement: Transnational Advocacy 
The persistent presence of transnational advocacy networks helped Uruguay’s 
human rights movement and the state to secure better compliance with transitional justice 
norms. They were a source of international oversight and helped domestic advocates who 
were worried that “nobody was really paying attention” to Uruguay’s human rights.35 
This was a factor not accounted for in the spiral model’s theorization of the last phase of 
norm adoption, where transnational advocacy work was expected to decrease as states 
became self-sufficient to act in compliance with adopted norms. Uruguay’s case 
demonstrated that the model’s expectations, did not hold true in every case that 
experienced the five step process. Additionally, given the positive impact of transnational 
advocacy in human rights compliance, Uruguay’s case provided the reasoning for which 
                                                          
35 Online Skype interview with Dr. Jo-Marie Burt, Department of Political Science, George Mason 
University, December 15, 2014. 
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the spiral model had to reconsider the role of transnational advocacy networks throughout 
all phases, even after the state reached the final phase of norm adoption.   
 Transnational advocacy had a reason to remain active in Uruguay: the 
continuation of amnesty. Adoption of norms and enactment of transitional justice policies 
fell short of challenging the amnesty law that violated norms of accountability. 
Understanding the importance of derogating amnesty for Uruguay’s future, a coalition of 
transnational advocacy was formed in 2006, three years after the submission of the 
Comisión para la Paz’s Final Report. Coordinadora Nacional por la Nulidad de la Ley 
de Caducidad (National Coordinator for the Nullification of the Amnesty Law) integrated 
dozens of human rights organizations and activists. Supported by international advocates 
(e.g., Amnesty), the Coordinadora represented the global front against amnesty.  
The Coordinadora and its supporters strongly believed that a referendum for the 
derogation of the Ley de Caducidad in 2009 would result in their favor. By this time 
Uruguay had established a truth-commission, reparations programs, and started 
investigations into Bordaberry’s case. Contrary to expectations, only 47.98 percent of the 
public endorsed the plebiscite (Buriano 2011, 190). The referendum failed for the second 
time. Nonetheless, it succeeded in bringing human rights back into public discourse and 
reinvigorated the movement against impunity (Burt, Fried, and Lessa 2013, 14).    
 Along with the movement against amnesty, a campaign against impunity 
emerged. Under the name Coordinadora Contra la Impunidad (Coordinator Against 
Impunity), student organizations and human rights groups launched a public awareness 
campaign to challenge amnesty through legislation. The efforts also garnered support 
from Congress, which declared impunity unconstitutional (CNDDHH 2009). Partly this 
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was due to the IACtHR’s decision on Gelman v. Uruguay (2011) that ruled amnesty law 
as lacking “legal effect” and ordered Uruguay to remove amnesty for cases of human 
rights violations (Burt, Fried, and Lessa 2013, 14). The Court’s rulings also brought up 
questions regarding statutory limitations for human rights cases, which would take effect 
on November 1, 2011. As statutory limitations extended for 26 years and eight months, 
by November 1, 2011 when the limitation would take effect, victims would be prevented 
from filing criminal complaints (Amnesty International 2011; Soltman 2013, 836; Burt, 
Fried, and Lessa 2013, 16).  
Following a series of lobbying efforts from the Coordinadora and domestic 
opposition leaders against impunity, just a few days before the expiration of statutory 
limitations, a change was produced. On October 27, 2011 the executive branch passed 
Law No. 18.831. The new law normatively challenged the extent of applicability of the 
amnesty law and brought Uruguay’s legal system closer in accordance with international 
standards. It eliminated the possibility of “any procedural defaults that would bar 
prosecution” and “legislatively reclassified crimes during the dictatorship as crimes 
against humanity,” eliminating any possible future statute of limitations (Soltman 2013, 
836). The new law also demonstrated Uruguay’s compliance with the Gelman v. Uruguay 
ruling.  
The advancements of Law No. 18.831 were met with resistance from the Supreme 
Court of Justice. The Court expressed the constitutionality of Article 1, which protected 
public prosecutors and magistrates in cases related to the dictatorship. However, the 
Supreme Court declared Article 2 and 3 unconstitutional. Article 2 referred to statutory 
limitations and Article 3 established that crimes referred to under Article 1 and 2 are 
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considered as “crimes against humanity pursuant to the international treaties” (Inter-
American Court of Human Rights 2013).  
Transnational advocacy was quick to mobilize and express concerns towards the 
Court’s wavering decisions. Domestically, thousands of Uruguayans took to the streets in 
protest against the Supreme Court on February 25, 2013. At the international level, 
Amnesty issued a criticism against the Court’s actions, urging Uruguay to conform to 
international standards (Amnesty International 2014). Other groups also expressed 
concerns, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. As of this writing, 
changes have yet to occur. However, as transnational advocacy pressure pushed Uruguay 
to promulgate a law that challenged amnesty, it is likely that continued mobilization will 
result in human rights progress in the near future.   
 
3.7 Democratic Transition and Former Power Circles 
Different than the overall positive influence of transnational advocacy on 
Uruguay’s norm compliance, political parties, representing both former and new power 
holders in government, had a mixed record of obstructing and collaborating with 
respecting human rights norms. For those political parties that restricted justice, respect 
for human rights was absent in their parties’ agenda. Méndez refers to a stratum of 
Uruguay’s social class that resisted changes to human rights. This class, he notes was 
represented by traditional political parties, such as the Blanco party, but not limited to 
them alone.36  
                                                          
36 Author’s interview with UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment Dr. Juan Méndez, American University College of Law, October 13, 2014, Washington D.C. 
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Non-traditional political opposition parties supported the efforts from Uruguay’s 
human rights advocacy. According to the spiral model, during the phases of repression 
and denial, weakened opposition parties received support from transnational advocacy 
groups. As conditions improved from the pressures exerted from the transnational 
network, eventually leading to regime transition, transnational mobilization decreased 
and opposition parties gained more ground in domestic politics (Risse and Ropp 2013). 
That was not the case with Uruguay. In many ways, a detailed examination of Uruguay 
reveals how political parties, not necessarily regarded as important in the latter phases of 
the model, came to exert significant influence over norm compliance.  
Part of the reason why political parties held a central role in norm adoption and 
follow-up to transitional justice policies had to do with Uruguay’s negotiated democratic 
transition. Pacto del Club Naval allowed a “carefully managed transition to democracy” 
(Roniger 2011, 698) that included concessions from the incoming regime. The new 
democratic government of Sanguinetti emphasized turning the page on the past. Critics 
characterize this era as “la restauración conservadora” (the restoration of conservatism) 
that included “operación de silenciamiento e impunidad” (operation of silencing and 
impunity) (Moreira 2011, 13; Lessa and Fried 2011, 33). This was characteristic of 
Uruguay’s political culture. The political elite valued stability and they “appreciate [d] 
the stability of the pact that they struck in the negotiation.”37 The political system also 
emphasized accommodation, a long-standing tradition based on the two political parties, 
Partido Colorado and Partido Blanco (Barahona de Brito 1997, 36). Over time, two-
                                                          
37 Author’s interview with Director Eduardo González, International Center for Transitional Justice, 
November 10, 2014, New York.   
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party cooperation became an institutionalized practice that led parties to believe that it 
was their right to divide and share benefits (Weinstein 1988; Gambi 2005, 97).  
Co-patronage initially prevented Uruguay from being subject to armed forces 
involvement. Latin American militarism was built upon a dynamic of armed forces 
interference in the absence of political parties and liberal institutions to resolve social 
problems. With Uruguay’s two-party system, the military was dissuaded to play an active 
role (Varela Petito 2007, 59). Uruguay’s persistent economic crisis however challenged 
the military’s non-interventionist position. Despite multilateral assistance that annually 
brought 1.4 million USD (Aldrighi 2004, 41-42), economic setbacks constrained the 
state’s capacity to provide for its populace. With political parties that lost credibility as 
“unwilling or unable to resolve the crisis,” extremist coalitions rose in protest (Ryan 
2005, 280). Frente Amplio represented the leftist groups that emerged during this period. 
They were seen as a challenge by the traditional parties and also from the armed forces. 
From a more critical perspective, human rights violations indirectly were 
precipitated by the alliance that formed between the dominant political classes and the 
armed forces. To suppress the left that questioned government efficiency, the political 
elite and President Pacheco called upon the armed forces to restore internal order 
(Galeano 2010). More specifically, the traditional political parties Blanco and Colorado 
brought the military’s involvement in politics. Such cooperation was manifested further 
during Bordaberry’s reign, when the armed forces intervened in higher rates. The 
involvement led to armed forces dominance in the political system (Valeria Petito 2007, 
70) along with an increased level of human rights violations.   
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The relationship between political parties and the armed forces made the state 
“less conducive to truth and justice,” (Barahona de Brito 1997, 36) delaying progress of 
human rights norms. Uruguay mirrored the political chess negotiation described by 
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), where a few players set new political processes and in 
doing so they “limit accountability to wider publics” and “deliberately distort the 
principle of citizen equality” (38). For this reason, while there was a strong push for 
justice and truth, they were met with resistance (Skaar 2011, 136). This included the 
amnesty law, which with its continued existence from 1986 to the post-transitional justice 
period created an environment of tolerance for human rights violations. As Faroppa 
points out, Uruguayans came to believe that it was possible to commit the gravest 
atrocities against other human beings, as long as one was socially, economically, or 
politically well-connected in society (2007, 18). In this socio-political context, human 
rights became a divided issue.  
From Batlle’s presidency (2000-2005) positive changes to human rights norms 
became instituted. The period coincided with the enactment of transitional justice 
policies. Batlle intended to “initiate recovery of the memory” that was “lost” (Faroppa 
2007, 19). Although Batlle represented Partido Colorado, that had previous records of 
obstructing justice, he carried out policies to help victims have the right to truth (i.e. 
Comisión para la Paz).   
With the beginning of Vázquez’s presidency (2005-2010) representing the leftist 
political coalition of Frente Amplio in 2005, greater changes to human rights were 
anticipated. Frente Amplio ended Uruguay’s dualist party model. The party ideologically 
identified with unions (Pucci, Nión, and Ciapessoni 2014, 7) and grew out in reaction to 
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state repression. In addition, most victims of human rights during the authoritarian 
periods were associated to Frente Amplio.  
The new government made many promises of human rights.38 These included the 
intent to reopen cases of violations by seeking loopholes in the Ley de Caducidad that 
would allow certain cases to be litigated (Prats 2010, 233). For instance, Vázquez urged 
the judiciary to initiate investigations into a case before consulting the case with the 
executive branch. The reversal of procedures granted more autonomy for the judiciary to 
rule on its own basis of investigation.  
Vázquez also collaborated with various actors to promulgate norm respect. He 
ordered the armed forces to investigate the cases of disappeared detainees, including the 
role the armed forces had in the process (Prats 2010, 234). Rather than relying on the 
report of Comisión para la Paz that overridingly concluded the fate of many of the 
disappeared with Operativo Zanahoria, Vázquez sided with human rights advocates in 
questioning the report (La República 2002). The government took the issue further by 
ordering Universidad de la República to corroborate with the investigation. Third party 
participation provided a mechanism of transparency for the government and assured 
objective analysis of cases (Prats 2010, 234).   
More positive changes to norm compliance followed with Vázquez making 
advances in implementing restorative justice mechanisms. As part of symbolic 
reparations to collectively recognize victims of violence, the state implemented 
commemorations and established physical places for remembrance and memory. 
                                                          
38 Author’s interview with lawyer María Leoni Zardo, Center for Justice and International Law, October 15, 
2014, Washington D.C. 
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Aligning symbolic reparations with international norms, Vázquez created a day of 
remembrance Día de Nunca Más (Never Again Day) on June 19. And in July and 
November 2007, the library of memory Biblioteca del Nunca Más Terrorismo de Estado 
(Library of Never Again State Terrorism) and the Museum of Memory of Uruguay were 
“inaugurated with an aim to recover the memory of the horrors of state terrorism and the 
sacrifices of the Uruguayan people against state repression” (Errandonea 2008, 58-59; 
Roniger 2011, 717; Roniger 2012, 72).  
These developments provided a symbolic recognition for victims as holders of 
rights that were violated by the state. Although memory initiatives alone are rarely 
“integrated into wider strategies,” it has an impact on other tools of transitional justice 
and as public spaces of reflection, they influence “our identity as a society” (Dulitzsky 
2014). As a ripple effect of memory, financial and medical reparations were also 
considered. Ley de Reconocimiento y Reparación a las Víctimas (Law of Recognition and 
Reparation for Victims) was adopted in 2009. The law recognized the rights of victims to 
integral reparations and the responsibility of the state in human rights violations during 
the civic-military dictatorship (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura 2009).  
These advances in norm adoption, implementation, and compliance however were 
accompanied with major setbacks. For instance, Vázquez preferred to not interfere 
directly with the amnesty law. Some scholars have gone as far as to belittle this position 
from the Frente Amplio government as “respetar la Ley de Caducidad” (respecting the 
Ley de Caducidad) (Prats 2010, 233). Hence, while the Frente Amplio government 
pushed to seek truth, issue reparations, and prosecute two heads of state on human rights 
crimes, the derogation of the law was not called into question. 
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In a similar way, President Mujica (2010-2015) who took over from Vázquez and 
also represented Frente Amplio preferred not to ally with the movement to derogate the 
amnesty law in 2009.39 In fact, Vázquez even sided against the plebiscite (Ros 2012). 
Partly influenced from these results, the 2009 referendum failed with “48%-52%, 
showing just how polarized Uruguayans remain [ed] on the volatile issue” (Buckman 
2014, 397).  
Additionally, even after the promulgation of Law No. 18.831 that nullified the 
effects of the Ley de Caducidad, the new law faced challenges of constitutionality from 
the Supreme Court of Justice. These developments fell under the post-transitional justice 
era (2009- ), when Uruguay was expected to comply with accepted norms. Relating this 
observation back to the framework of the last phase of the spiral model and a look 
beyond this period, Uruguay’s state behavior questioned the extent to which the state 
internalized norms.  
The resolution President Mujica promulgated since 2011 on the release of 
“ancianos presos” (old inmates) (LaRed21 2011), also provoked controversy as to the 
equal application of norms of accountability after prosecution. These inmates included 
those convicted of crimes against humanity. Under Uruguayan law, clemency can be 
granted with the exception of those charged with crimes “especially grave,” such as 
crimes against humanity (Martínez 2014). If Mujica’s resolution for clemency were to 
pass, former torturers such as José Nino Gavazzo would be allowed to serve the rest of 
his sentence under house arrest. This situation has been criticized by members of Frente 
                                                          
39 Online Skype interview with Dr. Jo-Marie Burt, Department of Political Science, George Mason 
University, December 15, 2014. 
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Amplio, including Parliamentarian Felipe Michelini, human rights advocates, and 
Macarena Gelman (Ros 2012; Martínez 2014). However the same proposal has been 
supported by other Frente Amplio politicians, as a humanitarian gesture for convicted 
criminals. Mujica’s resolution, disclosed party divisions within Frente Amplio on human 
rights issues. And this particular case further revealed the power of individual politicians 
in being able to influence the status of international norms compliance internally.  
Despite the challenges, compared to the earlier periods of traditional party 
governments, Uruguay demonstrated a higher level of norm compliance with transitional 
justice policies during the Frente Amplio led governments. Investigations into the fate of 
the disappeared, reparations policies, prosecutions of former heads of state, and the 
passage of Law No. 18.831 brought the state’s human rights record beyond that of the 
final phase of norm adoption. However, the developments that followed after the 
implementation of changes revealed a concerning picture of a state that has relegated to 
accepting its limited compliance behavior.  
Political parties within this context played a controversial role, in bringing 
advancements and also setbacks to human rights progress. As Galain Palermo noted, 
Uruguay’s case shows how transitional justice and the respect for norms changes as 
“government policies relating to the confrontation with the past change” (2010, 617). The 
influence of political parties on human rights norms as such affirmed the difference 
between domestic political interests and the level of weight international norms carried in 





3.8 Former Power Circles: Armed Forces 
Different from the positive influence that transnational advocacy brought for 
norm compliance, Uruguay’s armed forces delayed the state in maintaining norm respect. 
The power of Uruguay’s armed forces manifested most strongly during the periods of 
repression (1967-1972; 1973-1985) and decreased with democratic transition. Sikkink 
describes the stepping down of the armed forces as the institution’s “going back to the 
position prior to the coup” when they were perceived as one of the weakest militaries in 
the region.40  
Although Uruguay’s armed forces exercised less power comparatively to that of 
Peru, they were also able to obstruct the administration of transitional justice policies. For 
instance, the Comisión para la Paz was heavily criticized by the military. Partly this was 
due to the Comisión’s findings that pointed to the responsibility of the armed forces in the 
disappearance of 172 detainees, mass burial graves, and its participation in a transnational 
operation known as Plan Condor. The plan worked with militaries in Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, and Bolivia to achieve their goals. Abductions, interrogations, 
torture, assassinations, forced extraditions, and arbitrary detention in clandestine 
locations were central to the operations (Martorell 1999, 147). The extent of Plan 
Condor’s reach in society was such that “half of the cases that they are trying to get 
justice for in Uruguay (today) are related to Plan Condor.”41 
                                                          
40 Author’s interview with Dr. Kathryn Sikkink, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, November 
3, 2014, Boston. 
41 Online Skype interview with Dr. Jo-Marie Burt, Department of Political Science, George Mason 
University, December 15, 2014. 
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Plan Condor also made Uruguay susceptible to external influences from 
neighboring states. The majority of Uruguayans who died or disappeared suffered their 
fate “not inside their native country but abroad” as a result of the regional cooperation 
(Ryan 2005, 298). One of the key states involved was Argentina. On May 18, 1976, 
former President of the House of Representatives Congressman Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz, 
Minister of Education Senator Zelmar Michelini, and two Tupamaros members were 
abducted in Buenos Aires. The abductors were a Uruguayan-Argentinean military 
operation (Ryan 2005, 298-299). At the time, the two politicians were in exile, targeted as 
critics of the government. The bodies of Michelini and Ruiz, along with the Tupamaros 
were found three days after, “maniatados en el interior de un automobil” (manacled 
inside the interior of an automobile) (Martorell 1999, 147) with “signs of torture” 
(Sikkink 2011, 2). Uruguayan politician Wilson Ferreira Alduante escaped minutes 
before to London avoiding facing a similar fate.  
The military criticized the commission, citing bias in characterizing military 
commanders as individuals who enjoyed killing (Búsqueda 2003). Commander of the 
Armed Forces Lieutenant General Daners rejected the possibility of the institution 
apologizing for the disappearances and deaths during the dictatorship. Daners explained 
that the armed forces only complied with orders and were unaware of the mass graves 
(LaRed21 2001). The declaration was condemned by the Secretary General of the 
Socialist Party Roberto Conde who also pointed to the implicit role of the United States, 
in contributing to the armed forces’ human rights crimes.  
The armed forces continued this position even when military personnel were 
indicted internationally for human rights crimes. On June 2001, an Argentinean federal 
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judge asked for the extradition of retired colonels José Nino Gavazzo, Manuel Cordero, 
and Jorge Silveira. In response, Lieutenant General Daners and Santiago H. Pomoli met 
with the accused and assured them of the armed forces’ support (Rodríguez 2004). 
Silveira, known as “Pajarito” was accused of the attack on the Senate in 1973, torture and 
rape of detainees, transfer of teacher Elena Quinteros, disappearance of more than nine 
persons, and for his role in the Gelman case (Rodríguez 2010). On the abduction and 
detention of Quinteros, Pomoli publically declared the armed forces’ disagreement with 
Judge Alejandro Recarey’s judicial citations (Rodríguez 2004). The web of connections 
between military personnel responsible for human rights crimes and those who remained 
in power, demonstrated the strategic orchestration of the armed forces, in maintaining the 
institution from becoming under further scrutiny on human rights. 
The relationship between the armed forces and the political apparatus resurfaced 
in Gelman v. Uruguay. In the events that led up to the rulings in 2011, except for some 
brief moments of cooperation, President Vázquez did very little for the investigations to 
continue. Under Article 3 of the Ley de Caducidad the executive branch had the power to 
promulgate investigations (Ginzberg 2010). However, Vázquez only authorized the 
excavations of a military site Batallón 14, where the Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces General Bertolotti told Macarena Gelman that her mother’s remains were buried. 
Forensics found no remains at the site. These circumstances of obstruction of truth, 
revealed that the executive, armed forces, and even the judiciary were collaborating in 
impeding truth-seeking for crimes of the past (Ginzberg 2010).  
At most, the armed forces showed partial support in complying with human rights 
norms. Parallel to the excavations, Vázquez ordered the armed forces to create internal 
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committees within each branch to investigate the fate of the disappeared detainees from 
1973 to 1985. The armed forces initially conformed to the orders by producing their own 
findings (Casal Beck 2005). The reports however, simply reiterated information 
published by the Comisión para la Paz (Laura de Giorgi 2013, 84), which was replete 
with problems. The single new credible information was on the fate of José Arpina Vega 
and Ubagesner Chaves Sosa. The indication of their places of burial led to further 
investigations that found the remains of both victims’ bodies.  
 Such developments carried further with the declaration that was made on May of 
2006. General Álvarez and ten former chiefs of the armed forces released a document 
that “asumen plenamente las responsabilidades institucionales… por las violaciones de 
derechos humanos” (fully assumed institutional responsibilities… for the violation of 
human rights) during the dictatorship (Emol 2006). Public acknowledgment of the crimes 
was an important move for symbolic reparations, which previously had been clouded by 
the armed forces’ justification on stability and peace during the internal war (Reuters and 
AFP 2005). With these events, the armed forces seemed to recreate the image of an 
institution in cooperation with human rights. 
Despite the changes in favor of human rights norms, obstacles to justice still 
remain. Burt points out, “the fact that the amnesty law remains in Uruguay tells you 
something” about the continued power of the armed forces.42 These findings differ from 
the characterization of Uruguay as a state that fully consolidated in democracy (Börzel 
and Risse 2013, 69). Regardless of the advanced status of norm adoption and democratic 
                                                          
42 Online Skype interview with Dr. Jo-Marie Burt, Department of Political Science, George Mason 
University, December 15, 2014. 
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governance, rules established from the authoritarian regime remain and limit progress in 
Uruguay’s compliance with human rights norms.     
 
3.9 Conclusion 
Once referred to as the stable democracy of South America, Uruguay’s experience 
with human rights abuses, international norm acceptance, transitional justice policies, and 
what followed after varied significantly throughout the years. Twenty years after 
democratic transition, Uruguay engaged in accountability measures to litigate and convict 
those responsible for past crimes. However, the state also enacted an amnesty law that 
ushered in an era of impunity, which still continues on to the present day. Amnesty for 
human rights perpetrators was only challenged with Bordaberry’s conviction on 2010. 
The law still stands today and is a marker of obstruction of justice and accountability that 
has persisted in Uruguay.  
Nonetheless, Uruguay has also achieved remarkable advances in human rights 
norms compliance. In the last year alone, Uruguay garnered remarkable international 
attention by legalizing same-sex marriage (Sharnak 2014). Marriage equality is a right 
enshrined under Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the “rights 
of adults to enter into consensual marriage” (Amnesty International 2015). By granting 
minority citizens the right to marry, the state demonstrated its willingness to comply and 
adopt international human rights norms into its legal system. Moreover, the decision by 
President Mujica to “personally provide housing for 100 Syrian refugee children” 
(Sharnak 2014) demonstrated Uruguay’s willingness to take a step forward in pioneering 
respect for human rights.   
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At the international level, the influence of the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights has influenced significant progress for the state in internalizing and complying 
with norms. The emblematic case of Gelman v. Uruguay has been crucial in pressuring 
Uruguay to reevaluate the amnesty law. The Inter-American Court and Commission of 
Human Rights formed a part of the transnational advocacy network, where domestic and 
international advocates of human rights, including non-governmental organizations and 
intergovernmental organizations, united to push the state to comply with international 
standards of human rights. Although the spiral model envisioned a greater role for 
transnational advocacy in the early stages of the norm acceptance process (Simmons 
2013, 46) and a decreased role of the network after the state reached the latter phases, in 
Uruguay’s case, advocacy continued mobilizing even after post-norm internalization. In 
fact, it was the sustained efforts from transnational advocacy that at least brought some 
level of accountability mechanisms to succeed in Uruguay.  
In explaining the setbacks of criminal justice in Peru, both my study and Burt’s 
research suggests that international factors can only bring advances in accountability 
when certain internal political conditions are met (Burt 2011, 127-128). For Uruguay, 
traditional political parties and the conservative nature of the judicial organs restricted 
further progress into norm compliance and transitional justice implementation. In 
particular, political parties had a significant role in determining the status of human rights 
development and also conditioning the ways in which civil society was able to voice its 
opinions. These findings add weight to the argument that regime transition and 
democratic consolidation, which was considered complete in Uruguay (Börzel and Risse 
2013), has in fact yet to be fully realigned.  
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Uruguay’s case once again brings questions for the framework of the spiral model 
and the literature on transitional justice. Contrary to expectations that accepting norms 
representing transitional justice and human rights norms bring “positive changes for the 
state” (Dube 2011, 181), norm implementation faced challenges. The extent of influence 
domestic political factors have had in backtracking the state from its advances in human 
rights indicates the vulnerability of norms to that of state interests and domestic power 
politics.  
Rather, Uruguay’s experience hints at the necessity to not discount strategic 
calculations embedded in the logic of consequences argument. By this I mean that states 
behave in norm-compliant ways if it is in their interest to do so, when it serves the 
purposes of the government in power. Uruguay’s political parties for instance 
demonstrated these cost-based calculations where they paid lip service to prosecuting 
human rights violators, only when it did not destabilize their position in government. 
Even the cumulative achievement of international and domestic human rights advocacy 
towards accountability which resulted in the creation of the Comisión para la Paz, 
conviction of two former heads of state, and a law that legislatively challenged the 
amnesty law, were overturned when the judiciary and the government decided that it was 
in their best interests to continue the culture of impunity and silence by ruling the new 
law unconstitutional. The ruling effectively meant that “unless another successful 
complaint” was able to make it through the conservative court system, which itself would 
be difficult, “gross human rights violations committed under the dictatorship” would go 
unpunished (Sharnak 2015, 145). Therefore, norm compliance even for a state that had 
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progressed as far as to implement transitional justice policies, depended upon individual 








An ordinary student protest in the city of Kwangju in South Korea on May 18, 
1980, ended in one of the worst atrocities of killings and forced disappearances 
committed in modern Korean history. Nearly sixteen years later, Korea became the only 
state in Asia to bring two former heads of states to trial on human rights grounds related 
to the Kwangju massacre (Katsiaficas 2012, 364). Yet, scholarship of human rights 
norms and transitional justice have predominantly focused on the regions of Latin 
America, Africa, and Eastern Europe. These interests reflect the pioneering developments 
of truth commissions and prosecutions from Argentina, South Africa, and Yugoslavia 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Compared to these other regions, Asia, and in particular 
South Korea, has been less studied. Although the region has received considerable 
attention for intractable cases of human rights violations, its advances in human rights, 
have not been sufficiently studied.  
Despite the comparatively weak presence of human rights norms, one state in the 
region took a different path in respecting human rights. South Korea43 used transitional 
justice policies, with some ten truth commissions, and demonstrated efforts to adopt 
                                                          
43 Throughout this chapter, the term ‘South Korea’ will be interchangeably referred to as ‘Korea’.  
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human rights norms. Korea also hosted the first International Conference to 
Commemorate the Kwangju Massacre in 1998, providing symbolic recognition for 
victim, and became the state where the Asian Human Rights Charter was declared. The 
Charter called for the continued observance of the principles of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights along with other additional norms of human rights. Yet research related 
to Korea’s human rights practice has been relatively absent.  
Korea’s record of accountability and transitional justice followed a unique pattern 
of change from human rights norm compliance to setbacks. A year after convicting the 
two heads of state and demonstrating respect for accountability, in 1997 Korea reversed 
its behavior by granting amnesty via presidential pardon. During the same year, Korea 
once again changed its position towards human rights norms compliance by pursuing 
transitional justice policies of truth-seeking, which promoted reconciliation and 
democratic values by establishing an official historical narrative and addressing past 
accountability (Hirsch 2014). Truth commissions generally emerged after democratic 
transition when the state was ready to deal with the past. The earliest record of Korea’s 
truth-seeking in 1949 however, came prior to democratic transition and during the 
dictatorship of Rhee Seungman (1948-1960).  
This chapter compares the status of human rights norms in Korea with well-
known cases of human rights, Peru and Uruguay. The comparison attempts to fill the 
vacuum of research on Asia, how it differed from the Latin American cases, and offer 
insights into the set of factors that were comparatively influential in bringing the state to 
its transitional justice course. Particularly the Korean case brings to light how states that 
diverge from the spiral model’s five step trajectory of human rights norms adoption, for 
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example by enacting truth-seeking prior to democratic transition (1949), still arrive at 
similar final junctures of addressing past crimes. The analysis focuses on Korea’s 
compliance with transitional justice norms, emphasizing the policy of truth-seeking, and 
the norm of the right to life with the death penalty. Comparatively to Uruguay and Peru 
where prosecutions and reparations have developed, from the influence of the Inter-
American Court and Commission of Human rights, Korea’s transitional justice policies 
primarily focused on truth-seeking policies. Given this unique context of Korea, the 
comparative framework focuses on truth commissions and compliance with truth-
seeking.  
Outlining the processes of norm adoption following the premise of the spiral 
model of human rights, (Risse and Ropp 1999; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013) I examine 
the period after Korea implemented norms via domestic policies of transitional justice, to 
determine how Korea has varied in respecting norms post-norm implementation. The Jeju 
4.3 Commission (2000) and the South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRCK) (2005) are considered in detail, with each section outlining compliance records 
and the conditioning factors that limited continued respect for norms. To complement the 
findings related to compliance with truth-seeking processes, additionally, I also assess 
Korea’s compliance with a different adopted international norm, on the right to life.  
Despite the positive developments in adoption and application of international 
human rights norms, Korea oscillated in its compliance with transitional justice norms. 
Korea’s case demonstrates the political vulnerability of human rights vis-a-vis domestic 
political interests associated with democratic transition and the importance of the 
domestic front of transnational advocacy that helped maintain some level of norm 
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compliance from the state. These factors are also relevant for conditioning Uruguay and 
Peru’s norm compliance behavior. Precisely for this reason, Korea’s case adds more 
weight to the two factors of influence in understanding the development of transitional 
justice and processes of norm acceptance.  
 
4.1 Tracing Human Rights Development: Korea’s Norm Adoption Processes 
During the first phase of the spiral model, authoritarian regimes engage in 
repression. In response to state violence, international and domestic human rights 
advocacy groups mobilize a transnational network to exert pressure on the state. States 
respond initially with denial but later yield with tactical concessions to divert attention 
from the international community. The following phases open room for states to change 
laws and establish institutions to monitor human rights. At the final stage, states begin to 
behave in compliance with normative rules (Risse and Ropp 2013; Rise and Sikkink 
1999), during which norms of accountability and truth-seeking are sought.  
 
Figure 4.1 South Korea’s History of Repression 
 
Korea’s repression expands from 1910 to 1988. As seen in the figure above, 



























Uruguay from 1967-1972 and 1973-1985), scholars designate various periods for South 
Korea. The timeline begins with the Japanese colonial era (1910-1945), American 
occupation (1945-1948), Korean War (1950- 1953), the dictatorship of Rhee (1948-
1960), to Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) and Chun Doo Hwan’s (1980-1988) authoritarian 
rule (Kim 2012, 125). The years that are important for norm adoption processes, with 
Korea moving from repression to the later stages in the spiral model, are Park and Chun’s 
periods. During the two regimes and Roh Tae Woo’s presidency (1988-1993) that 
followed, Korea underwent changes in behavior towards human rights norms and truth-
seeking.  
Park ruled from 1961 to 1979, the year when he was assassinated by a member of 
the Korean Central Intelligence Service. Although human rights violations accompanied 
Park’s reign, they were overshadowed by economic success and prosperity. Following 
Park’s death, the military staged a coup d’état on December 12, 1979 that brought 
General Chun to power. With Chun, the gravest human rights violations occurred. On 
May 1980, a popular uprising of citizens against Chun resulted in the Kwangju Massacre. 
According to government estimates, two hundred demonstrators died in the city of 
Kwangju, while others estimate the number “close to two thousand,” likened to the 
experience of China’s Tiananmen Square (Heo and Roehrig 2010, 32). As had been noted 
in the spiral model, local human rights groups reached out to mobilize international 
support against domestic repression. Korea’s domestic opposition Kwangju Citizen’s 
Council called for the international community, namely the United States to help stop the 
violations. The request was denied. Instead, the Carter administration approved the 
mobilization of Korean troops “under the US-Korean Joint command” to Kwangju to 
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suppress the citizens (K. Kim 1994, 202). The complicity of the U.S. provoked a series of 
anti-American protests and unified underground domestic movements of intellectuals, 
students, and opposition groups against the military regime (K. Kim 1994, 203).  
Chun’s regime denied responsibility, conforming to the behavior of a repressive 
state. International advocacy groups attempted to exert international pressure to help 
weakened domestic advocacy groups, such as the Association of Bereaved Families.44 
Already in 1975, Amnesty International, Asia Watch, International Human Rights Law 
group, and the North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea45 lobbied U.S. 
Congress to open hearings on Korea’s human rights situation (Chang 2015, 165). 
Amnesty also adopted up to one hundred prisoners of conscience by 1979, mainly 
dissidents critical of Park who included Kim Dae Jung and Kim Chiha. Kim Dae Jung 
was a human rights activist and politician who was arrested for conspiring to foment 
revolution and sentenced to death during the “purge of the nation’s press” on May 31, 
1980, that also banned opposition political activity (Asia Watch Committee 1988, 4). The 
political opposition included democratic activist politician Kim Young Sam. The 
violation of right to freedom of expression and the conviction of a renowned human 
rights defender sparked protest from Amnesty and other human rights groups (Amnesty 
2009; Asia Watch Committee 1988, 5).  
Rather than respond with denial, Chun’s regime granted concessions. Particularly, 
when international advocacy pressure added with the challenges of legitimacy Chun 
                                                          
44 Online interview with Mr. Hyung Ho Park, former TRCK investigator, March 13, 2015, Kwangju-South 
Korea. 
45 U.S. newspapers also reported such activism from American advocacy networks with St. Petersburg 
Times publishing the work of the North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea against human 
rights violations of political activists and religious leaders during the Park regime (1978). 
144 
 
faced for the Kwangju Massacre, it became a major concern (Heo and Roehrig 2010, 32). 
Concessions were a strategic move from the state, which was unwilling to change its 
behavior permanently but needed to make compromises to temporarily better the 
situation. The first change came with Kim Dae Jung’s death sentence commutation. 
Second, Korea ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) on December 27, 1984. As Article 6 (1) of the Korean 
Constitution recognized “rules of international law” as having the “same effect as the 
domestic laws,” CEDAW ratification provided the basis for legislative revisions in 
observance of human rights (Kim and Cho 2008). Chun’s regime also lifted the ban of 
Kwangju citizens visiting Mangwoldong cemetery where the majority of victims from the 
Kwangju massacre were buried (Lewis 2002, 166). Additional changes took place after 
the May 1985 protest demanding state apology for Kwangju. Kim Dae Jung was released 
and Chun began laying the groundwork for the power transition to Roh Tae Woo, an 
“accomplice” to Chun’s 1979 “military mutiny and 1980 national subversion” (B. Kim 
2008, 175) who shared responsibility for human rights crimes. 
 Demands for more political change and truth-telling about Kwangju culminated in 
the pro-democracy and anti-dictatorship movement on June 1987. As expected from the 
spiral model where sustained pressure from below bring the state to make compromises, 
domestic advocacy movement resulted in more policy changes. Concessions were built 
around establishing Roh’s political legitimacy. Roh created an ad hoc Committee for the 
Promotion of Democratic Reconciliation, which focused on reconciling the public’s 
“bitterness…over military atrocities” of Kwangju (West and Baker 1991, 236). Such 
functions of the Committee were similar to the aim of truth commissions that sought to 
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prevent “violence and rights abuses in the future” by “encouraging reconciliation 
between opposing groups” (Hayner 2011, 182). However, given his role as an 
accomplice, Roh opposed official investigations into the massacre (N. Lee 2013, 57).    
Nonetheless, important advances were made on reparations, policies which 
addressed the material, physical, and moral damage suffered by victims in the form of 
monetary, medical, or even symbolic compensations (Guillerot et al. 2009, 26). 
Interestingly, it was a human rights criminal Roh, who enacted reparations that had been 
largely absent in Korean history. The policies included the reclassification of the 
Kwangju Massacre from a “mob revolt” to a “democratic movement” (Han 2005, 104), 
the passage of a special act allowing victims’ compensation (August 4, 1990), and the 
“banishment” of Chun to Solak Mountain in 1988 (B. Kim 2008, 175).46 Roh’s 
government also “expressed official regret” over Kwangju and promised to “offer 
financial support and medical services and to construct a monument” (Han 2005, 1004).  
Political reforms also took place. The first democratic elections took place on 
December 16, 1987 (Neary 2002, 78). Despite questions of legitimacy Roh’s party 
(Democratic Justice Party (DJP)) faced, the opposition coalition of Kim Dae Jung and 
grassroots activist Kim Young Sam failed to gain power (Wong 2015). The Kims 
originally formed a joint political party Tongil Minju Dang against DJP. However due to 
internal party divisions, the same year of the elections, Kim Dae Jung left to create 
Pyungwha Minju Dang (PDP). PDP divided opposition votes (Kim Dae Jung with 27 
                                                          
46 Some scholars characterize this banishment of Chun as a self-imposed exile (Park 2001) and not one that 
resulted out of Roh’s pressure.  
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percent and Kim Young Sam at 28 percent) and Roh was elected as the president with 36 
percent of the votes (Neary 2002, 78).   
Towards the end of Roh’s presidency, negotiations began for democratic 
transition. The decision came from Roh’s government that did not fear the “consequences 
of democratic transition” (Haynes 2001, 1882). Roh had already made several changes 
that procedurally made the political environment more conducive to respecting human 
rights norms. Korea ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
and the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR on April 1990. Additionally, amendments to the 
constitution included the right of freedom of expression, association, and assembly, right 
of detainees to be assisted by council, and the rights of women in terms of employment, 
wages, and working conditions (Neary 2002, 78), which aligned Korea with previously 
ratified international documents, such as CEDAW. Given institutional efforts in 
addressing human rights norms, Roh was less concerned of the repercussions the 
transition would bring upon him for past human rights crimes.  
Korea followed a negotiated transition to democracy similar to Uruguay. 
Accommodations from Roh’s regime ensued an “elite-dominated pacted transition from 
authoritarian rule” (Haynes 2001, 1880). The compromise between pro-democracy forces 
and governing elites (Gills 1993, 238-239) provided a “rapid dismantling of a 
nondemocratic regime and the setting of an early and specified date for free elections” 
(Linz and Stepan 1996, 56-57). Opposition parties of Kim Young Sam, old power 
representing New Democratic Republican Party, and Roh’s DJP (which espoused Chun’s 
interests) converged together in a three party alliance. Allegedly Roh approached Kim 
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Young Sam, assured him that he would be the “next candidate” for the ruling party, and 
requested DJP’s support for Kim (Kim 2011, 40-41). The union merged differences 
between the former regime and pro-democracy supporters and guaranteed a level of 
political stability. Kim Dae Jung continued with his political party, as the official 
opposition party.   
  The processes of regime change, as expected from the spiral model, broadened 
societal demands for human rights and in doing so brought concerns for human rights to 
domestic political discourse. Opposition non-governmental organizations such as 
Kwangju Citizen’s Solidarity and politicians, such as Kim Dae Jung, urged the 
democratic president Kim Young Sam to address human rights issues.47 In particular Kim 
Dae Jung, who had been a former collaborator with Kim Young Sam, expressed concerns 
of the new government, which in part espoused the interests of human rights criminals 
Roh and Chun through the three party alliance. The continued presence of former regime 
interests was also referenced in Chun’s response to prosecutors summons in 1995, “if I 
am a chieftain of treason” then “President Kim Young Sam should also bear appropriate 
responsibility” (Gentilucci 2005, 96), referring to the party merger and the common 
political interests that Kim and he now shared. 
However despite concerns from the opposition, Kim Young Sam was “confident 
of his democratic credentials” as the former leader of the opposition (B. Kim 2008, 175; 
                                                          
47 Some scholars question the extent to which Korea has actually transitioned to a full-fledged democracy. 
Pointing to the segmented party lines and the growing provincial alliance with certain political parties, Dr. 
Seo cautions in characterizing the Korean political system as one that fits the definition of a democratic 
government. Rather, she notes that the state conforms to a procedural democratic government with populist 
elements that drive the political system. Author’s interview with Dr. Kyung Kyo Seo, Hankuk University 
of Foreign Studies, March 17, 2015, Seoul-South Korea. 
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Han 2005, 1005). While continuing the party alliance, Kim launched reforms to diminish 
the military’s power that had played a central role in past human rights crimes. He 
dismissed or “postponed promotion” of personnel associated with Hanahoe, the 
“unofficial fraternity of military officers” allied with Chun (Lee 2010, 9; Roehrig 2002, 
189). Additionally, Kim started a reexamination of past human rights crimes. The 
decision was a step towards the latter phases of the spiral model, stages in which states 
may include human rights in the political discourse and implement policies that 
demonstrate sustainable change and compliance in respecting human rights, in the form 
of transitional justice policies. 
Kim’s government first pursued reparations. During the presidential address on 
May 14, 1993, Kim acknowledged the importance of Kwangju for Korea’s 
democratization and emphasized the need to “replace” the wrongful rhetoric” of the 
Massacre (Han 2005, 1005). Kim also supported restoring the honor of Kwangju victims, 
allocating reparation for victims and families. Following these developments, Kim started 
a year-long (1994-1995) investigation of the military putsch on December 12, 1979 and 
the Kwangju Massacre in May 1980. While evidence connected former presidents Chun 
and Roh to human rights crimes in both events, Kim did not readily pursue charges (Kim 
2002, 99). However, the investigations laid the foundations for the eventual prosecution 
of Chun and Roh in early 1996.  
Along with reparations, Kim’s administration pursued truth-seeking for human 
rights atrocities during earlier eras of repression. Through the Special Act No. 5148 
“Recovering the Honor of Victims of the Geochang Event and Others” enacted on 
January 5, 1996, Kim set up a special committee to investigate the events at Geochang in 
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1951 (H. Kim 2013, 455).48 Geochang massacre took place during the Korean War, when 
the Korean army “slaughtered several hundred unarmed civilians in South Gyeongsang 
Province” (Wolman 2013, 36). The committee found the armed forces’ responsibility for 
the massacre and identified 548 victims and 785 family members (H. Kim 2014, 107; H. 
Kim 2013, 455). The commission’s findings however did not lead to prosecutions. With 
the exception of a “few commemoration projects,” the state took no action (H. Kim 2013, 
455).  
Amidst these developments and criticism directed towards Kim’s policies that 
were seen as for lip service to the public and rendered no accountability for human rights 
perpetrators,49 pressure from advocacy groups increased. Amnesty International criticized 
Korea on stalling human rights progress and called on the state to reform human rights 
laws (Amnesty 1995). The timing coincided with the deadline for statutory limitations 
that also applied to the prosecution of those involved in the 1979 coup and 1980 Kwangju 
Massacre. The decision from Kim to forgo trying Chun and Roh also sparked 
controversy. Local advocacy, including 398 relatives of victims of the Kwangju 
Massacre, “appealed the prosecutors’ decision” to not carry out the prosecution (Oh 
1999, 171). Responding to the domestic and international developments, Kim passed a 
                                                          
48 The act’s mandate was originally to create various truth commissions which would also uncover 
atrocities committed by the state and the armed forces during the repressive periods of Korean history. 
However, as explained by Hun Joon Kim (2014, 106-107; 2008, 239; 2013, 455), there were certain 
political and social factors that prevented the other commissions from developing. These included, the 
victims’ unwillingness to go public in fear of the old political regime elements still in powerful roles of 
government and the regional politics that may have advanced the creation of one type of commission but 
delayed the efforts for others. The argument based on regional politics, hints at the Jeolla and Gyeongsang 
Province divide, which surfaced to a significant extent during Park Chung-Hee’s regime and was often 
used as a political tool.  




law that allowed for the arrest, detention, and prosecution of Roh and Chun in 1996, 
along with “former high-ranking officials in both the military and the executive branch” 
(Han 2005, 1008).  
Transitional justice policies of prosecutions advance separation of the democratic 
government away from the predecessor regime (Teitel 2000, 3), making litigation of 
human rights criminals an important mechanism that adds legitimacy of rule for the new 
regime. Contrary to expectations, the court found the charges on the Kwangju Massacre 
against Roh and Chun as “insufficient” proof for conviction (West 1997, 137), removing 
human rights crimes from the trial. Instead, the court convicted the leaders on mutiny for 
the 1979 coup, corruption, and treason “relating to Kwangju Massacre” (Roehrig 2002, 
174; Gurtov 1996, 115). The defendants were also charged for homicide for the purpose 
of treason, which under Article 88 of Korea’s Criminal Code made individuals 
punishable by death or life imprisonment. Chun was sentenced to death and charged a 
fine of $238 million and Roh received 22 years with $355 million in fines (Heo and 
Roehrig 2010, 49). Both presidents appealed the sentences. In the end, the court reduced 
Chun’s sentence to life imprisonment and Roh to 17 years in prison (Park 2001, 136).   
No matter how “legally or politically dubious they may have been” the attempt of 
starting a trial related to human rights crimes against Chun and Roh filled the vacuum of 
justice for victims (Park 2001, 139). On the other hand, the failure to bring the charges 
specifically on human rights grounds revealed the difficulty of addressing accountability. 
Although evidence directly identified the defendants’ responsibility for Kwangju, Roh 
and Chun contended that the Massacre occurred as a result of soldiers acting in self-
defense against violent demonstrators (Han 2005, 1017). The trial produced outcry from 
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domestic and international advocacy groups. Amnesty International issued calls for a 
“full investigation into past human rights violations” (Amnesty 1996). Nevertheless, as 
the accused were given a near maximum sentence within the Korean penal system, 
protests diminished significantly in the months following the trial.  
 
4.2 Post Transitional Justice and Rule-Consistent Behavior 
Korea moved to the latter phases of the spiral model with the civilian government 
in 1993. Although some transitional justice policies were implemented long before this 
period (e.g., the Special Committee and Court for the Punishment of Pro-Japanese 
Collaborators in 1948/9), from 1993 to 1996, additional international treaty ratification 
occurred (Convention against Torture 1995) and measures to address past abuses were 
put in place (i.e. Recovering the Honor of Victims of the Geochang Event and Others), 
and in 1996 the state prosecuted Chun and Roh. Given the importance of the prosecution 
of two former heads of states, originally on human rights grounds, 1996 can be regarded 
as the year when the state began the last phase of the spiral model.  
According to the model, at the final stage of norm internalization states start 
demonstrating sustained compliance with norms. By this period, the role of international 
advocacy diminishes and local groups gain political ground over their domestic 
opponents who oppose change with respect to human rights norms. Transitional justice 
measures are more often than not expected to emerge around this period. Roughly when 
Korea reached this phase in 1996, it “adopted three types of transitional justice measures: 
criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, investigative commissions, and reparations” 
(Jeffrey and Kim 2014, 30). However, examining the events that unfolded following the 
152 
 
“trial of the century” in 1996 (Oh 1999, 172) raised questions about the level of Korea’s 
norm compliance.  
A year after the reduction of sentences, a political agreement between president 
Kim Young Sam and the newly elected president Kim Dae Jung granted amnesty to Chun 
and Roh on December 18, 1997 (Roehrig 2002, 179). Amnesty or pardon in any form, is 
“undeniably at odds with the demand for retribution, an affront to victims and survivors, 
and potentially a blow to the rule of law in transitioning states” (Freeman and Pensky 
2012, 42). Yet, some human rights defenders interpreted Kim Dae Jung’s pardon in a 
different way. They regarded the gesture as one that reflected Kim’s “honorable” persona 
of having been a prisoner of conscience and still having the heart to forgive those who 
had imprisoned him and also as a gesture of societal reconciliation.50 However, as other 
scholars pointed out, pardons were also a political maneuver used by presidential 
candidates, in particular Kim Dae Jung, who wanted to “appease his old veto groups as a 
gesture of tolerance” (Han 2005, 1029).  
Amnesties or government decisions to absolve human rights criminals for the 
purposes of gaining votes or political stability in a new regime, presented setbacks to the 
advances in other realms of human rights. In Korea’s case, hence, Kim Dae Jung’s 
pardon took back the state’s progress on norms of accountability. While Kim wanted to 
bring societal reconciliation and secure regime stability for the incoming presidency 
(New York Times 1997), the decision angered Kwangju citizens who suffered as victims 
of violations (Katsiaficas 2012, 365). Moreover, as Chun, Roh, and all those convicted in 
                                                          
50 Author’s interview with Mr. Sun Ho Kim, former TRCK investigator and current research fellow at the 
Center for the Study of the Korean People, March 19, 2015, Seoul-South Korea. Author’s interview with 
Dr. Hun Joon Kim, Korea University, March 18, 2015, Seoul-South Korea. 
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the trial were released, for victims it became harder to seek sustained recognition from 
the state on the crimes that had been committed. Additionally, as the trial convicted 
individuals not on human rights crimes, it further relegated the position of human rights 
as a secondary concern for the state.  
Nonetheless, aside from the setbacks in the post-prosecution phase, Korea 
experienced advances in other realms of human rights. As a result of local advocacy 
groups mobilizing to push for human rights norms recognition from the state, Korea 
hosted the first international conference to commemorate Kwangju and partook in the 
adoption of the Asian Human Rights Charter in 1998. The charter called for the 
continued observance of the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
along with other norms of human rights (Lee 2005, 41). These two events were organized 
by the Asian Human Rights Commission, victims’ groups all over Asia, and Korean 
human rights groups, such as Kwangju Citizens’ Solidarity that had actively pushed for 
Chun and Roh’s prosecution (Baik 2012, 152).  
 
4.3 Legislative Changes: Truth-Seeking 
Korea’s case demonstrates the positive impact that democratic transition, active 
state involvement in the international human rights arena, and continued push from 
human rights advocacy groups have had in bringing the state to initiate transitional justice 
processes. Particularly, domestic human rights groups have been important in 
strengthening Korea’s human rights record and adapting truth-seeking initiatives to 
address the various periods of political repression. With over ten existing, continuing, and 
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completed state sponsored truth-commissions, Korea has made major strides in 
internalizing transitional justice norms of truth-seeking.  
Truth commissions, “bodies set up to investigate a past history of violations of 
human rights” (Hayner 1994, 558) have been numerous in Korea. Political scientist Hun 
Joon Kim attributes the development of Korea’s commissions as a result of political 
agreement and political concessions that facilitated their rise, comparatively to that of 
other transitional justice measures.51 Rather than have one that investigated the regime 
preceding democratic transition as had been case with Uruguay and Peru, Korea’s 
estimated ten truth commissions52 expanded the definition and scope of truth-seeking by 
covering the period from Japan’s colonial history from the 1900s all the way to 1986. For 
instance, the Special Committee for the Investigation of Pro-Japanese Collaborators and 
Forced Labor under Japanese Rule (2005) revived an old historic committee that 
investigated pro-Japanese collaborators during Rhee Seung Man’s presidency (1948-
1960).53 The new commission picked up from where the former had left off with the 
mandate to investigate and identify collaborators with Japan’s colonial government. The 
basis for the creation of the commission was to return confiscated Korean land (presumed 
to be under the ownership of Japanese collaborators) rightfully back to the owners. 
However, its work stretched to cover questions of human rights. The commission sought 
to bring “justice” for those who “participated in anti-Japanese movements” and suffered 
                                                          
51 Author’s interview with Dr. Hun Joon Kim, Korea University, March 18, 2015, Seoul-South Korea. 
52 The numbers that have been cited by scholars vary as to their determination of whether or not 
investigative commissions also formed a part of the truth commissions. In the most recent work by Jeffrey 
and Kim (2014, 30), Korea is recorded to have ten official truth commissions to date.  
53 Truth-seeking into colonial past also deviated greatly from newly developing truth commissions, such as 
the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission that investigated the truth about the events that took 
place in residential schools for the aboriginal peoples of Canada dating back to the 1870s. 
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“human rights abuses, violence, and massacres,” by holding Japanese collaborators 
indirectly accountable for the crimes (TRCK 2009, 15; SW. Han 2008, 671-672). The 
table below lists the truth commissions in chronological order. 
 
Table 4.1 Truth Commissions Matched with the Spiral Model of Human Rights 
Truth Commission  Year  Spiral Model Stage 
The Special Committee and Court for the 
Punishment of Pro-Japanese Collaborators 
1949 Repression (1st phase) 
The Congressional Committee for the 
Investigation of Civilian Deaths 
1960 Repression 
The Congressional Committee on Kwangju 1988 Tactical Concessions (3rd 
phase) moving to 
Prescriptive Status (4th 
phase) 
The Special Committee for the Investigation of 
Geochang Events 
1997 Rule-Consistent Behavior 
(5th phase) 
The Presidential Truth Commission on 
Suspicious Deaths and the Presidential Truth 




The National Committee for the Investigation 
of the Truth about Jeju April 3 Events 
2000 Post 
Special Committee for the Investigation of 
Forced Labor under the Japanese Rule  
 
2004 Post 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRCK) 
2005 Post 
Special Committee for the Investigation of 
Pro-Japanese Collaborators  
2005 Post 
The Presidential Truth Commission on 
Military Suspicious Deaths 
2006 Post 
 
Certain academics characterize all the commissions that developed out of this 
period, particularly those that were dedicated to colonial history, as the result of political 
interests. More specifically, they regard it as Roh’s revenge politics against previous 
156 
 
governing circles of power in Korean politics.54 Others reference the pressures from civil 
society and academics mobilization that demanded uncovering the truth about the 
Japanese occupation (Cho 2007, 604). These competing positions point to the question of 
whether or not truth commissions were representative of the overall level of norm 
internalization that had taken place in Korea.  
Of the numerous commissions, including those that addressed colonial history, 
this study focuses on the two most recent and comprehensive truth commissions to 
examine Korea’s compliance with transitional justice norms of truth-seeking, namely the 
South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRCK) and the National 
Committee for the Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Events. A brief 
assessment of the level of state compliance with the recommendations of the committee 
provides some measure of respect towards human rights norms. The results reveal the 
status of Korea’s norm compliance and what conditions aided or hampered the continued 
observance of norms.    
 
4.4 Compliance with the TRCK and Political Influences 
The South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission was launched on 
December 1, 2005 via the Framework Act on Clearing up Past Incidents for Truth and 
Reconciliation (Law No. 7542). The commission was given the mandate to examine 
various periods of Korea’s repression, including Japanese occupation; the history of 
overseas Koreans who “have maintained the sovereignty of Korea or enhanced national 
                                                          




capability since the Japanese occupation”; the killing of civilians during the Korean War; 
suspicious, unlawful, or conspicuously improper exercises of state authority which 
resulted in deaths, disappearances, tortures, and human rights violations from 1945 
through the authoritarian regimes; and individual cases that the TRCK regarded as 
meriting investigations (Cho 2007, 608).55 Although previous specialized truth 
commissions addressed some past crimes, the TRCK attempted to cover all the remaining 
parts of truth-seeking.  
From the start of its creation, the commission encountered difficulties. 
Investigators participating with the commission’s efforts have noted the difficulties of the 
TRCK in examining the cases relevant to the Japanese occupation period and the Korean 
War. Particularly, finding victims and witnesses related to the crimes was difficult, as the 
incidents had occurred over fifty-years ago and the victims were too old or dead to 
provide testimonies. Moreover, due to the commission’s limited power and vulnerability 
to political influences from former regime leaders that still maintained power in the new 
governments, the TRCK faced administrative difficulties.  
States that had adopted norms and advanced to even address past crimes were 
understood to have moved to a phase where compliance with norms was an expected 
pattern of behavior. And therefore, in the period after policies that mirrored adopted 
norms were implemented, states such as Korea were to act with respect to norms. 
Different from these views, truth-seeking efforts in Korea were undermined by domestic 
political interests. Formed under a series of political compromises that led to the 
                                                          
55 Author’s interview with Mr. Sun Ho Kim, former TRCK investigator and current research fellow at the 
Center for the Study of the Korean People, March 19, 2015, Seoul-South Korea. 
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Framework Act (Law No. 7542) on May 31, 2005, the commission’s mandate was to 
investigate incidents regarding “human rights abuses, violence, and massacre occurring 
since the period of Japanese rule to the present time” (United States Institute of Peace 
2015; D. Kim 2010). Hence, it was not meant to “pursue justice through the legal system” 
(Kim and Selden 2010) and had “no legal power to obtain necessary documents from 
state institutions if they were said to include sensitive materials” (D. Kim 2010, 545).  
In fact even though the TRCK was created during a favorable human rights 
climate, it still was limited in power. Hyung Ho Park, who participated in the TRCK’s 
investigative efforts, notes that the commission was not provided a protected mandate 
and authority to carry out its investigations, which had a negative impact in the final 
observations it produced.56 Also, the TRCK continued to be viewed as an organization 
that was “nagging” government agencies for cooperation (D. Kim 2010, 546).  
From 2005 to December 31, 2010, the TRCK investigated 11,174 cases, 
confirming 8,468 and rejecting 1,729. During this process the TRCK suggested that 
“courts investigate and judge” crimes, particularly related to the Kwangju Massacre 
(Olsen et al. 2010, 472). On December 2010, the commission released its final report 
wherein it identified various cases for truth-telling in Korea, including the bombing of 
Wolmido and the Ulsan Bodo League Massacre (TRCK 2010). The perpetrators varied 
for each case. The U.S. forces were responsible for the indiscriminate bombings that 
resulted in civilian casualties in Wolmido and the Korean police perpetrated the massacre 
in Ulsan against suspected leftist leaning individuals during the Korean War (1950-1953). 
                                                          




The majority of other human rights violations were associated with state agents (82 
percent) and the rest (18 percent) were attributed to North Korean military, leftist groups, 
and enemies of the state (H. Kim 2013, 444). The report also included recommendations 
for official state apologies, reparations, and follow-up legislation for proper execution of 
recommendations, among other things (TRCK 2010, 106-107; H. Kim 2013, 444).   
The recommendations were focused on bringing victims symbolic, material, and 
medical reparations. As expected of a state that adopted international norms and 
advanced to implement transitional justice policies, Korea demonstrated some level of 
compliance with the TRCK’s recommendations.57 However, consistent compliance was 
absent. Even during the progressive government of president Roh Moo Hyun (2003-
2008), official apologies from the state towards victims were issued on only a few cases 
(H. Kim 2014, 250). Apologies comprised a significant portion of the TRCK’s 
recommendations, which would allow victims to get symbolic reparations and closure as 
a result of state recognition of the crimes. Recognition to victims is the goal of all 
transitional justice measures and it is one of the first demands of victims--to be 
recognized that they have been “harmed, and intentionally so” (de Greiff 2012, 42).  
Korea issued state and individual level apologies, all of which were recommended 
by the TRCK. In 2006 and 2008 President Roh apologized for the state’s role in the Jeju 
April 3 Incident, Ulsan Bodo League Massacre, and “illegal acts” of the state committed 
during the Korean War (Wolman 2015, 26; H. Kim 2014, 250). This was accompanied by 
                                                          
57 Some scholars have viewed the description of all victims of human rights as patriots by the TRCK 
critically. They argue for the need to different between state recognition of victims and victimhood versus 
mystifying individuals many of whom were innocent bystanders caught in the line of fire. Author’s 




reparations measures, including the continued function of the Recommendation Follow-
Up Board, created in 2007 under the Office of the Prime Minister. Aside from the 
apologies issued by the state however, no further advances to reparations occurred during 
Roh’s presidency.58  
Lee Myung Bak’s government (2008-2013) also failed to make significant strides 
in complying with the TRCK’s recommendations. Human rights practitioners voiced 
criticism against Lee’s government that hampered efforts at carrying out the 
recommendations from the TRCK (Kim and Selden 2010).59 Parallel to obstructing 
compliance with the TRCK however, Lee pursued truth-seeking in other areas. He 
created a commission to investigate the damages caused by “forced emigration” during 
Japanese rule that had not been addressed. The committee investigated the abduction of 
South Koreans by the North during the Korean War and attempted to “restore the honour 
of the victims” (Wolman 2015, 28). These efforts absolved families that were previously 
associated as being defectors to Japan, who were categorized as Japanese collaborators. 
Moreover, related to Japanese colonial rule and human rights abuses committed during 
this period, Lee demanded an official apology from the Japanese emperor. In a statement 
released on August 14, 2012, Lee argued that if Japan wanted to reestablish normal 
relations with Korea, the emperor had to recognize and apologize for past crimes 
committed by the imperial Japanese government (T. Kim 2012). Hence, although Lee’s 
                                                          
58 Author’s interview with Mr. Sun Ho Kim, former TRCK investigator and current research fellow at the 
Center for the Study of the Korean People, March 19, 2015, Seoul-South Korea. 
59 Author’s interview with Mr. Sun Ho Kim, former TRCK investigator and current research fellow at the 
Center for the Study of the Korean People, March 19, 2015, Seoul-South Korea. 
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administration did not directly comply with all of the TRCK’s recommendations they still 
promulgated a truth-seeking agenda related to other past violations.  
The creation of the TRCK and what followed confirmed the concerns of Korea’s 
level of norm internalization. While the state embarked on the creation of the TRCK, it 
failed to demonstrate a consistent pattern of compliance with norms. As already noted, 
the TRCK’s recommendations were selectively followed by Roh and Lee. Examining the 
periods more closely, international human rights norms and the behavioral change it was 
expected to have brought upon the state could not explain the state’s dualistic behavior 
(i.e. government pursuit of truth-seeking and noncompliance with post-implementation). 
Human rights in fact was conditioned more by the change in political circles of power 
and the old rivalries that existed between party lines. For this reason, while Lee could 
have supported efforts to extend the TRCK’s mandate, as a leader representing different 
political party interests, he chose not to continue the commission’s work.60 Instead, he 
launched his own truth-seeking commissions to give the impression that his political 
party, often characterized as related to former regime circles of the authoritarian period, 
could also lead human rights progress. Such behavior revealed the ways in which human 
rights norms and truth-seeking were conditioned by domestic political interests.    
 
4.5 Compliance with Jeju April 3 Commission and Local Advocacy 
The vulnerability of truth-seeking policies to political influences also manifested 
in the Jeju April 3 Commission or Jeju Commission, established a few years before 
                                                          
60 Human rights advocates criticize the partisan sides Lee took in opposing the TRCK. Author’s interview 
with Mr. Sun Ho Kim, former TRCK investigator and current research fellow at the Center for the Study of 
the Korean People, March 19, 2015, Seoul-South Korea. 
162 
 
TRCK in 2000 during Kim Dae Jung’s administration. As a former prisoner of 
conscience, Kim focused on launching initiatives of reparations and truth-seeking that 
would investigate deaths of individuals involved in Korea’s pro-democracy movement 
(i.e. Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths (2001)) and restore their honor 
of dying for just causes (i.e. The Act for Restoring the Honor of Democratization 
Movement and Providing Compensation for Them (2000)) (Hanley 2014, 152). Amidst 
these mechanisms, the Jeju Commission was also established in 2000. The commission 
mirrored the expansive understanding of truth commissions that Korea adopted, 
investigating the 1948 communist uprisings in the island of Jeju.  
While there are studies that examined the Kwangju Massacre and other atrocities 
during the Korean War (I. Han 2005; SW. Han 2008; D. Kim 2010; D. Kim 2010; H. 
Kim 2012; Lee 2013; Park 2001; Wolman 2015; Cho 2007), the massacres that took 
place before the Korean War in Jeju have largely gone “unnoticed by scholars and 
practitioners around the world” (H. Kim 2014, 3). This had with do with the political 
climate of the governments after democratic transition that prioritized addressing recent 
atrocities and crimes related to the Japanese colonial period. Particularly, progressive 
governments of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun focused on truth-seeking to bring out 
the identities of former Japanese collaborators, who were assumed to be a part of the 
conservative political parties.61 Notwithstanding the political emphasis on other periods, 
truth-seeking in Jeju continued. I focus on this understudied case of the Jeju 4.3. 
                                                          




Commission, that despite the oversight in the scholarship has rendered important 
advances for transitional justice processes of reparations.  
Korea’s human rights development and the changes that brought forth transitional 
justice were largely an effort concentrated at the domestic level.62 This was reflective of 
Korea’s political history and the various periods of repression, where the presence of 
human rights activism both nationally and transnationally was relatively absent. As 
Amnesty International’s report in the late 1980s demonstrates, even the activity of the 
International Human Rights League in Korea was minimal and remained to conducting 
surveys on the status of human rights. At the time, only individual human rights lawyers 
and judges formed part of the scene of activism (Bae 2007, 70). The international actors 
that partook in advocacy were also limited to Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, and the International Commission of Jurists, that all expressed concerns and 
published reports on the status of human rights in the state (Walldorf 2009, 146; S. Lee 
1993, 708). Nonetheless, the observations were not followed-up with interactive 
dialogues between the international and domestic advocacy groups.  
Rather than establish a collaborative relationship with international advocacy 
groups that could aid in the formation of a transnational advocacy front, local advocacy 
monopolized the struggle to advance effective strategies for human rights.63 This in part 
was reflective of the idea that while international or transnational factors are important, 
they can only bring advances in accountability when certain internal political conditions 
                                                          
62 Author’s interview with Mr. Sun Ho Kim, former TRCK investigator and current research fellow at the 
Center for the Study of the Korean People, March 19, 2015, Seoul-South Korea. Author’s interview with 
Dr. Hun Joon Kim, Korea University, March 18, 2015, Seoul-South Korea. 
63 Author’s interview with Dr. Hun Joon Kim, Korea University, March 18, 2015, Seoul-South Korea. 
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are met (Burt 2011, 127-128). The domestic political conditions referred to here could be 
understood as the state’s willingness to align the legislative system with international 
human rights standards and also an environment in which domestic human rights 
advocates have taken some role in forming a human rights movement. 
Scholarship related to Jeju provides supporting evidence for this observation. It 
took thirteen years of sustained “grassroots advocacy” work to establish the Jeju 
Commission that investigated the armed uprisings and counterinsurgency actions that 
took place in Jeju Island from 1947 to 1954 (H. Kim 2012, 727). Local advocacy in 
Korea was not based on NGOs but comprised mainly of individuals that came together in 
defense of human rights. These included students, scholars, social activists, and 
journalists (H. Kim 2012, 732). Many of the individuals resided in the locality where the 
events took place and incrementally voiced their efforts at initiating the cause for 
investigations. From as early on as 1960, local advocates mobilized to demand truth 
about the massacre of citizens by government commando units. One of the first groupings 
of such efforts was the Association for the Investigation of the Jeju 4.3 Incident formed 
by seven students at Jeju National University (Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation 2003, 39).64   
In contrast to the role of local advocacy groups that reinvigorated truth-seeking 
initiatives after the 1987 democratization movement, for the Jeju Commission, 
international human rights advocates had a minimal role. The exception were religious 
actors. A network was built between local Christian activists and the international church 
community (Chubb 2014, 92). Reverend Harvey, an American pastor speaking in defense 
                                                          
64 Jeju 4.3 refers to the April 3rd incident that took place in Jeju.  
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of human rights, was the key person in disseminating information on the status of human 
rights in Korea for the Western world. Along with Japanese, Korean, and American 
activists, he worked as the editor of the Korean Communique from Tokyo and was 
involved in human rights work (Chubb 2014, 92). The World Council of Churches and 
the Christian Conference of Asia contributed financially in helping Korean academic and 
activist Dr. Chi Myung-Kwan, who was seeking refuge in Tokyo (Chubb 2014, 92). 
Writing under the pseudonym of “T.K.” Chi published a series of Letters from South 
Korea in the Japanese magazine Sekai from May 1973 to March 1988. The letters 
provided narrative on the experience of Korean writers, religious leaders, journalists, 
students, and workers who stood in defense of human rights against the military regime 
(i.e. Chun’s regime). However, Dr. Chi and the religious transnational advocacy’s work 
was related to the general status of human rights in Korea. The Jeju commission emerged 
as a result of the pressures of local advocacy groups and advances in norm adoption from 
the state. 
Once the Jeju commission began the investigations of the massacre and launched 
its report, numerous positive advances were seen with the state’s response. With the 
exception of one or two polices, the state complied with policy recommendations from 
the commission. Its major recommendations were for the government to “issue an 
apology, declare a memorial day, use the report to educate students and the general 
public, establish a memorial park, provide essential living expenses to bereaved families, 
support excavations of mass graves, and continuously support further investigation and 
commemorative projects” (H. Kim 2014, 145). The presidential apology for the abuse of 
state power by President Roh Moo Hyun was given on October 31, 2003, the first of its 
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kind issued by a head of state in Korea regarding human rights abuses (H. Kim 2014, 
153). The apology was repeated three years after in 2006 during a memorial service for 
the victims of Jeju, once again the first of its kind attended by a president. As apologies 
serve to provide victims and their family members with a sense of recognition of the 
abuses they suffered, it was a step towards expanding the truth commission’s efforts 
towards symbolic reparations.  
Other recommendations included the rewriting or correction of history related to 
Jeju, establishment of a memorial park, museum, and a commemorative date for the 
victims. These were part of the memory-building policy of reparations, to re-establish 
historical records and monuments to ensure proper recognition for victims and in doing 
so promote societal reconciliation (United States Institute of Peace 2015). During the 
same year as the publication of the commission’s report, the Jeju 4.3 Peace Memorial 
Park was opened. A wall inscribing the names of the estimated 30,000 Jeju victims 
commemorated fallen victims and memorial services began from 2004 in the park (D. 
Kim 2010; H. Kim 2014, 155). The museum finished construction in 2008. Although 
many critics have pointed to the conservative opposition that commissioners faced in 
demanding truth and reparations for Jeju victims, it was during President Park Geun 
Hye’s government in 2014, who most often was characterized as representing the 
conservative bloc (H. Kim 2014; D. Kim 2010), that April 3 was finally designated as the 
official commemorative date for Jeju victims.  
Even with the advances in recommendations however, the commission was not 
without its flaws. Despite the objectivity that truth commissions were presumed to 
predicate their views, the final report produced by the commission reflected the political 
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influences that determined the report’s outcome. As part of the commission’s 
recommendations, a remembrance date was suggested to annually observe and honor the 
victims. Rather than commemorate September 21 when the armed uprisings finalized in 
1954, commissioners recommended to have April 3, the date when the insurgency began, 
as the memorial date. The commemoration of April 3, the day when Namro Political 
Party armed uprisings began to prevent May 10th elections for South Korea’s first 
government, legitimized the deaths of innocent civilians who were caught in the middle 
of the political battle between state forces and Namro Party and the armed affiliates. 
Although Namro Party had risen up for a just cause to protest against the general election 
that would partition the Korean peninsula and in resistance against police and armed 
forces brutality towards political protesters in Jeju (Katsiaficas 2012, 94), nonetheless 
their political cause could not justify the commission’s legitimization of the killings of 
other innocent Jeju people.  
 Another discrepancy from history was the report’s characterization of victims as 
political activists. The majority of victims were in fact non-politically motivated civilians 
who were not in Jeju to oppose the first election for the South Korean government. These 
individuals suffered their fates because they were stuck between state forces trying to 
suppress the uprising and others who wanted to continue the armed resistance. For this 
reason, to describe this group of people (who formed the majority of victims) as martyrs 
who died for political causes mischaracterized the truth (J. Lee 2015). Moreover, 
commissioners focused on victims of state violence but deemphasized the importance of 
state officials who died in putting the elections in place, including local community 
leaders, who were killed by Namro related insurgents. These individuals were not 
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politically motivated to fight Namro Party affiliates but were fulfilling their electoral 
functions non-violently. However, the report was limited in recognizing state officials as 
also victims of human rights violations. Additionally as Jeju 4.3 victims’ organization 
also noted, the victims list for the Jeju incident included 53 individuals non-deserving of 
their status, namely Namro leaders and North Korean armed forces personnel (Chosun 
Ilbo 2015). These also included South Korean personnel who conspired with North 
communist forces to re-take over the South during the Korean War (Chosun Ilbo 2015). 
As the objectivity in treating individuals equally as victims of human rights was a central 
principle of a truth commission, Jeju Commission’s report demonstrated levels of 
subjectivity that detracted its credibility.   
  While the Jeju commission revealed the comprehensive truth and restored the 
honor for individuals who were facing false accusations of being communist guerillas, 
the silencing and mischaracterization of other aspects of the truth raised questions on the 
nature of truth-seeking efforts in Korea. Often characterized as a struggle between 
progressive political forces that along with local advocacy groups try to promulgate the 
truth and conservative political parties that oppose these efforts, Jeju’s case proves that 
no one political side held the complete truth over the events that took place.65 That is to 
say that, the progressive side that dominated the discourse in the final report also could 
not fulfill its goals to uncover the objective truth. The politics and the interests 
                                                          
65 Some human rights advocates argue that the rhetoric of conservative versus progressive political party 
circles related to human rights had an impact in all transitional justice efforts (inclusive of the Jeju 
Commission). While progressive forces were more prone to advancing the cause for human rights, 
conservative presented hardships for commissioners to overcome in uncovering the truth of the repressive 




represented by each political side dominated the discourse and once again human rights 
relegated to a subsidiary position.  
 
4.6 Compliance with International Norms: Right to Life 
As compliance with international norms is not only observed in truth-seeking, it is 
also important to regard other cases of norm implementation to comprehensively assess 
Korea’s compliance with human rights norms. One of these efforts were manifested with 
the norm of right to life (anti-death penalty). Rather than used as a measure to punish 
common defenders, under Korean law the death penalty was used to suppress political 
dissidents. It was a “major social control mechanism” as Bae argues, employed by 
“authoritarian governments” against those that challenged their political views (2013, 
94). In fact, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was passed in 
1948, during the same year, Korea passed the “National Security Law” that subjected 
violators of the law to “harsh punishment, including the death penalty” (Bae 2013, 94). 
The violators were at times identified ‘correctly’ but in other cases, innocent individuals 
who were suspected of being “related to communists” were arrested and “executed 
without due process” (H. Kim 2013, 442). Such acts were in violation of Article 10 and 
Section 1 of Article 11 of the UDHR, where every individual is “entitled in full equality 
to a fair and public hearing” and “everyone charged…has the right to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty” (United Nations Human Rights 2015). The draconian nature 
of the National Security Law, where the state gained ground to legally carry out killings 
against its own populace, was a violation of the right to life and defied international 
human rights norms against the death penalty.  
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The continued practice of the death penalty in Korea, in addition to other 
violations including torture, sparked concerns amongst domestic and international human 
rights advocacy groups who voiced their concerns for the respect of human rights. 
Amnesty International published a report in the late 1980s on Korea’s death penalty, 
which fueled domestic advocates to pursue the issue further and led to the emergence of 
the anti-death penalty movement. The Association for the Abolition of the Death Penalty 
or Sapehyup (Hankuk Sahyung Paeji Undong Hyupuihoe), formed on May 30 1989 (Park 
2015). Its members were made up of religious leaders, legal scholars, academics, and 
lawyers who had worked with prisoners in death row during 1970s and 1980s in Seoul 
Detention Center. Most of those sentenced to death were political dissidents. The goal of 
Sapehyup was to abolish and institute the norm of prohibition of the death penalty.  
On three different occasions Sapehyup filed petitions to Congress for the 
reevaluation of the death penalty. Under Article 250 of the National Criminal Law, the 
death penalty was permitted for crimes of murder, homicide, and killings (Park 2015). 
Additionally, the death penalty could be applied to other instances, related to crimes of 
national security among other things. Although individual justices were sympathetic to 
the cause of Sapehyup and voiced concerns on the death penalty as a form of “inhumane, 
cruel, and unconstitutional” treatment (Bae 2007, 71), they formed a minority within the 
Constitutional Court. For this reason, despite Sapehyup petitions, the legal system 
remained reticent to change and allowed for the execution of 15 inmates in 1994, 19 in 
1995, and 23 in 1997 (Park 2015).  
Changes came with the presidency of Kim Dae Jung who was criticized for 
pardoning Chun and Roh, but nonetheless also continued implementing truth-seeking 
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policies (i.e. Jeju Commission). As Bae notes, even when other Asian leaders (e.g., Lee 
Kuan Yew of Singapore) advocated “Asian values” and viewed human rights as a 
Western ideological “imposition,” Kim argued in defense of international human rights 
norms as applicable to all individuals regardless of cultural differences (Bae 2007, 73). 
Kim’s position in part reflected his experience as a human rights victim. Rather than see 
the influence of international norms in institutionally changing the behavior of the state, 
the Korean case demonstrated the propensity of norms once again to be subject to 
political interests, whether personal, or defending a particular institution. Such became 
more relevant in the years to follow.   
A political climate in favor of human rights and increased efforts from religious 
organizations, Amnesty, and human rights activists brought the death penalty to national 
attention. Catholic Justice and Peace Committee began collecting petition signatures to 
abolish the death penalty in 1999, three years after the 1996 conviction of Roh and Chun, 
and vowed to stop the execution of inmates at least for the millennium year 2000 (G. Lee 
1999). Other religious groups such as the Korean Bishop’s Community for Justice and 
Peace and the Social Correction Apostolate Committee of Seoul raised “public 
awareness” of the issue of death penalty (Bae 2007, 74). The Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference of Korea also demonstrated support by forming a special committee 
dedicated to the abolition of the death penalty. Along with the Catholics, from December 
19, 2000, other religious leaders also expressed solidarity with the Catholic community to 
push for the state to reconsider the death penalty. These efforts culminated in the prayer 
service of June 3, 2003, when death-row inmate Mr. Lee Do Haeng was found to be not 
guilty and exempted from being executed. The late Cardinal Kim Soo Hwan hosted the 
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service and organized subsequent meetings with President Roh Moo Hyun and Congress 
to accelerate the abolition of the death penalty (Park 2015). 
 In continuation with the domestic pressure from below, international human rights 
advocates also exerted their support for the abolition of the death penalty. The UN 
Human Rights Committee urged Korea to sign the Second Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty. Amnesty International supported this 
cause further by launching a pro-abolition campaign for Korea. With the objective to 
foment more awareness of the issue at the legislative level, Amnesty helped create the 
Anti-Death Penalty Asia Network (ADPAN) and in coordination with human rights 
activists and regional non-governmental organizations, worked to pass an abolition bill in 
Congress (Bae 2008, 233).   
Met with an amicable internal political climate in favor of respecting international 
human rights norms, the mobilization of various sectors of domestic and international 
human rights advocacy groups gained significant momentum with President Roh Moo 
Hyun. On December 2007, Korea made the “list of de facto abolitionist countries,” or 
states that “retain the death penalty for ordinary crimes but have not executed anyone 
during the past 10 years or more” (Bae 2013, 93).  
However, there is still work to be done on aligning South Korea’s legislation to 
mirror the respect for the norm of right to life. The death penalty still continues to exist in 
constitutional law. Even with the ratification of ICCPR (April 1990), Korea chose not to 
regard Article 6 Section 1 of the Covenant that guaranteed the right to life (United 
Nations Human Rights 1976). This position of the state was reaffirmed in the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling in 2010 where the Court ruled capital punishment as not 
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“violating human dignity and worth” contrary to international norms that considered the 
death penalty as a violation of the “right to life and constitutes ultimate cruel, inhuman 
and degrading punishment” (Amnesty 2010). The issue rose to light again in 2014 with 
the sentencing of the Sewol Ferry Captain. Although the captain of the capsized Sewol 
Ferry where over 300 people died avoided the death penalty and was found guilty of 
violating “seamen’s law” and “abandonment causing death and injury” (Park and Kwon 
2014), the pursuit of the death penalty from the prosecution indicated that the norm of the 
right to life had yet to be respected under domestic law.  
Transnational advocacy’s push for the death penalty to be abolished brought some 
level of compliance behavior from the state, including treaty ratification, passage of an 
abolition bill, and a prolonged period of non-execution. Compared to the regional trend 
on the use of executions, South Korea’s case is indeed “highly noticeable” for suspending 
capital punishment during the past ten years or more (Bae 2014, 159). And yet, the 
continued debate over capital punishment on high-profile cases (e.g., Sewol Ferry 
captain) and constitutional law that remains in the constitution reveals the politically 
conditioned nature of human rights norms.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
South Korea has made significant progress in the human rights arena. Following 
the various processes of norm adoption from the spiral model of human rights, Korea’s 
transitioned from a long period of repression to a democratic state that began addressing 
past atrocities. The negotiated democratic transition ushered in the exposure of the state 
to the international human rights arena. This process was accompanied with the state 
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adoption of international human rights agreements and an advanced level of norm 
acceptance, manifested in the implementation of transitional justice.  
Throughout these phases, Korea incorporated transitional justice policies in 
various points in time, deviating from the expectations that would have placed them 
towards the latter part of the norm adoption process. Moreover, the actors that were 
expected to have the greatest influence (i.e. transnational advocacy) in transitioning the 
state to the later stages of norm internalization had a partial role for Korea. The spiral 
model emphasized the work of transnational advocacy networks in pushing the state from 
the period of repression to ultimately engage in regime change, incorporate human rights 
in political discourse, and recognize international human rights standards through 
adjustments in domestic law (Risse and Ropp 2013, 8). While not disregarding the work 
from transnational networks, the Korean case demonstrated the leading role of domestic 
human rights groups in carrying out norm adoption, aided in part by the help from 
international advocacy groups.   
An examination beyond the spiral model’s five processes, during the period after 
the creation of transitional justice policies, which I argue represent an advanced level of 
norm acceptance, Korea’s behavior also did not conform to theoretical expectations. 
According to the spiral model, states that transitioned to the final phase were expected to 
sustain behavior and domestic practices that conform to previously accepted international 
human rights norms (Risse and Ropp 2013, 10). From this perspective hence, the Korean 
government was to demonstrate commitment to international human rights norms. 
However, even during the period after 1996 when Korea prosecuted two former heads of 
states on human rights related charges, which marked the official start of full-fledged 
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transitional justice, international human rights norms came secondary to that of domestic 
political interests.  
Particularly in the post-implementation phase of the Jeju Commission (2000) and 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea (TRCK) (2005), Korea fell short of 
meeting the expectations for a state behaving in complying with norms of truth-seeking. 
The commissions’ suggestions were selectively carried out by political leaders. 
Consistency in carrying out recommendations, which included reparations policies and 
possibilities for accountability measures were hence, absent. Moreover, truth-seeking 
efforts were affected by domestic political interests. For instance, the final report of the 
Jeju Commission faced problems of subjectivity in favor of the progressive sector and the 
TRCK’s mandate were curtailed by the conservative bloc. Both observations indicated 
the influence of the conservative and progressive interests in Korean politics, which 
tampered with the efforts of uncovering the truth, providing reparations, and helping 
society reconcile with past human rights crimes. Such behavior was also manifested in 
the observation of the anti-death penalty movement, which notwithstanding its progress 
demonstrated its politically conditioned nature in the most recent trial of the Sewol Ferry 
captain. 
In a way the Korean case retells the story of Uruguay and Peru, where domestic 
political interests presented obstacles for the continued observance of international norms 
by the state. The trajectory of a pacted, negotiated, or even a ruptured democratic 
transition for the three states, did not position Peru, Uruguay, or Korea differently on 
being subject to the influence of internal politics. A look beyond the policy 
implementation in Korea reveals concerns for the effect of international human rights in 
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fundamentally changing state behavior. The most pressing issue of amnesties for former 
presidents has not been heavily contested and even human rights practitioners are hesitant 
to revisit such questions, as they regarded the presidential pardon as a conciliatory 
measure for society. Truth commissions also suffered from political influences, with 
victims that have still yet to be fully recognized for the violations they suffered. These 
experiences indicate the limited influenced international norms had in changing Korea’s 
stance towards norms compliance and raises concerns on the spiral model’s expected 









States that come to recognize their human rights violations, seek truth, prosecute 
perpetrators including heads of state, and distribute reparations for victims of human 
rights, could arguably be seen as having made a clean break with the past, as states 
willing to respect norms of accountability and justice. The spiral model of human rights 
characterizes such states as having reached the stage in which sustained compliance with 
human rights norms are expected. These have been the cases of Peru, Uruguay, and South 
Korea. The three states transitioned from authoritarian repressive governments to 
democratic systems and instituted transitional justice policies. When such states turn their 
behavior against the norms they internalized and implemented, it brings to light new 
questions as to what the theoretical models and existing research have missed in the story 
of states and norm compliance.   
This study aims to expand our understanding of why, and under what conditions, 
states comply with adopted international human rights norms, namely through the 
examination of transitional justice processes. It focuses on two questions: Why do states 
that adopted norms and advanced to addressing past abuses change their behavior against 





mechanisms that influence this result and what does this reveal of theoretical expectations  
of norms and state behavior? The point of departure for this research is the spiral model 
of human rights, which describes the five step processes through which states come to 
adopt and implement human rights norms. I extend the last phase of the spiral model’s 
human rights acceptance to examine the period after policy implementation of 
transitional justice norms.  
The next sections are organized in three parts. In the first part, I briefly describe 
the status of transitional justice norm compliance for Peru, Uruguay, and South Korea 
examining the follow-up to truth-commissions’ recommendations, distribution levels and 
abidance with symbolic, medical, and financial reparations policies, and the continued 
prosecution of human rights criminals, including respect for convictions and abidance of 
court rulings. Then, I present some of the common conditioning elements of states’ norm-
compliance among the case studies as well as lessons that can be drawn from them. 
Finally, I discuss the wider theoretical implications of the research and offer insights 
regarding the strategy that states at similar junctures of norm application may wish to 
consider moving forward.  
 
5.1 Status of Norm Compliance: Peru, Uruguay, and South Korea 
Peru 
The transition to democracy in 2000 brought a dramatic change in regards to 
adoption of human rights norms in Peru. The ruptured regime transition from Alberto 
Fujimori’s authoritarian government to interim President Paniagua and the incoming 
President Toledo’s administration, shifted the stance of Peru from a state with a poor 
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human rights record to one that began adopting and implementing norms into domestic 
policies. By 2001, the state started its first transitional justice policy of truth-seeking with 
the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (Truth and Reconciliation Commission). In 
its Final Report released in 2003, the Commission recorded an estimated 70,000 deaths 
and disappearances (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2003) and issued a list of 
recommendations for the state to follow, which included the enactment of reparations 
policies and prosecution of human rights criminals. 
Peru complied with the Commission’s recommendations, establishing the Plan 
Integral de Reparaciones (Integral Plan of Reparations) in 2005, filing extradition 
requests for Fujimori from Chile in 2007, and starting the prosecution against the former 
president on crimes against humanity. The state also abided with rulings from the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, particularly in the cases of Ochoa Lizarbe v. Hurtado 
(Accomarca Massacre) and Hugo Bustíos-Saavedra and Eduardo Rojas-Arce v. Perú, 
which was also recommended by the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación as a case 
that needed to be re-opened and investigated. The role of the Inter-American Court 
continued even after democratic transition, as a complementary judicial organ that 
pressed the state for accountability.  
Table 5.2 Peru's Transitional Justice Policies and Compliance Record 
Transitional Justice Norms Compliance Record 
2001-2003 Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
-Partial Monetary Reparations 
-Partial Medical Reparations 
2009 Fujimori Conviction -Conviction Held; Amnesty Discussions 
-Continued Litigation; Numerous Acquittals 
-Delayed Litigation 
2005 
Integral Plan of Reparations 
-2005 Integral Plan of Reparations 




And yet, in the period after transitional justice policies were put in place, Peru 
recorded quite a few setbacks to its norm compliance status. As seen in the table above, 
reparations policies faced administrative and financial obstacles, including the decision 
from the government to put a final date to the victims’ registry and the reduction of 
monetary reparations, which changed from allocating funds for each individual victim to 
a single family unit. Prosecutions of human rights criminals also resulted in a 
disproportionately large number of acquittals and even convicted criminals received 
lighter sentences than had been originally proposed. Moreover, the vulnerability of the 
judicial organ to political influences exacerbated the respect for the rule of law and Peru’s 
ability to carry out measures of accountability. These extended to the Inter-American 
Court of Human Right’s rulings, many of which remain re-opened in domestic courts but 
have been stalled in their legal process.      
 
Uruguay 
Uruguay’s experience of norm adoption and implementation processes provides 
an illuminating case study of a state that repressed its population at times above that of 
Argentina or Chile’s military dictatorships,66 then transitioned to re-consolidating its 
democratic values and implementing transitional justice policies. Transitional justice 
norms and addressing past abuses did not follow immediately after democratic transition, 
as had been the case of Peru. However, by 2001 Uruguay also began truth-seeking with 
the Comisión para la Paz (Commission for Peace).  
                                                          
66 Phone interview with Dr. Felipe Michelini, Human Rights Lawyer and Member of Parliament, Uruguay,  
November 20, 2014. The extent of repression in Uruguay was such that newspapers from neighboring  
authoritarian states were re-censored in Uruguay (Galeano 1989, 242).  
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The Commission issued its Final Report in 2003, in which it outlined a list of 
recommendations, including reparations for victims of human rights violations. In 
compliance, the state established the Comisión Especial de Reparación (Special 
Commission for Reparation) and distributed symbolic and monetary reparations to 
victims’ families, including official state recognition of responsibility in acts of torture, 
disappearances, and political incarceration, among other things. Norms of accountability 
faced difficulties due to the existing amnesty law. However, the conservative judiciary 
made an exception for the case against the two former heads of state and issued 
convictions on the basis of human rights crimes. In former president Bordaberry’s case, 
although he was already serving a thirty-year sentence for extrajudicial killings, he was 
convicted for the second time in 2010 for mediated authorship and ten accounts of 
aggravated homicides. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights also complemented domestic prosecutions, by 
issuing rulings and recommendations against Uruguay on emblematic cases of human 
rights violations, for example the case of Gelman v. Uruguay.   
Table 5.3 Uruguay's Transitional Justice Policies and Compliance Record 
 
Transitional Justice Norms Compliance Record 
2000-2002 Comisión para la Paz -Partial Monetary Reparations 
-Symbolic Reparations: Plaque for Public Display 
2009-2010 Bordaberry and 
Álvarez 
 
-Presidential Pardon of Human Rights Criminals; 
Delayed Litigation 
-Amnesty Law; Attempt to Nullify Amnesty Law 
(Law No. 18.831) 
-IACtHR Compliance with Gelman v. Uruguay 
2009 Reparations commission; 
Reparations for truth commission 
 
-Symbolic Reparations: Plaque for Public Display 




Despite these advances in transitional justice policies, in the period following the 
implementation of transitional justice policies and the Inter-American Court and 
Commission’s recommendations, Uruguay slowed down in its compliance towards 
norms. From 2012 to 2014, the national human rights institution Institución Nacional de 
Derechos Humanos y Defensoría del Pueblo (INDDHH) recorded 144 new cases of 
human rights violations. Out of the 87 that were admitted, violations related to access to 
justice, reparations for victims of state terrorism, and ill-treatment in police headquarters 
made up 28 percent of the total cases (INDDHH 2014, 67). Additionally, obstacles to 
accountability continued to prevail in the legal system, with the Supreme Court 
oscillating between upholding and rejecting a law that nullified the effects of the amnesty 
law. Problems also persisted with reparations policies that excluded certain victims’ 
groups from receiving remunerations, primarily policemen, military personnel, and rural 




Compared to other states in Asia where human rights norms abuses are prevalent 
(e.g., China), South Korea has followed a different path in adopting and initiating 
transitional justice policies. Following democratic transition in 1993, Korea expanded its 
human rights norms adoption and instituted transitional justice policies. The state 
prosecuted two human rights criminals and former heads of state Chun and Roh in 1996, 
not specifically on human rights crimes but on related political grounds of treason, 
corruption, and mutiny.  
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Korea pioneered and dedicated the bulk of its policy reforms to truth-seeking. The 
list of truth-commissions, including the three established during the authoritarian 
governments of Rhee Seung Man (1948-1960) and Roh Tae Woo (1988-1993) with 
limited mandate, expanded to include roughly ten different commissions. Some of the 
commissions focused on specific human rights violations, such as The National 
Committee for the Investigation of the Truth about Jeju April 3 Events (2000). Others 
complemented the earlier commissions, as had been the mandate of The South Korean 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2005) that examined various periods of 
repression, from the Japanese occupation period to the individual human rights cases the 
Commission regarded as meriting further investigations. In the commissions’ reports, 
recommendations were issued, which often included reparations measures for the state to 
recognize state responsibility, distribute financial reparations, and provide symbolic 
reparations in the form of commemorative dates and museums. 
Table 5.4 South Korea's Transitional Justice Policies and Compliance Record 
 
Transitional Justice Norms and 
Additional Human Rights Norms 
Compliance Record 
11 different truth commissions -Partial Monetary Reparations 
-Symbolic Reparations: Placards 
1996 Chun and Roh -Presidential Pardon 
-No Further Litigation 






-Limited Monetary Reparations 
-Jeju Commission: Primarily Symbolic 
Reparations; Excluded Beneficiaries of 
Reparations: Victims Categories 
-TRCK: Symbolic Reparations; Litigation 
Not Permitted 
Norm of Right to Life: ICCPR (r. 1990) -Violations Continued 
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In what followed after the truth-seeking processes concluded, the state’s 
enthusiasm in enacting multiple truth-seeking efforts was met with resistance to comply 
with the commissioners’ recommendations and also limit their mandates. The South 
Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission could only investigate human rights crimes 
but not pursue “justice through the legal system” (Kim and Selden 2010). The 
recommendations issued from the Commission were followed-up in a selective basis, 
with states complying with symbolic reparations of official apologies and state 
acknowledgement of crimes. And, litigation against perpetrators and specific reparations 
to victims and their family members with states issuing official apologies and 
recognitions remained significantly behind. Other human rights norms, such as the right 
to life related to the anti-death penalty movement faced similar circumstances, with state 
compliance lagging after international norm adoption via the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (r. 1990).  
 
5.2 Conditioning Elements: Transnational Advocacy 
The networks of transnational advocacy played an important role in all aspects of 
norm adoption, internalization, and domestic policy implementation. As networks of 
activists “distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in 
motivating their formation,” they are the groups that bridge the domestic and the 
international spheres with “links among actors in civil societies, states, and international 
organizations” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 1). Their unique ability to maneuver through 
various levels of the international system, allows the networks to initiate conversations 
and shed light upon issues that have long been neglected. Particularly for human rights, 
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the mobilization of networks adds weight to the work of domestic advocacy groups 
through the exchange of information from the domestic to the international that help 
generate transnational campaigns on specific violations of human rights. In doing so, the 
networks influence “policy outcomes” and also “transform the terms and nature of the 
debate” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 2). 
The core work of transnational advocacy networks manifested in the earlier 
phases of norm adoption and were important in the process of socializing non-norm 
compliant states to human rights norms during the five different phases of repression, 
denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status, and rule-consistent behavior. They 
collaborated in empowering weak domestic opposition, mobilizing international human 
rights organizations and sympathetic democratic states to pressure repressive states on 
improving their human rights record (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Risse and Ropp 2013). 
Their role continued throughout the latter phases of the spiral model, but receded as the 
domestic conditions of the state improved with democratic transition, new human rights 
institutions, and legislative changes that brought domestic laws in line with international 
treaty and protocol norms. By the last phase of the model, the mobilization of the 
network decreased as the state began to demonstrate norm consistent behavior with 
adopted international human rights norms. 
 Throughout the norm adoption processes for Peru, Uruguay, and South Korea, 
transnational advocacy played varying roles in advancing the state towards implementing 
domestic policy changes, which included transitional justice policies. For Peru and 
Uruguay, the networks which included regional intergovernmental bodies (i.e. the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission of Human 
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Rights), pressed to diminish the legal impact of amnesty laws, assured domestic 
opposition of an international oversight on human rights violations, and in doing so 
influenced some of the initial processes related to democratic transition. Transnational 
human rights advocacy for South Korea manifested most significantly with specific 
human rights campaigns on the norm of the right to life, the first of its kind regionally 
which involved various international human rights groups such as Amnesty International, 
participating in raising awareness and exerting pressure on the state.  
 According to the spiral model, transnational advocacy networks’ mobilization 
decreased with the state reaching the final phase of norm internalization. However, 
during the period after transitional justice policies were implemented, which I argue falls 
after the final phase of the spiral model, transnational advocacy in Peru, Uruguay, and 
South Korea continued to remain important for shaping the status of norm compliance for 
states.  
Specifically, for Uruguay, the persistent presence of transnational advocacy 
networks helped the domestic human rights movement and the state to secure better 
compliance with transitional justice norms. Their efforts centered upon norms of 
accountability and the Ley de Caducidad. These included primarily the work by 
organizations such as Amnesty International that issued criticisms against the state’s 
status of accountability and urged the state to conform to international standards of 
human rights (Amnesty International 2014). A coalition of transnational advocates also 
formed, backed by a strong domestic movement of the Coordinadora Nacional por la 
Nulidad de la Ley de Caducidad (National Coordinator for the Nullification of the 
Amnesty Law) which integrated dozens of human rights organizations and activists. The 
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network pushed for the derogation of the amnesty law that prevented prosecutions of 
human rights criminals. The referendum of 2009 failed to discard the law. In fact, even 
with the enactment of Law No. 18.831 that legislatively annulled the effects of the 
amnesty law, transnational advocacy persisted their campaign for accountability as the 
new law faced judicial obstacles of constitutionality from conservative organs of 
Uruguay’s political system. And to date, international human rights organizations and 
individual human rights activists continue to issue recommendations for the state to keep 
track of abiding the norms it internalized, particularly related to accountability.  
Unlike in Uruguay, where transnational advocacy remained united in pushing the 
agenda of compliance on accountability, for both Peru and South Korea, transnational 
advocacy focused on a wider set of human rights norms. Additionally in Peru and South 
Korea’s cases, the domestic human rights groups that participated within the transnational 
advocacy networks played a greater role in the compliance record of both states. For 
Korea, scholars would even argue that international advocacy had a minor role in the 
state’s transition to implementing transitional justice policies.67 Rather, individual 
activists, student groups, and lawyers were more influential in bringing about change. In 
the period after transitional justice policy implementation, the presence of international 
advocacy groups was absent and domestic human rights organizations such as Kwangju 
Citizens’ Solidarity and the Center for the Study of the Korean People were more 
influential in keeping the state in line with their normative obligations. Nonetheless, in 
comparison to the power exerted from political interests that presented obstacles to 
                                                          
67 Personal interview with Dr. Hun Joon Kim, Korea University, March 18, 2015, Seoul-South Korea. 
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accountability, the influence of the domestic front of transnational advocacy remained 
weak in changing state behavior.  
Similarly, in the aftermath of transitional justice policies, the domestic 
components of transnational advocacy networks conditioned Peru’s status of norm 
compliance. However, unlike the positive influence advocacy groups had on Uruguay 
and Korea’s human rights record, the institutional divisions and politicization of 
advocacy groups disintegrated the domestic human rights movement and led to 
significant setbacks in compliance with norms. Differences of policy agendas among 
non-governmental organizations, on seeking a broader human rights agenda versus others 
that sought to address specific victims’ centered rights issues divided the united human 
rights movement. Furthermore, the public declaration from domestic human rights 
organizations endorsing presidential candidates accused of human rights crimes detracted 
the meaning of pursuit of accountability from domestic advocacy. Instituto de Defensa 
Legal (IDL; Institute for Legal Defense), the CNDDHH, and the APRODEH declared 
their support for Ollanta Humala in 2011. At the time Humala was accused for the forced 
disappearance of civilians in the military base in Madre Mía (Burt 2014, 167). Such 
political involvement, which was not supported by all individuals or organizations 
involved in domestic advocacy helped Humala’s election. However, once Humala 
assumed presidency, he appointed former armed forces personnel who were accused of 
human rights crimes into government. These processes resulted in delayed prosecutions 
and investigations into human rights crimes.  
The role of transnational advocacy allowed Uruguay to challenge amnesty laws 
and advance to its current status of partial transitional justice norms compliance. And it 
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can be argued that Peru perhaps could have maintained a stronger record of human rights 
compliance, with greater transnational oversight. In Peru’s case, the disintegration of 
domestic advocacy made the work of transnational advocates that continued their push 
for accountability, less effective. Furthermore, vocal criticism for South Korea’s human 
rights from international advocacy groups would likely have pressured the state to better 
address its records of reparations, accountability, and truth-seeking.  
Despite the partial compliance status of Peru, Uruguay, and South Korea, all three 
states fared better when transnational advocacy exerted oversight on the states’ 
compliance record. In fact, transnational advocacy continued to mobilize even after the 
state implemented transitional justice policies. In contrast the spiral model expected 
mobilization to diminish as states transitioned to a democracy and engaged in legislative 
reforms consistent with adopted international norms. These findings add weight to the 
importance of transnational advocacy networks in positively influencing norm 
compliance for states that advanced to adopting norms and implementing them by 




Figure 5.1 Role of Transnational Advocacy Networks in Norm Compliance in the 
Extended Period after the Spiral Model 
 
5.3 Conditioning Elements: Former Regime Circles 
An overlooked factor in understanding the status of norm compliance of states has 
been the impact of the clean break with the past. This process is otherwise known as 
regime change or within the context of the spiral model, a transition from an authoritarian 
to a democratic government. The change is expected to have lasting consequences in 
allowing international norms to become accepted and recognized by states as part of 
domestic political discourse. During these developments, states attempt to move away 
from their repressive pasts, initiating transitional justice policies of truth-seeking into past 
crimes, prosecutions of human rights perpetrators, and recognizing victims of atrocities. 
These actions allow new democracies to consolidate their political systems and further 
institute mechanisms of accountability to prevent future violations from occurring.  


























Peru, Uruguay, and South Korea all advanced to launch truth-commissions, 
prosecute former heads of states, and provide monetary, symbolic, and medical 
reparations for victims of human rights and their family members. And yet, their 
compliance record suffered setbacks. The principle factors of influence were related to 
the power of former regime circles in the political systems of each state. Democratic 
transition alone could not protect the state from being conditioned by political leaders, 
political parties, and even armed forces that all held connections with the authoritarian 
repressive pasts of all three states.     
Political parties and individuals that held power during authoritarian periods and 
were implicated in human rights crimes maintained their stronghold throughout the 
processes of democratic transition. Peruvian presidents García and Humala that were 
elected into office after the enactment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and 
the Integral Plan of Reparations and the 2016 frontrunner in the Peruvian presidential 
elections Keiko Fujimori, were among those involved in human rights violations. Thus, 
throughout these administrations, the government deliberately presented obstacles to 
accountability and impaired the distribution of reparations for victims and their families. 
This included reforms to strengthen the armed forces, the institution responsible for 37 
percent of the human rights crimes during the internal armed conflict (Transfer 
Commission of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru 2014, 12). Such 
changes problematized efforts to seek justice in Peru.  
Uruguay’s presidents that served their terms following the Comisión para la Paz 
(2001) predominantly represented the leftist radical political party Frente Amplio that had 
been repressed during the authoritarian period. Nonetheless, the relationship between the 
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armed forces, former regime personnel, and Uruguay’s political system continued to 
present obstacles to compliance with transitional justice norms. In the events that led up 
to the Gelman v. Uruguay rulings in 2011, President Vázquez, who represented Frente 
Amplio did very little for the investigations for the remains of Macarena Gelman’s 
mother to continue. Under Article 3 of the Ley de Caducidad the executive branch had 
the power to promulgate investigations (Ginzberg 2010). However, Vázquez only ordered 
the excavation of specific military sites that were pointed out by the Commander in Chief 
of the Armed Forces General Bertolotti. The excavation resulted in no forensic evidence 
that matched the victim. The obstruction of truth, extended beyond that of political party 
differences. Collaboration between the state and former perpetrators continued. 
In comparison with the cases of Peru and Uruguay, Korea’s outcome depended 
more on the political interests of governments that followed transitional justice processes. 
Prosecution and conviction of the two former heads of states in 1996 were overturned 
with a presidential pardon from President Kim Dae Jung. Although Kim was himself a 
human rights activist and did not have any relations with former regime personnel, his 
pardon granted the former leaders amnesty from accountability. Depending on the type of 
political party in power, either conservative or progressive, each government pursued its 
own selective compliance with transitional justice norms. Conservative governments 
sought truth-seeking initiatives of specific periods in history that did not jeopardize their 
legitimacy, while progressive administrations followed their own truth-seeking agenda. 
For example, the Special Committee for the Investigation of Pro-Japanese Collaborators 
(2005), enacted during progressive President Roh Moo Hyun’s government was criticized 
by academics as Roh’s party’s revenge politics against previous governing circles of 
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power in Korean politics.68  The differences in norm compliance therefore were not 
necessarily conditioned by former regime personnel but rather based on political interests 
of each competing political bloc. In addition, selective compliance with truth-
commissions’ recommendations and commissions’ reports that misconstrued the truth 
were the result of political clashes between various interests in the political system.    
There was no correlation between the type of democratic transition and the 
presence of former regime elements that impacted norm compliance. Peru’s ruptured 
break from the past gave the state impetus to pursue accountability against former 
repressive leaders. However, it did not guarantee the state’s continuous pursuit of 
accountability. Despite the institutional dismantling of the armed forces and the return of 
the security forces to civilian administration, former regime personnel’s connections with 
the new political system was too far entrenched to not be represented in political 
decisions to thwart prosecutions, truth-seeking, and reparations.  
Uruguay and South Korea’s negotiated transition, compared to Peru, did not result 
in significant differences in the continued influence of the former regime. Particularly for 
Korea, transitional justice norms were implemented regardless of the type of regime in 
power. The earliest forms of truth-seeking occurred prior to democratic transition, during 
one of the early periods of repression in 1949 with the Special Committee and Court for 
the Punishment of Pro-Japanese Collaborators. Additionally, democratic transition and 
consolidation that is often characterized with positive human rights norms compliance 
(Börzel and Risse 2013), also did not guarantee states’ compliance with human rights 
                                                          




norms. In Uruguay’s case, the state’s high level of democratic consolidation, could not 
overcome the conservative record on nullifying the amnesty law or providing a broader 
mandate for the truth-commission to investigate human rights crimes, call on witnesses, 
and recommend litigation against human rights criminals.  
 
5.4 Theoretical Implications 
The underlying theoretical explanation for the case of Peru, Uruguay, and South 
Korea could be better understood in a broader context of the principle debates in 
international relations theory on the logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences. 
The logic of appropriateness assumes a constructivist background, one which regards 
norms of behavior and social institutions to guide state action. From this perspective, 
states behave in compliance with norms because they have become socialized to accept 
norms and understand these behaviors to be appropriate (Finnemore 1996, 28-29). Norms 
not only regulate behavior but they also start to shape states interests, their roles, and 
provide the principles that guide states behaviors (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 913).  
Projecting these ideas back to the spiral model, standards of morally appropriate 
behavior specifically related to human rights become a part of states’ identity and start to 
define their roles through a five-step process. The processes include regime change from 
a repressive to a democratic system and domestic policy changes that mirror states’ 
concordance with adopted norms, which sets the standards for the normative obligation 
of states. Transitional justice norms of truth-seeking, prosecutions, and reparations 
become central in this process, as policies that provide accountability for past abuses for 
states. The norms help constitute a new social and political reality and a new moral 
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obligation for states, which in the final phase of norm adoption sustains compliance with 
adopted international human rights norms. These, I argue, include continued compliance 
with transitional justice norms, in the form of continued prosecutions of human rights 
criminals, distribution of reparations for victims of abuse, and adherence to the 
recommendations from truth-commissions.  
However, the analysis of the three states using an extended application of the 
spiral model and transitional justice processes demonstrates the challenges that political 
calculations present for sustained compliance. That is not to discard the positive domestic 
human rights norms progress that norm adoption and measures to seek accountability, 
truth, and reparations have made. At the basic level, transitional justice policies have set a 
standard of human rights domestically, which human rights advocates could refer to 
when states failed at complying with norms.   
Nonetheless within the greater context of assessing norm compliance, political 
dynamics of interests and strategic calculations had a comparatively stronger impact in 
problematizing compliance for states. Even after Peru, Uruguay, and South Korea 
adopted human rights norms, institutionalized them, transitioned from an authoritarian to 
a democratic government, and started transitional justice policies, new norms did not 
induce states to fully respect human rights. Instead, the three states’ behaviors were 
conditioned on internal political calculations of utility. For this reason, as Figure 5.2 
shows, Peru, Uruguay, and South Korea recorded only a partial compliance with adopted 




Figure 5.2 Norm Compliance Record Measure for Peru, Uruguay, and South Korea 
 
For Peru, depending on the president, his own past related to the armed conflict, 
and the presence of old power circles in government, compliance towards adopted human 
rights norms was affected. Calculations of individual political interest, which involved 
amnesties were considered before that of norms. The governments of Paniagua and 
Toledo, that came immediately after the end of the internal armed conflict (1980-2000), 
demonstrated respect for adopted norms. During both governments, the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission finalized its report, the state followed up on the 
Commission’s recommendations and implemented the Plan Integral de Reparaciones 
and started the preliminary process of bringing former president Alberto Fujimori to 
justice. Neither Toledo nor Paniagua had links to human rights crimes. On the other hand, 
non-compliance with accountability, truth-seeking, and reparations was prevalent in the 
García and Humala administrations, both of which were implicated in human rights 
violations. These leaders also had close connections with the armed forces and their 















presence thus politically restricted the status of compliance. The conditioned status of 
norms to individual political interests, hinted at the limited reach that norms had in 
fundamentally changing state behavior.  
Uruguay and South Korea faced similar difficulties of being conditioned by 
former regime circles and their presence in government. More specifically, political 
parties influenced Uruguay’s record of compliance with transitional justice norms of 
accountability. Political parties and leaders preferred to take an approach of appeasement 
where they chose not to interfere directly with the existing amnesty law. Even with 
Frente Amplio governments that represented the former political opposition to Uruguay’s 
repressive authoritarian periods, President Vázquez nor Mujica chose not to ally with the 
movement to derogate the amnesty law (Ros 2012). Moreover, the judicial institution that 
was supposed to preserve the importance of international human rights norms and uphold 
accountability above that of political interests, directly challenged the new Law No. 
18.831 that contested the amnesty law’s provisions.  
Korea’s truth-seeking efforts depended on political interests. Particularly in the 
post-implementation phase of the Jeju Commission (2000) and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Korea (TRCK) (2005), the commissions’ suggestions 
were selectively carried out by political leaders. For instance, progressive president Roh 
Moo Hyun promulgated policies that brought forth accountability against the 
conservative bloc, conservative president Lee Myung Bak preferred to hold back in 
complying with the commissioners’ recommendations and launched his own truth-
seeking efforts. Additionally, the commissions’ final reports faced issues of objectivity, 
as depending on the government that established each truth-commission, the findings 
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varied. For example, the Jeju Commission created during a progressive administration, 
neglected to include the violence from the Namro political party (leftist political party) 
against local state personnel and civilians during the April 3 massacre. The 
Commission’s final report also provided a more pro-progressive rhetoric, to the extent 
that perpetrators of the massacre that included the Namro party and North Korean 
personnel were labelled as martyrs.  
The theoretical observation of the three cases opens up discussions on the 
argument put forth on the logic of consequences. Otherwise referred to as the pragmatic 
approach or the realist model, this approach argues that “decisions to address the past or 
avoid it depends on the balance of power between the former enemies during the 
transition” (Kovras 2014, 6). In the name of achieving political stability and democratic 
consolidation, domestic agents prefer to adopt amnesty laws to avoid dealing with past 
abuses. Part of this political behavior is affected by the distribution of power during and 
after transition. As “power and self-interest” become prioritized (Vinjamuri and Snyder 
2004, 352-353), actors in government calculate their utility functions and capabilities.  
Peru initially pursued norms of accountability and prosecutions by invalidating 
the Amnesty Law (Law No. 26479) and an Interpretative Law (Law No. 26492) during 
Paniagua and Toledo’s regimes. However, the continued power of the former power 
circles in government with García and Humala’s administrations, impeded compliance 
with accountability. As seeking justice and truth did not benefit their political standing 
nor their position as human rights criminals, they introduced numerous obstacles to 
thwart the advancement of norms.  
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Similarly, even in Uruguay, which was considered to have a consolidated 
democratic status and where the armed forces receded in political power, accountability 
was still conditioned on political calculations. The institutional capacities of domestic 
courts were limited in dealing with rights abusers as the amnesty law remained effective. 
Even after the amnesty law was legally revoked by Law No. 18.831, with declarations of 
unconstitutionality, the judicial organ demonstrated its unwillingness to address 
accountability.  
South Korea’s status of seeking accountability also were influenced by strategic 
calculations of utility. Kim Dae Jung’s pardon of former leaders Chun and Roh, after they 
had been convicted and sentenced for crimes symbolically related to the Kwangju 
Massacre, fulfilled the political objective of reconciling the past with the present. 
However, for victims and their family members, such decisions from the leadership 
undermined their rights for justice and reparations for the violations suffered. Even 
improved human rights behavior, in Korea’s case, depended on political conditions that 
accommodated to such demands. For instance, The Special Committee for the 
Investigation of Geochang Events was launched not only for truth-seeking, but also to 
bring credibility to the new government that emerged from a party alliance with former 
human rights perpetrators.  
The status of norm compliance hence depended on the individual political 
leader’s own rational utility calculations based on interest and determined their plan of 
action. Compliance with transitional justice norms and human rights norms were weighed 
against political interests, and the latter was upheld to obtain a quick reconciliation with 
society and stabilize the new political system. Such behavior was not only prevalent in 
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the period after regime transition but continued throughout the years after transitional 
justice policies were implemented, prosecutions against former heads of states finalized, 
reparations distributed, and truth-seeking concluded. These experiences revealed that 
political interests and not considerations of morally appropriate behavior were prioritized 
and upheld. 
The theoretical observations lead to suggest that perhaps it is early to expect that 
internalization of norms conclusively changes state behavior in accordance with social 
structures of norms. The literature on transitional justice and the spiral model of human 
rights change still remains theoretically useful and provides a clear “pattern of human 
rights progress” (Risse and Ropp 2013, 7). Yet, while the constructivist approach and the 
spiral model in particular, may be useful in understanding the global acceptance of norms 
since 1948 that originated from a process of norm cascade, there is still work to be done 
in explaining how and why a democratic state that accepted norms took a step back in its 
advancements of compliance.  
Rather, indicators of norms acceptance (e.g., transitional justice policies) do not 
necessarily correlate with the assumption that state behavior will be rebuilt on the 
premise of normative structures of human rights. To a certain extent, utility calculations 
of power seem to better explain the status of state behavior in the aftermath of norm 
application. Nonetheless, it is still important to recognize the extent to which the 
conversations on human rights norms have progressed in all three states as a result of 
international norm internalization. For the first time in history, Uruguay legislatively 
challenged the amnesty law of 1986 via Law No. 18.831, South Korea initiated numerous 
truth-seeking process that led to the first state reparations for victims, and Peru tried the 
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first democratically elected president and is continuing the pursuit of accountability for 
other heads of state. These examples, despite the room needed for improvements, have 
helped set a new standard for human rights domestically and brought transitional justice 
processes to the center of domestic political discourse on human rights. And in doing so, 
adopted norms have presented a new constraint on state behavior, pushing the state to 
consider more than its political interests and ultimately restricting the scope of state 
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